


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# IDEALS OF AMERICA





# Ideals of America

*Analyses of the guiding motives of contemporary American life by leaders in various fields of thought and action.*

PREPARED FOR THE  
CITY CLUB OF CHICAGO  
1916-1919



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## INTRODUCTION

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**A**N ERA ended in July, 1914. A civilization reached its conclusion. We are now far enough away to begin to see its affairs in perspective. Nineteen hundred and fourteen is detached from the present. The year so recent has begun to take its place with 1896, 1861, and even with 1775. This almost immediate past is already becoming as alien to us as are the epochs we have learned through the written chronicles of the past. What is ahead we cannot say with assuredness, although the rude outlines of the future are visible now to the clear-eyed as objects perceived in the semilight of approaching dawn. At such a season of transition it is, accordingly, especially valuable to attempt to take stock so that thereby we may cooperate with destiny in achieving a more satisfactory society.

With this purpose in mind during the early months of the Great War, George E. Hooker, then civic secretary of the City Club of Chicago, conceived the idea of bringing together leaders distinguished in many fields and of obtaining from them statements of the dominant ideals in

their respective spheres of attention. At different times, from 1916 to 1919, these various contributions have been produced. The goal constantly in view has been the cutting of cross-sections through several departments of life so that the truly significant motives might be exposed to useful consideration. Representative individuals have united thus in the endeavor to interpret the America which saw the initiation of the supreme conflict. They have spoken calmly—with detachment—for, with three exceptions, the chapters in this book were produced before Germany compelled the United States to enter the struggle. The horror of militarist-materialist imperialism was even then overshadowing the spirit of man, but the friendly objectivity of the scientific observer was still an attainable attitude in America.

As the originator of the idea of this congerie of efforts to picture the America that was, it is wholly fit that Mr. Hooker should himself produce the first general chapter. He has done this briefly and with felicity. Himself the civic reformer *par excellence*, he has centered his thought on the ideals, "the paramount wishes," of yesterday in the constructive effort toward the better shaping of America's true and fitting ideal.

Professor Bramhall of the Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, has illuminated in his essay the field of American political

ideals as he finds them arrayed at the beginning of the postwar era. He expresses the frank disappointment of many thoughtful Americans with the functioning of the "democratic" system in the industrial society of today, the disparity between the ideals of democracy and the facts of American life. "Democracy is an assurance neither of wisdom nor virtue in our day; but it is the best hope that we have of their gradual emergence." Professor Bramhall analyzes the forces which have made the American citizen essentially a "routineer" in politics and a worshiper of political dogma. On the other hand, he points out the many tendencies away from the earlier tradition. Tentativeness and plasticity, he says, are the characteristics of present-day American political thinking. "If we have courage," he concludes, "to trust the democratic method of growth and change toward democratic ideals, the patriot and the humanitarian may still be optimists."

Chief Justice Winslow of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in his chapter has traced the opposition, as registered in the law, between the old idea of individualistic liberty and the new concept of social freedom. With mastery he has recounted the meaningful readjustments which help to explain our ante-bellum civilization. Real equality of citizenship, not the hypothetical equal-

ity before the law proclaimed in an age of less complicated economics was, to Judge Winslow, the ideal coming into sovereignty during the years comprehended by his scrutiny.

John P. Frey, editor of the *International Molders' Journal*, and conspicuous in the intellectual leadership of the American labor movement, is responsible for the exceedingly able account of the ideals leading the workers' unions during the generation under observation. The drift toward equality which Judge Winslow saw in the decisions of courts, becomes in the field of toil the concrete human longing for liberty, equality, fraternity.

Dean Swanson of the Northwestern University School of Commerce took up the narrative from the standpoint of domestic business. He traced the intermingling of antagonistic motives in the commercial world with the gradual obsolescence of the *caveat-emptor* standard in favor of the ideal of social responsibility. Thus he outlined the obverse side of the human situation handled by Mr. Frey.

Mrs. Parsons also is in contrast to Mr. Frey. She held up for inspection that phenomenon of American life suggested by the term "society." In a scintillant analysis, Mrs. Parsons pointed to the new democratization, new fearlessness, and new freedom which tend to transform that old



exclusive group which arrogated to its own purposes the very word which binds all the race—society.

As the application of the scientific method has supplied the data which are disintegrating the older aristocracies, so an examination of the ideals of science itself is of assistance in appraising the past as well as in the proper effort to determine the probable future. Professor John M. Coulter does this from the vantage ground of botany. Science, or the scientific method, it may be noted, is one of the human products whose worth has not been influenced by the war. Its position, despite the revolution which is smashing civilization and building a new order, is still commanding. The ideas, which in themselves constitute the scientific method, are, moreover, to be grasped in many various places.

Along that pathway of mankind called "education," Professor Ernest C. Moore, following Mr. Coulter's more general statement, made his unifying collection. Professor Moore is very definitely a modern teacher. He is a prophet in that school, one of whose acknowledged leaders is Professor John Dewey. Professor Moore assembled the ideals of the diverse bands of teachers and threw the energy of his approval behind those purposes which through the classroom make for the same socialized liberty, the same democracy

of free men and free women glimpsed by other contributors through their sundry special avenues of approach. To Professor Moore there is but one authentic ideal of education. It is the process by which each child of the race, guided by his own interest, employing his own attention and using his own mind in comprehending the process of human living, becomes a person who thinks, desires, and acts as the embodiment of social laws.

Music in many phases manifests within itself the same aspirations for a more complete participation by the great majority in the pleasant activities of civilization. Music, furthermore, in education and in the wider community, has of late proved itself to be an agency of expression which both set free the noble emotions of the individual and supplied the impulse necessary to coordinate our socially inchoate communities. Professor Dickinson described persuasively the rôle this art assumed in the erection of a new and fairer democracy.

The events of the world struggle have induced many to look to religion in the hope that there solace might remain. Some have moved onward, saying to themselves with Professor Coe, "religion that supposed itself to be a monotheism of universal human significance turns out to be a collection of national religions each with its own god of war." That realization comes some-

times as an occasion of despair. But Professor Coe's eloquent and open-minded consideration of the state of religion affords grounds for a courageous trust in what is to be. The dogma of the brotherhood of man, so influential in political and social theory of the last generations, is a direct quotation from religion. Evidences that religion will fuse this revolutionary principle into human relations—social and international—are not wanting. Professor Coe for himself says bravely, "I bow my spirit before the spirit of the world democracy that is to be."

The humble posture assumed by the open-minded prophets of religion as they gaze upon humanity is paralleled by a similar reverence in philosophy. Professor Harry Allen Overstreet of New York thus maps the wanderings of philosophy in America and indicates the lines of development. Philosophy, keeping pace with the mutations of the world which produced and cherished it, has, like the arts and sciences, discovered the dignity of man in the mass and sought to lend its great stimulus to the furtherance of the democratic process.

In his brilliant and wise essay Robert Morss Lovett reveals the play of the democratic tendency in literature. The dominant ideals of literature are of the stuff of the forces transforming education or revolutionizing industry

and government. "The so-called degradation of literature, and the loss of its ideals," said Dean Lovett, "are due to the democratic demand that it shall serve the uses, not of the few, but of the many." Literature has lost "the obsession of eternity" and has been vulgarized while our culture, with universal education, has become literary. Yet literature is still a fine art. In truth it may be questioned whether literature as a superior aesthetic achievement "was not always, except in cases of sheer imitation, the unsought result of an unfathomable combination of the Maker's soul with that of His fellow-men—only whereas in the past it was only the souls of the few who counted, today it is the soul of democracy." Dean Lovett sees no loss in this. The writer is still the artist. "Naturalism, impressionism, symbolism, imagism, mysticism, come and go—a dust of systems and of creeds. It is hard to predict which devices among so many will survive the day which called them forth. Only this is certain, the true aesthetic cannot be imposed from without by individual caprice or vision, nor can it be recovered from the past by study. The laws of beauty were not given along with the Ten Commandments. The true aesthetic is the result of human need, human aspiration, human agony. It cannot be complete unless it takes account of the human experience of the entire race, in which

today for the first time in the world's story the soul of man is tragically one."

Finally after all these confessions the question still remains: Is there such a thing as human progress?

Allen B. Pond, a former president of the City Club, under whose auspices this assemblage of essays was prepared, has made answer to that ancient problem. With his forceful reasoning this volume is ended.

WILLIAM L. CHENERY.



# Can America's Ideal Be Consciously Shaped?





# Ideals of America

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## I

### CAN AMERICA'S IDEAL BE CONSCIOUSLY SHAPED?

By George Ellsworth Hooker, *Civic Secretary City  
Club of Chicago, 1908-19*

A PEOPLE, like an individual, needs a conscious and dominant ideal to evoke its powers, to integrate its efforts and to sustain its course against lethargy, illusion, and gusts of temporary emotion. A people should be ever striving to perceive more and more clearly and define for itself more and more perfectly what its true ideal is, in order thus to press more and more successfully toward its realization. To satisfy the human mind this guiding motive must be not only a broad and inclusive one, but a great upbuilding conception making for human development.

The terrible European drama, and events leading up to it, illustrates as does perhaps no other situation in history, the organizing and

energizing power over entire peoples of a dominant purpose. It is hardly an overstatement to say that in half a dozen European nations the idea of trial at arms has for years or generations dictated social legislation and commercial, industrial, and civic policies, as well as military and naval budgets. It has beckoned international finance, guided diplomacy, and marshaled the so-called balance of power. It has integrated both national and international policy. Its story marks in a striking way the power of a ruling aim.

The notion of physical mastery as between nations has never been a dominant idea and thus a consolidating influence among our people. Our social life has not been shaped and energized by a military program. But what equivalent have we as an actuating and molding popular force? Are we as a nation moved by or committed to any creative and absorbing conception of social advance capable of vitalizing and really organizing us for human progress? It is not suggested that we have had no conspicuous American ideas, shaping important lines of individual and social conduct; but have we today as a nation any great human policy giving conscious direction and cohesion to our life as a whole, so that it could truthfully be called our ideal? In so far as we are for "preparedness" have we in mind any

ultimate human attainment which we plan to secure thereby? In so far as we object to militarism are we essentially objectors—playing a negative and thus a necessarily weak rôle? Have we a yardstick by which to measure and compare both policies? In this confused world situation, out of which will come the watchwords of tomorrow, have we any positive and dominating idealism, verified in our experience or even delineated in our faith, which, as an affirmative aim, we can offer to others or invoke for our own guidance?

There certainly exists in many minds a distinct, not to say alarmed, feeling that as a people we have no such mastering aim; that instead our active life is marked by disorder and drift, rather than by organization and design; that we lack coordinated and directed movement; that the events of our social existence happen as a vast medley, rather than as consecutive parts of an intelligently laid plan, moving forward in stages of intended and far-sighted advance. This disorganization in action—wasting effort and retarding progress—betrays a prior moral drift, to which it is due. We lack clear convictions as to what the proper ends of society are—and this lack necessarily precludes a unified and progressive social life directed toward the attainment of such ends. This is true also not merely in the degree to which life's ends always tend to elude

definition, but in an unusual degree. There is an unusual sense of society's being without compass or goal. There is a peculiar feeling of bafflement at events as they crowd upon and against each other. There is a special sense of need for some adequate and up-to-date summation of our dominant conclusions about life, which summation might unify and enlist us for its logical program of action.

The urgency of this need is deepened by the unparalleled forces now awaiting release for social welfare. The powers of mind and matter ready in this age to be organized toward high and worthy objects are of unprecedented scope and content. The present-day economic and intellectual revolution has opened the door of human possibility wider than it ever was opened before. The resources of modern enterprise imply a rewriting of the aims of human society with the use of a new scale and a new faith.

The present is a fit time for this constructive effort by reason of the stage now reached in the modern transition period. May we not regard the current revolution in thought and belief, which has resulted from that in science and industry, as having run its necessarily negative and destructive course sufficiently far so that the rebuilding process may now safely proceed, and proceed in a

strong and efficient manner? Has not the ground been sufficiently cleared, has not adequate constructive material been accumulated, have not our minds been sufficiently liberated, have we not suffered enough the ills of divisive negation, so that the task of erecting the new symbols of positive social purpose may now be wisely and advantageously begun in a systematic manner?

The war too, argues for such new guideposts. The economic upheaval overspreading the world, the shattering of conventions which has taken place, the break-up of religious and political notions, the disclosure of concealed forces directing great world movements, the adoption of new social machinery for social ends, the demonstration of unsuspected powers of human inventiveness and endurance—these new conditions and dynamic events are an unparalleled challenge to the moral enterprise of society to mark out its future career on revised estimates of social conviction and human capacity.

In this loosening of moorings and this expansion of outlook can some semblance at least of the true spiritual and creative purpose befitting America today be defined, through attention, and become our rallying and dynamic aim? By conscious efforts toward clarifying and organizing our thought and feelings can the high, but hazy, ill-defined and ill-adjusted moral conceptions which

admittedly feature our life, be composed into the symbol of a fit creative purpose for tomorrow? Can we pick out from our common knowledge and real convictions enough threads of agreement to weave therefrom a positive, constructive, and truly great program of human development, which can hold us together and hold us to its course? Can we as Americans justify our occupation of a continent by unfolding and pursuing a beneficent, an upbuilding ideal, outbidding disruptive motives and matching the inciting challenge and resources of our day?

One may scoff at or write down endeavors toward comprehensive appraisal and guidance of social life. But society will continue its age-long strivings toward such premeditated self-direction. Men have always been trying to straighten the path of progress and strengthen conviction by undertaking, periodically, in Holy Writ, constitutions, charters, creeds, to define as clearly as they could the great objects of life, so that such definition might serve to guide action. This effort may be intermittent, but it will not cease. Despite its stumblings, we might almost call it the chief social effort of mankind, this strife for a better-piloted future. Without such determination of a long-range and paramount aim it is impossible to determine proper local and minor policies for the daily affairs of life. With

such determination the various branches of social endeavor tend to fall into orderly and cumulative sequence.

If the task thus crudely hinted at can be successfully prosecuted, if a more worthy, adequate, and dynamic objective for our social life, an objective responding to and illumined by current science and faith, can by conscious effort be set forth and made effective, this better objective must arise out of those which already exist. It must be a development, a refinement, a higher integration of the motives and aims operating within our present social life. Our ideal as a people must blend and bring to consummate flower the ideals of the constituent parts of existing society.

The first step in the task is then to learn what are the ideals, the paramount wishes of today, as found in the great divisions of contemporary activity. Wise answers will be given in this symposium, telling forsooth not what might or should be, but what in actual fact are the ideals of life held by those engaged in the main branches of current action, or expressed in that action, what the people themselves—whose consciousness is perhaps more richly furnished in this direction than we think—want life to be for themselves and for society, and what, in their own

strivings and work, they are trying to make it.

These answers, aside from their profound inherent interest, will constitute the material to be used in the next step, the constructive effort toward the better shaping of America's true and fitting ideal.



## II

### Ideals in Politics



## II

### IDEALS IN POLITICS

By Frederick D. Bramhall, *Instructor in Political Science,  
University of Chicago*

**M**R. JAMES MUIRHEAD, in his *Land of Contrasts*, written in 1893, says:

The American note includes a sense of illimitable expansion and possibility, an almost childlike confidence in human ability and fearlessness of both the present and the future, a wider realization of human brotherhood than yet has existed, a greater theoretical willingness to judge by the individual than by the class, a breezy indifference to authority and a positive predilection for innovation, a marked alertness of mind, and a manifold variety of interest — above all, an inextinguishable hopefulness and courage. It is easy to lay one's finger in America on almost every one of the great defects of civilization — even those defects which are specially characteristic of the civilization of the Old World. The United States cannot claim to be exempt from manifestations of economic slavery, of grinding the faces of the poor, of exploitation of the weak, of unfair distribution of wealth, of unjust monopoly, of unequal laws, of industrial and commercial chicanery, of disgraceful ignorance, of economic fallacies, of public corruption, of interested legislation, of want of public spirit, of vulgar boasting and chauvinism, of snobbery, of class prejudice, of respect of persons, and of a preference of the material over the spiritual. In a word, America has not attained, or nearly attained, perfection.

But below and behind and beyond all its weakness and evils there is the grand fact of a noble national theory, founded on reason and conscience.

And Mr. Herbert Croly, in his *Promise of American Life*, written in 1909, after quoting this passage, goes on to comment :

. . . . The trouble is that the sins with which America is charged by Mr. Muirhead are flagrant violations of our noble national theory. So far as his charges are true, they are a denial that the American political and economic organization is accomplishing the results which its traditional claims require. . . . If the substance of the foregoing indictment is really true, why, the less that is said about a noble national theory, the better. . . . His indictment is practically equivalent to the assertion that the American system is not, or at least is no longer, achieving as much as has been claimed on its behalf. A democratic system may permit undefiled the existence of many sins and abuses, but it cannot permit the exploitation of the ordinary man by means of unjust laws and institutions. Neither can the indictment be dismissed without argument. . . . A considerable portion of the American people is beginning to exhibit economic and political, as well as personal discontent. A generation ago the implication was that, if a man remained poor and needy, his poverty was his own fault, because the American system was giving all its citizens a fair chance. Now, however, the discontented poor are beginning to charge their poverty to an unjust political and economic organization, and reforming agitators do not hesitate to support them in this contention.

I quote from another critic, Mr. Walter Weyl, in his *New Democracy*, published in 1912 :

America today is in a somber, soul-questioning mood. We are in a period of clamor, of bewilderment, of an almost tremulous unrest. We are hastily revising all our social conceptions. We are hastily testing all our political ideals. We are profoundly disenchanted with the fruits of a century of independence. . . . The shrill political cries which today fill the air are in vivid contrast with the stately sounding phrases of the Declaration of Independence. Men speak (with an exaggeration which is as symptomatic as are the evils it describes) of sensational inequalities of wealth, insane extravagances, strident ostentations; and, in the same breath, of vast boss-ridden cities, with wretched slums peopled by all the world, with pauperism, vice, crime, insanity, and degeneration rampant. We disregard, it is claimed, the lives of our workingmen. We muster women into dangerous factories. We enroll in our industrial army, by an infinitely cruel conscription, the anaemic children of the poor. We create hosts of unemployed men, whose sullen tramp ominously echoes through the streets of our relentless cities. . . . Revolutionary and reactionary agitators are alike disillusioned. They no longer place their faith upon our traditional democracy.

Even the mass of men — that experimental, inventive, but curiously conservative group of average Americans — though voting instinctively, is beginning to feel that in essential respects the nation "conceived in liberty" has not borne its expected fruits. No one believes after this century of progress that the children of America are endowed with equal opportunities of life, health, education, and fructifying leisure, nor that success depends wholly on individual deserts. The "unalienable rights" have not availed against unemployment or the competition of the stronger. Our liberty is not yet absolute nor universally beneficent; our right to bear arms, our right to trial by jury, our rights of free speech and free assembly have been sensibly abridged. The slums are here; they cannot be

conjured away by any spell of our old democracy. . . . It is in this moment of misgiving, when men are beginning to doubt the all-efficiency of our old-time democracy, that a new democracy is born. It is a new spirit, critical, concrete, insurgent. A clear-eyed discontent is abroad in the land. There is a low-voiced, earnest questioning. There is a not unreverential breaking of the tablets of tradition.

I know of no better point of departure for an attempt to set down the contemporary political ideals of America than these contemporary witnesses. We have indeed lost some of the firm conviction of our national youth that we are the recipients of an ultimate political revelation. Not every feature of our political landscape seems now appareled in celestial light, nor have we so long trailed our clouds of glory without an increasing sense that they are being darkened with the soot of an industrial era. This land of ours trembles and waits.

To attempt to say what the ideals of America are today, then, is especially presumptuous. In doing so, one can hardly avoid the charge of being more dogmatic than the facts warrant; there are many currents and multitudinous dissents. I shall try to describe only what seem to me to be the ideals of the average thoughtful, public-spirited American. How many such persons there are I should be quite unable to guess: perhaps a million, perhaps two, out of a hundred;

and even they are by no means alike. But although this is so, the common denominator of their ideals is the common denominator of the ideals of America, and whether they be regarded as prime movers or as resultants of forces (for they are both), they are equally significant as an index of the movements of our great inarticulate national spirit.

This account, then, will be false in at least two ways. First, the run of men (and women) are not such creatures of reason as this description would make them appear; their responses are in general much more emotional and much less rational. And, second, because that is so, the American people, as a whole, is much less consciously touched with change, much more conservative in the matter of political ideals, than this picture would make them out. That is because (at least so I believe) contented people are, by and large, not thoughtful people, and, by the same token, thoughtful people are usually discontented people in this world of ours; and therefore when one is describing the ideals of people, thoughtful enough to have ideals of their own, one inevitably puts exaggerated emphasis on the critical rather than the complacent, on the inventor rather than the routineer, to adopt Mr. Walter Lippmann's terms. The great mass of us are routineers in politics.

Moreover, the maintenance of the routineer cast of mind is served by two of the most powerful engines of general influence: the larger daily newspapers and the public school. The magnitude of the fixed capital in a large modern newspaper plant and the consequent importance of its advertising and business connections make it unlikely that any great daily will be at all persistently a force for the reshaping of political ideals. Orthodoxy on the whole is their inevitable line.

Even more significantly is this true of the public school. Faced with the unprecedented task of assimilating copious and heterogeneous streams of foreigners, the American school has devoted itself to the inculcation of traditional patriotism and political orthodoxy more consciously and effectively than any other educational system, except that of Germany since 1870. That this was a necessary and an inestimable service is not here questioned; but the fact nevertheless remains and must be reckoned with. In the lower grades, through the celebration of holidays and daily exercises, the cult of the flag, the rather esoteric sentiments of *My Country 'Tis of Thee*, and the virtues of the pioneer era with illustrations from the early life of George and Abe, are efficaciously practised; in the upper grades this is reinforced by the teaching of American history, seldom later



than the Civil War, in which the doctrines of 1776 and 1789 (assumed to be identical) are usually presented as absolutes both of time and space. Nor is this intended as a condemnation of the responsible managers and teachers of our schools; overworked and underpaid, no other attitude has been possible to them. But there is unquestionably developing, and will now rapidly develop, if the account here given of contemporary ideals is true, such a sense of false dualism, of divorce between piety and life, as already exists among the more independent-minded pupils in most Sunday schools, unless these ideals are able to react soon upon the temper of the schools. That there are signs of such a reaction is not to be overlooked; but under any circumstances the force of the common schools will surely continue to be, and ought in measure to be, on the side of political inertia. Accordingly, such movements as the Short Ballot, the central control of local administration, and the closer union of legislative and executive branches have to reckon with the rooted orthodoxy of common school teaching as a very practical matter. Any departure from *The Fathers* or *The Word* has to meet not only the interested opposition of vested rights but the disinterested hostility which is the result of youthful indoctrination.

Usually the representatives of these two forces

against change work effectively enough together, although, as Mr. Dooley remarked of the Supreme Court justices, they often concur for totally different reasons. There was, however, a certain irony in their conflict over the proposed New York constitution of 1912. The leaders of the convention were men who had devoted themselves to the preaching of the principles of the Fathers and the iniquity of a departure from them; but as men interested in modern efficiency they proposed a fairly radical departure from them in the relations of the governor and the legislature in the matter of the budget. Immediately, they found themselves confronted (along with other opposition) with a deep-seated suspicion from the generality. Those so inclined may find a certain poetic justice in the fact that these leaders proved to be the most ineffective proponents of reform that could have been discovered. They were estopped by their own reiterated political ideals.

Let us come, then, to the thoughtful minority. If a hundred average Americans were asked what was the chief of American political ideals, ninety-nine would probably answer: Democracy, the Sovereignty of the People. As yet there has been no significant dissent from the doctrine of the Declaration that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. So much is

axiomatic. But if you were to ask why they were devoted to this ideal, the voices of response would grow more uncertain and various. You would undoubtedly catch references to a natural right to vote (and some of these would undoubtedly be in feminine tones); someone would aver that taxation without representation was tyranny; and someone, in senatorial accents, would declare that the voice of the people is the voice of God. But many would at first be silent. They have seen the sovereign people ruling at many primaries and elections. They know how many in the long procession at any polling place have never in their lives weighed rationally the pros and cons of a single policy or the candidates for a single office; how many never cast a vote in their lives for the general good, but always for a real or fancied special interest of their own—how many, indeed, are quite incapable of the idea of a general good; they know how pitifully many there are who in election after election are cajoled or bamboozled, played with to their own hurt by people who are shrewder and more unscrupulous than they. No, the voice of the people is not the voice of God, and your average American is not at all sure of a natural right to do wrong with other people's business.

Slowly, however, out of the confusion might come some such reply as this: Democracy is an

assurance neither of wisdom nor of virtue in our day; but it is the best hope we have of their gradual but slow emergence. This is mainly for three reasons. First, the broader the popular base on which your government rests, the more stable it is and the more stable is progress under it. All will have some reason to believe that the will they obey is their own will, and that the commands of law are self-imposed. All feel themselves more or less committed to the playing of the game according to the rules. Violent breaks with the past are less to be feared. It follows then that progress, though it may be slower in any given time than under the enlightened few, is likely to be more secure. Since no significant step can be taken until the assent of the many has been won, it is likely that a step once taken will not have to be retraced. The vanguard may have to pause for the stragglers to come up, but it will not probably be forced to give up hard-won positions, to fall back with heavy losses upon an army with which it has lost touch. Second, democracy seems to be the only promising device for keeping government aimed straight. Since we have definitely given up the Platonic notion of a classification of human beings in respect of essential worth, and come to the conclusion that the chance for a good life for everyone must weigh equally in the scales of state, then a wide distribution of

power is the best safeguard against the distortion of the purpose of equal service. Let a government be stupid or inept, and we may forgive; but if it persistently devote its powers to the service of some at the expense of others, that is the unpardonable sin. From that sin, democracy offers the best promise yet made of saving us. No critic or opponent of democracy has offered any practical alternative whatever. And third, democracy is the most powerful engine of general education. Learning by doing, improvement by trial and error or success, training for responsibility by the sharing of responsibility—these are phases that nowadays carry pretty general conviction. And if it is true that diverse as we are, we are nevertheless a common humanity; if, in the long run, it is impossible in any civilization for any lesser part to go permanently forward while the greater part remains permanently behind, then this enterprise of the common adventure may still command our vision. Democracy with all its disappointments and dangers, but at the same time with its recognition of human dignity and its faith in human improvability, is still the experiment for America to pursue.

So, I think, would your thoughtful American regard the democratic ideal; and if his attitude seems to have lost some of its youthful confidence and finality and to have become more tentative,

more empirical, more pragmatic, then, I think, as has been suggested at the outset, it will be fairly typical of contemporary political thought.

The second phase of present-day political ideals which, I believe, deserves attention has to do not with the method but the purpose of the democratic state. To a degree which still shocks the survivors of a generation brought up on Herbert Spencer and Manchester economics we have accepted the social responsibility of the state. The reign of *laissez faire* seems to be over for good and all. No longer does the notion that the good of all can be arrived at by a simple addition of the separate self-interest of each command assent; nor its concomitant notion that the chief business of the state is to keep hands off and allow the unrestrained enterprise of individuals as nearly free rein as is compatible with elementary protection of life and property. There has disappeared, therefore, most of the interest which used to be exhibited in the discussion of the Sphere of the State. It is only in utterances quite divorced from action that the Jeffersonian of today insists on his doctrine of a minimum of government. Today we are inclined to avoid dogmatism on this matter, and to insist that the assumption or avoidance of a new governmental activity should be decided on the merits of the particular issue, without avoidable reference to "principles." The cry of

socialism, too, though not infrequently raised, has lost most of its terror to non-socialists.

Does this spell an abandonment of cherished ideals? In an obvious way it does; but as superficial as it is obvious. So far as the American ideal has always been for a land where, as Lincoln put it, all had "equal opportunities in the race of life with all its desirable human aspirations," we are not only not abandoning it, but showing a desire to put forth efforts too long delayed and to take new risks for its truer realization. Physically and industrially we live in a new world. When there were still vast unappropriated natural resources and the call of the West still echoed in every young man's ears, we were probably more nearly in a situation in which the facts of life corresponded to the *laissez-faire* theory than any other people ever has been, and when, therefore, the equality of opportunity to which our ideal dedicated us could really be allowed in the main to take care of itself. The unmerited hardships which went inevitably with a rigorous hands-off policy were easily ignored in the clamor attending great and general successes. That the devil took the hindmost was genially included in the scheme. About the time, however, that the government officially announced the disappearance of the frontier, we began to waken to the fact that a whole concatenation of circumstances was



closing the avenues of individual adventure. Unmitigated freedom from state interference was beginning, to increasing millions of us, to seem to mean the constriction of actual self-determination within very narrow limits set by the growing power of private economic and industrial authority. The succession of the Populist movement, the Free Silver gospel and the Bryan Democracy, the Muckrakers and the Square Deal, the Insurgent movement, and the Progressive party, together with an impressive increase of the Socialist vote, was not "the blind fumbling of atheistic chance." That it was the duty of organized society to see to it that the equality of opportunity was a reality, not a theory; that we must collectively guarantee that the social environment gave a fair chance, at least, for a free and self-respecting life for every man, and every man's child; that the hindrances to the good life that a workaday world presented to the ordinary well-meaning man beyond his power to avoid, must, in justice, be avoided for him by the alertness and vigor of the agents of the common business—these were the new ideas that worked themselves into the inveterate *laissez-fairism* of our national thought.

But a warning is necessary. It must by no means be thought that this trend is universal, nor that all thoughtful people would admit it as anything more than a temporary departure from the



path of rectitude. It is beyond much question that we Americans are still more rootedly individualistic, that we react more instinctively to the appeal against government interference than any other people. The "state-blindness" that so impressed Mr. H. G. Wells when he wrote his remarkably keen impressions of us a dozen years ago is still with us, whether you call it by that or by a sweeter name; individualism is still the prevailing creed with us, even though it be worn with a difference. All that is here insisted on is the fact of the trend.

Associated with this change is another. The natural-rights theory is an accompaniment of the negative notion of government and is gradually sharing its eclipse. Just in proportion as the impression grows that the real threats to the equality of opportunity come not from the state itself, but from forces that we look to the state to restrain, our interest in hedging the government round with "Thou shalt nots" inevitably slackens. Bills of rights are receding from the forefront of popular interest partly for this reason, and partly for another: because of experience which goes to show that paper safeguards are in themselves frequently futile in guaranteeing the immunity we have used them to sanctify. The workman who sees the injunction deprive him, as he believes, of trial by jury, the accused man who receives "the third

degree," the radical writer who finds himself silenced by the postmaster-general, are inclined to lose faith in the traditional constitutional protections. The effective control of the forces that actuate, the spirit which moves, government are coming to be of more concern than the writing of negatives into instruments. Yet here again, we must reckon with a strong conservative tendency which clings to the old fortifications. The New York State Federation of Labor based its opposition to the draft constitution above referred to principally on the avowed ground that the convention had refused to insert a new article in the Bill of Rights. Their logical position should have been: "Give us a government that we can control, and we don't care whether you put in negative commands or not." But tradition was stronger than logic, and the fact that most of their members were at the same time asserting that the articles already there were not accomplishing the results for which they had been put in did not seem materially to affect their interest in putting more in. Here, as before, we may insist only on the trend toward a more lively interest in having a government which will not want to, rather than one which is forbidden to violate what are regarded as rights.

At the same time there has begun to come into existence an impressive amount of questioning of

the traditional use of constitutions not only to bind governmental agents in the interest of common men, but to bind majorities in the interest of established and traditional principles. It is only recently that it has been at all decent for historians to call attention to the fact that the Fathers of the Constitution did their work in a period and a mood of anti-democratic reaction; that, with great ability, they persuaded the giant of Democracy to distrust his own strength and to place himself under guardianship, to restrain not only the agents of Democracy and prevent them from betraying their master, the People, but to restrain also that very master from departing from the limits of a bond, which was, at least so it turned out, to be invoked, interpreted, and enforced by the courts. A popular majority disposed to the active use of its collective authority would naturally begin in time to find these restraints galling, the more so as by the lapse of time they come to appear not as self-imposed, but as the legacy of the dead. Now it is an unfortunate fact that even men who were innovators when alive become opponents of change, deaf to all argument when dead. A disposition, therefore, to be impatient of the dead hand, to demand the more complete enfranchisement of contemporary intelligence, whether for better or worse, seems to be certainly a growing factor in Ameri-

can political ideals. This means, primarily, a reexamination of the amending clauses of our constitutions; and secondly, a reexamination of the position of the courts as the trustees and executors of the political estate.

These general changes in our attitude toward the nature and the business of the state cannot help bringing changes in the attitude toward the structure of it. If the state is to be an instrument of social purpose, then inevitably it will be instrumentally regarded, not in the older posture of rapt contemplation and worship, but with a disposition to analyze and criticize the machinery of government and its aptness to use in much the same way that other human contrivances are criticized: irreverently and prosaically. The golden age of the worship of the Constitution is past. It is no longer a final and completed thing, the letter of which is to be religiously accepted by one generation from its predecessor, and as religiously handed on in scriptural integrity to its successor. In things political, the American people cannot be charged (or credited) with a predilection for change; but whether we like it or not, there is abroad in the land a disposition to regard the inherited structure of government as a set of devices, good so far as they work, and subject to alteration like other human creations under the teachings of experience. Let us hasten to add,

for reassurance, that as yet there is no likelihood that the burden of proof will be shifted from the proponents of change, where it may be admitted to belong, to the defenders of things as they are. All that the former seem likely in the predictable future to secure is the right, hitherto not in America generally conceded, to come into the court of public opinion on the merits of the case.

There are three movements in ideals having to do with the structure of government upon which I want to touch. They are: first, the desire for more direct action of the electorate; second, a decline in confidence in legislative bodies and a questioning of the whole representative theory on which they rest; and third, a weakening of the doctrine of the separation of powers and a corresponding movement toward the simplification of government.

First. This does not now take the form of a desire for the election of more officers, though inbred predispositions make us still likely to resist a reduction of them. It takes rather the form of a demand for the direct interposition of the voters, acting by ballot, to supplant, instruct, or correct their elected representatives—the direct primary, the initiative, the referendum, the recall. Of course, all this is steadfastly resisted; but it must be confessed that perfectly sound appeals to Mill and to the reconciliation of popular suffrage with

government by the best, through the beneficent operation of the representative principle, have, to many who have watched unrepresentative government at work in the United States, an unfortunately hollow ring. The more thoughtful of the advocates of these innovations declare that their purpose is not to destroy the representative principle, but to restore it to its once fair estate as an agency of the democratic purpose; and to quiet the alarm of their opponents, they point to the underestimated force of popular inertia, to the pretty steadily conservative bent of the American electorate, and the rare occurrence and comparatively low pitch of those "waves of popular passion" which the Fathers feared. These demands are however important rather as symptoms than as substantial transformations of our political forms. It is apparent that their basis is in part the same as that of the next movement.

Second. The dissatisfaction with legislatures is notorious. We are usually told that the reason for it is that we do not elect good enough men; but what truth there is in this easy statement is truism. The fact that this feeling applies not to the two houses of Congress only, but to state legislatures (and both houses of them), and to city councils as well, and not for one year, but for a generation, leads the thoughtful to a search for more fundamental explanations. Once pop-

ular legislatures were the visible embodiment of the democratic ideal; now there is almost none so poor to do them reverence. That practically all advanced countries deplore a similar decline in legislatures has not yet struck the American consciousness; if it had, we might find a doleful consolation in it. In truth, the reasons are probably spread large on the surface of national life. The legislature a hundred years ago was the one meeting of minds touched with a public consciousness; public opinion was practically within its four walls. Now, with the spread of general education, the coming of rapid transportation and communication, the telegraph, the cheap newspaper, and the great news services, that is no longer so. The dignity and prestige of the legislative function, and its attractiveness to ambitious men, have suffered a relative depression. But there has also been an absolute depression, due partly to the reaction of these things just mentioned, but largely, I venture to say, to the coming in of the era of capitalist enterprise and the opportunities both for offense and defense which the traditional legislative structure and the circumstances of popular election offered.

Whether these explanations be accepted or not, the situation is here. When a man so far removed from destructive radicalism as Mr. Root is reputed to be, declared in 1912 that the govern-



ment of New York had been for a generation about as representative as that of Venezuela, such dissent as there was must have been expressed in the newspapers of Venezuela. What the contemporary ideals for reconstruction are, however, is by no means so clear. We may notice one new current, the volume of which is likely to grow, viz.: that away from an exclusively geographical basis of representation. An increasing number of reflective people is asking why it should be that the one criterion for the formation of a constituency should be a greater or less propinquity of the dwelling houses of its members. Is the fact that people live somewhere near one another (or, in cities, that they sleep, rather, in the same quarter of town) the only or even the most significant fact on which to base community of representation? What of community of thought and purpose? Of interest? Of calling? Can we hope on a purely geographic basis ever to get a legislature which is a true picture of the public mind? In the past, these questions have been raised chiefly by the rather academic advocates of "proportional representation;" but recently there have been added to these, from the industrial side, the advocates of group representation, of guild-socialism, of economic federalism. It is too early yet to say whether these ideas will grow powerful enough in this country to modify our legislative, if



not indeed our whole state structure. Give a continuance of present dissatisfaction, and we may guess that they will.

Third. Dogmas have had a tenacious grip on the American political mind. Of this there is no more striking illustration than the persistence of the theory of the separation of powers. Originating in a faulty description of the English constitution by a Frenchman, it suited the current run of political thought in the authors of the constitution. The separation of government into three distinct bodies, the placing of each in a distinct orbit, the establishment of checks and balances, the nice adjustment of centripetal and centrifugal forces, so that once started the stately processions of political bodies might go unalterably on under the compulsion of forces not unlike that which doth preserve the stars from wrong—all this was, as Professor Wilson of Princeton said, some years ago, a typically eighteenth century, mechanical, Newtonian theory. But we have passed over into the age of Darwin, of organic evolution, and biological science; and at the same time, as already has been observed, into the positive and active, rather than the negative and passive state. The doctrine of separation of powers was never a working doctrine and it has never worked; and although it is still frequently invoked, it is undoubtedly losing power. The

agitation for a budget system, the commission system for cities, are both indications of its weakening hold.

Especially is the decay of the separation of powers theory opening the way for a frank recognition of the changed position of the executive. We are beginning to cease apologizing for the exercise of executive leadership, and to accept that leadership as a part of our working ideals. It is fairly safe to predict that, with some safeguards against the use of illegitimate weapons, the executive will be definitely accepted as a voice of the public purpose and a formulator of public policies. The shape this is likely to take—whether it will approximate to the forms in which executive leadership already is recognized in practically every other significant government than our own, or find new forms more indigenous—need not detain us here.

Finally, let us return to the characterization of our contemporary political ideals with which this paper began. The impression which I have intended to keep in mind throughout has been that of tentativeness and plasticity. We have the sense of having left an era behind, and of facing an era whose main forces we cannot at all measure. The one thing, I think, that we are sure of is that there is no sureness in anything political except the fundamental purpose to realize a truer

justice, a fairer equality of opportunity for every child born into the country; and a faith in the realization of that purpose through the active co-operation of all. In that deepest sense of democracy, the indefinite improvability of all manner of men, we have so far kept the faith. If there is a disposition to discard old ideals, then, it is the minor ones that we abandon, and only for the purpose of pushing on more resolutely toward the greater ideal we have always professed.

That there are dangers ahead, no lover of his country, no one who "finds in her a bulwark for the cause of men," can or would deny. And the greatest of these dangers is that we may, through lethargy or selfish blindness allow that fatal cleavage to develop between the noble profession of the great ideal which has always been America's pride, and the concrete realization of it. If we blindly allow a political system theoretically democratic to be thwarted by the pressure of an economic system not democratic; if we permit inherited forms to be not channels for political progress but obstacles to it, then we shall really have jeopardized American political ideals. The only rock on which we are in great danger of splitting is a growing sense of the futility of the democratic method, in its visible forms, for reaching the democratic goal; that distrust of political action and disposition toward substitut-

ing "direct action" for it which too complacent a clinging to old ideals of form and function alone is capable of producing in any considerable part of the American people. If we have courage to trust the democratic method of growth and change toward democratic ideals, the patriot and the humanitarian may still be optimists.

### III

#### Ideals in Law



### III

## IDEALS IN LAW

By John Bradley Winslow, *Chief Justice*  
*Supreme Court of Wisconsin*

IT HAS been said that "ideals are like stars; you will not succeed in touching them with your hands, but, like the seafaring man on the waste of waters, you choose them as your guides, and following them you reach your destiny." A civilization destitute of high ideals is at best only a gilded barbarism; a people which sets up for worship the trinity of wealth, luxury, and frivolous amusement has its doom already pronounced.

Industry, commerce, science, art, education, social intercourse, in fact all the organized human activities which make up what we call civilization depend for their existence upon social order, and social order in turn is dependent upon the effective protection of life, liberty, and property by law. Hence it is hardly too much to say that civilization is really law, or at least that it cannot exist in the absence of law; and if this be true then it must also be true that the civilization of any

people or any age must find accurate expression in the laws of that people or age.

A fundamental ideal which is not ultimately reflected with greater or less fidelity in the law can hardly be called an ideal of the age but rather the ideal of a few individuals or of a class. Yet the ideal must, of course, precede the law and frequently exists for a long time before it crystallizes into law. The reasons are obvious. Ethical and moral standards change from century to century but the change is only gradual. The law represents the prevailing thought at the time of its adoption. Manifestly there will be no change in the law until the new thought has become dominant and very markedly dominant. It must have passed the stage of mere agitation, however vigorous the agitation may be, and reached the point where it is accepted by the majority of the electorate before it can hope to find expression in law.

Especially is this true under a government which, like our own, is based upon an unyielding written constitution. Here the ideas and ideals dominant at the time of the adoption of the Constitution have been enacted into fundamental law which can be changed only after a long and laborious process, generally including the approval of two legislatures and a referendum vote by the people. It is very manifest that substan-



tial changes cannot be expected in constitutional provisions until the new idea has been long debated and has become overwhelmingly strong.

This is not to say that written constitutions are undesirable, nor even that the amendment of such constitutions should be made easier of accomplishment. I believe in the written constitution and also believe that it should not be subject to quick and easy change to suit the popular whim of the moment, but I have no brief on those propositions to present. After all is said that may be said, the fact remains that the existence of such a constitution unquestionably postpones and makes more difficult the incorporation of new and fundamental ideas into the law and this is the point which I wished to emphasize.

No more striking example can be found of the crystallization of governmental and political ideals into fundamental law than that furnished by the constitutions of the American states. What may be called the constitution-making period of our history (comprising the latter part of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries) was a period when new ideas and ideals of the most advanced character dominated American thought. Never was there a more favorable opportunity for the incorporation of ideals into basic law than the opportunity then presented.

Here were empires in the making; here was

being done what never before had been done, at least on any such magnificent scale, namely, the creation out of hand of sovereign states composed of highly civilized, intelligent people conscious of their power and confident of their ability. No time-hardened precedents barred the way; no hereditary privileges, secular or ecclesiastical, had to be dislodged; no hoary abuses buttressed behind the walls of centuries frowned defiance on the champions of the new order of things.

We know very well that the governmental ideal which was then dominant was the great ideal of untrammelled, individual liberty and we also know very well why this was so. Centuries of arbitrary and irresponsible government had produced its natural result—a result proclaimed as well by the Parisian mob which stormed the Bastille as by the embattled farmers of Lexington and Concord whose shots rang around the world—and that result was a conviction that the individual citizen, whatever his station, was entitled to the greatest liberty of action consistent with the existence of a stable government.

Here was unquestionably the dominant governmental ideal of our fathers and it needs only the most superficial examination of our constitutions, state and federal, to see that they crystallized that ideal in sweeping and unmistakable language in the fundamental law of every American state.

Every demand and every guaranty in the bill of rights (which is preserved at length in nearly or quite all of the American constitutions) breathes forth this idea in one form or another. Examine these guarantees and see if this is not so. First comes the statement of the inherent or inalienable rights of man, the rights to life, liberty, and property, or, as it is sometimes put, the pursuit of happiness. Then come the more concrete rights: the right of free speech, of jury trial, of a uniform rule of taxation, of petition, of freedom of worship, of a certain remedy in the law for all wrongs, of an impartial jury and a speedy trial in all criminal prosecutions, as well as the right to confront the witnesses and be informed of the charge and be heard by himself and by counsel. Then come what may be called the negative rights such as the provisions prohibiting two prosecutions for the same offense, self incrimination, unreasonable searches and seizures, cruel and unusual punishments, the impairment of the obligations of contracts, imprisonment for debt, *ex post facto* legislation, the taking of private property without compensation, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in time of peace, the establishment of religious tests, and the elevation of the military above the civil power.

In one way or another they are all intended to put into effect the fundamental idea that the citi-

zen of a democracy is entitled to the widest liberty of individual action consistent with the existence of good government.

This is doubtless the basic principle upon which a democracy rests, in fact it seems that there can be no real democracy unless this principle be paramount and supreme. But it is, of course, an abstract idea; it does not carry with it any test by which it may be infallibly interpreted in any given case; it may mean one thing to one mind and another thing to another; indeed it may mean different things to the same mind under different conditions.

The original constitution makers lived and wrote at a time when life was simple, wants few, and the population scattered; a time when there were no great cities, no congested areas of population and everyone had or might have elbow-room and to spare. They knew that arbitrary power in the past had confiscated property under the guise of taxation, set at naught contracts and contract rights, denied religious freedom, bullied the courts, made the administration of justice a mockery, suppressed free speech, imprisoned the citizen without trial, hurried innocent men to the dungeon and the headsman's block and interfered with the exercise of the most fundamental human rights, and these were the things which they had in mind when they framed the bill of rights.

Moreover the wondrous idea that all men were equal filled the air, not merely equal before the law but substantially equal in opportunity and ability to defend their right. Any boy might aspire to the presidency. All that any citizen needed or deserved was a fair field. Never was there a time, probably, when this theory came so near being true as in America a century ago; nevertheless we know it was not really true then and is much further from the truth now. But it was unquestionably the prevalent and preponderating idea at the time the early constitutions were written, and under its influence the sweeping commands and prohibitions of the constitutions were made. The idea was, let every citizen have precisely the same abstract rights and let him defend them as best he may; this makes a democracy; this carries out the glorious idea that every citizen is the master of his own destiny and carves out his career with his own unaided arm.

The constitution makers were great men; we shall always rightly reverence them; yet they were not omniscient. They could not look into the distant future and see how rapidly the beautiful theory of equal opportunity was to fade. Nor could they suppose that conditions might so change that some of the very provisions which to them seemed necessary to protect the individual from executive tyranny would be invoked to justify a

tyranny quite different in its nature but quite as disastrous in its effects upon the citizen and upon the state.

They could hardly imagine that the time would ever come when it would be thought by anybody that public welfare would demand that a man be protected from his own acts, or in other words that his right to contract with regard to his own labor should be limited; they could not suppose that it could ever be seriously claimed that inequality in taxation might constitute the truest equality, that private property or property rights ought sometimes to be sacrificed for the benefit of the public, that any business naturally lawful ought to be controlled by the state, or that the remedies afforded by the courts had become inadequate. And yet the time has come when these things, and many more of like nature, are said, not because there was any serious need that they should be said at the time the first constitutions were written, but because of the enormous change in the conditions of life, both material and intellectual, which a century has produced.

Great as this change was, its significance was long unappreciated, nor was this strange; the wonders of the industrial revolution wrought by nineteenth century inventions came so rapidly that there was little opportunity for any thought save thoughts of amazement and exultation. Had this

been otherwise, however, the great national problems involved in the Civil War—the abolition of slavery and the reconstruction of civil government in the South—so fully occupied the public mind for more than a quarter of a century that there was room for little else. In the presence of problems like these, mere sociological and economic questions were dwarfed into insignificance.

The great and significant legal ideal of that period was the ideal of equal rights to a greatly wronged race and this ideal was wrought into the national Constitution by the Fourteenth Amendment which forbade any state to abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or to deny to any person the equal protection of the laws.

This amendment embodied in the fullest degree the idea of the inviolability of property and property rights; its purpose was to place the Negro on the same plane in these respects as the white man; the thought that individual freedom could ever be too carefully protected had not yet appeared; the amendment marked the high tide of individualism; it was not long before the subsidence of the tide began. Not that the abstract ideal of the greatest individual liberty consistent with good government was to be rejected, but that it began to be realized that it was entirely



possible that too much thought had been bestowed upon the individual, and too little thought upon the mass.

I would not be understood as indicating that there had been no legislation aiming to ameliorate the condition of the poor and the unfortunate prior to the Civil War. The quarter century following the panic of 1837 was marked by much legislation, both constitutional and statutory, along this line. During this period imprisonment for debt was almost universally abolished; exemption of homesteads, household goods, and wages from seizure for debt became general; mechanic's lien laws were perfected; free school systems were established, and the protective tariff system, for the avowed purpose of protecting the home laborer against foreign, low-wage competition, became a national policy. Generally speaking, however, these measures were supported by humanitarian and philanthropic arguments and not by the thought that the theory of individualism could be carried too far. The change of thought on this subject did not become significant until after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.

It is scarcely necessary to enlarge upon the change of conditions which was largely responsible for this change of thought. The desirable public lands had been taken up, and thus



one safety valve for a constantly crowding population had disappeared; a nation principally rural in its population had become more and more largely urban; vast industries with armies of workmen had succeeded to the village shop; the laborer dealt not with an individual employer at arm's length but with mighty corporations whose officers knew him only by number; an enormous commerce, domestic and foreign, had brought wealth and luxury undreamed of a century ago; imperial cities with their magnificence and their squalor, their wealth and their poverty, their palaces and their slums, had come and come to stay; in a word the elbowroom was gone, and men jostled their neighbors at every turn; untrammelled individual freedom of action became impossible if men were to live together in peace and harmony.

The changes which have taken place since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in social, economic, and governmental ideals, and the extent to which those changes have been reflected as well in statute law as in the decisions of the courts are the subjects to which I wish briefly to direct your thought. It would not be correct to say that formerly the tendency of thought was to exalt individual freedom without regard to the welfare of the general public, and that now the tendency is exactly to the contrary, yet unquestionably this

correctly states the points of greatest emphasis in past and present thought.

The most superficial observer can hardly fail to notice that, during the last three or four decades, a number of more or less definite and radical general ideas have taken strong hold of the public mind. Some of them are very markedly humanitarian in their nature, some of them have to do with a more equitable distribution of the rewards of toil and burdens of taxation, some with a better control of the great public utilities, some with city building and sanitation and public health and safety, some with conservation of our national resources, both material and human, some with a more direct control by the people over governmental processes, but all of them in greater or less degree involve for their realization increased governmental activity and increased regard for the general welfare of the mass as distinguished from the abstract right of the individual.

Among these ideas may be specially mentioned the idea that under modern industrial conditions employer and employee do not meet on an equal footing when they are contracting or when their interests clash and that the law ought in some way or ways to remove or minimize the inequality; the idea that housing and living conditions in cities, sanitation, playgrounds, and the building of cities

cannot be left to the mercies of private selfishness but must be controlled by the state; the idea that the state should place higher education within the reach of all citizens; the idea that we have allowed large portions of our great national resources to go permanently into private ownership and become the foundations of private fortunes instead of retaining the fee title in the state and allowing use and exploitation only under such conditions as would conserve them for the ultimate benefit of the whole people; the idea that both state and national governments should undertake reforestation and afforestation to replace the forests which have been destroyed and prevent the serious effects upon climate, rainfall, flow of rivers, and erosion of soil which ever have followed the wholesale destruction of forests in other lands; the idea that combinations of capital and business tending to stifle competition are hostile to the best interests of the people; the idea that public utilities must be regulated by law both as to their rates and as to the quality of their service if the public is to be properly served; the idea that the public should be protected from the man who sells adulterated food and the quack who fattens on the credulity of the sick; the idea that property taxation does not result in a just distribution of public burdens but that the public expenses should be defrayed far more largely by graded

taxes upon privileges, occupations, incomes, and inheritances; the idea that our methods of enforcement of the criminal law have not been scientific or successful; the idea that the administration of justice by the courts has not been efficient; and lastly the idea that we need more complete democracies and that to that end the people should have the right to nominate candidates for all offices at primary elections, to recall at will officials who are not giving satisfaction, and to legislate by direct vote without the intervention of legislative bodies.

The order in which these ideas are here suggested is not to be taken to indicate in any way my idea of their relative importance. I have simply listed them as they have occurred to my mind. Nor do I undertake any argument in support of them at this time; it is enough for my present purpose to note their widespread existence and to give some idea of the extent to which the law has responded to some of them.

**Labor** legislation of various kinds may well be first considered not only on account of its volume but also on account of its intrinsic importance. Few realize the extent of the legislation, state and national, in this general field during recent years.

Early in 1914 the federal department of labor published the labor laws of the states in two volumes containing more than 2,400 pages. No

complete compilation has been made since that time, but the legislatures of the various states have added many hundreds of new laws to the list. Certainly the legislative response to the popular thought has been ample in quantity, if not in quality. In general these laws may be said to be based upon one or both of two general ideas; *first*, that employer and employee do not stand on an equal footing, and *second*, that it is to the interest not merely of the employee but of the state that the inequality be corrected as far as possible, because the state is vitally concerned in the physical and mental welfare of its citizens.

To list these laws would be tiresome; a statement of the principal objects sought to be accomplished by them must serve the present purpose. Among these objects are, the abolition of the company stores and the payment of wages in cash, the regulation of hours of labor especially of female labor, the prohibition or great restriction of child labor, the establishment of the minimum wage, the compulsory adoption of safety devices, the guarding or fencing of dangerous machinery, the safeguarding of factories from danger by fire, from infectious diseases, from defective ventilation and the like, the prevention of discrimination against union labor, the establishment of industrial accident insurance or workmen's compensation systems by which compensation for industrial

accidents not self-inflicted is at once made and ultimately borne by the public, the establishment of public employment agencies and mother's pensions.

This list does not by any means include all of the governmental activities in the field of labor which have become well established in some European states such as insurance against old age, unemployment, illness, chronic invalidism, and death, as well as widows' and orphans' insurance; nor does it include laws providing industrial courts or tribunals for the settlement of disputes between employer and employee, which successfully operate in Europe.

As illustrative of the general character of labor legislation and its treatment by the courts, it will be helpful to consider briefly the legislation requiring wages to be paid in cash and the kindred legislation which aims to abolish or remedy the evils of the company store, sometimes called the "truck" store. This subject is treated somewhat fully in the following paragraphs because it was practically the first of the police measures affecting the relations between business and labor to come before the courts and because in the contest over its constitutionality the principles which were destined to prevail were first distinctly laid down.

Most of the states have laws of one kind or

the other and some have both. The company store is, of course, a store which the employer owns and compels his employees to patronize, paying them in orders for goods at the store and thus selling his merchandise at a profit and without competition. The abuse is an ancient one and came to us from England. The statutes intended to correct the evils of the company store system either forbid the employer from being interested in such a store or in the furnishing of supplies to his employees, or else they prohibit the issuance of any check or order, in payment of wages, which is not redeemable in lawful money. Such laws are necessarily based on the idea of inequality in the position of employer and employee when they meet to make their contract, an inequality which the state ought to correct as far as possible.

They were at once attacked in the courts and with considerable success. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1886 said of the provisions of an act requiring all workmen in manufacturing establishments to be paid in cash at the end of each month, they are

Unconstitutional and void inasmuch as by them an attempt has been made by the legislature to do what in this country cannot be done; that is, prevent persons who are *sui juris* from making their own contracts. The act is an infringement alike of the right of the employer and the employee; more than this, it is an insulting attempt to put the laborer under a legislative tutelage which is



not only degrading to his manhood but subversive of his rights as a citizen of the United States. He may sell his labor for what he thinks best whether money or goods, just as his employer may sell his iron or coal, and any and every law that proposes to prevent him from so doing is an infringement of his constitutional privileges and consequently vicious and void.<sup>1</sup>

In 1899 the Supreme Court of Kansas dealt with a similar statute and, if possible, with greater vigor. That court said:

Freedom of action, liberty, is the cornerstone of our governmental fabric. Laws which infringe upon the free exercise of the right of a workingman to trade his labor for any commodity or species of property which he may consider to be the most advantageous is an encroachment upon his constitutional rights and an obstruction to his pursuit of happiness. Such laws as the one under consideration classify him among the incompetents and degrade his calling . . . it is in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in that it denies to persons within this state the equal protection of the laws.<sup>2</sup>

Nor was the Supreme Court of Illinois far behind in this Herculean effort to save the workingman from degradation. That court said as early as 1893,

The right to contract necessarily includes the right to fix the price at which labor will be performed and the mode and time of payment. Each is an essential element of the right to contract and whosoever is restricted in

<sup>1</sup> *Godcharles v. Wigeman*, 113 Pa. St. 431.

<sup>2</sup> *State v. Haun*, 61 Kan. 146.



either, as the same is enjoyed by the community at large, is deprived of liberty and property.<sup>1</sup>

It is quite probable that few workingmen appreciated the anxiety shown by the courts in these decisions to prevent the restriction of their liberty to make contracts. Indeed, it would be a remarkable man who could appreciate it. They had asked for no such relief, in fact they had been absolutely content to remain in their state of tutelage, but they had been rescued from it at the earnest request of their employers. It was all very confusing. An academic victory like this, achieved against his wish under the generalship of his employer and wrought out in the rarefied atmosphere of abstract reasoning, must have been about as satisfactory to the workingman as a "Barmecide feast" to the hungry.

In these opinions the dominance of the classic ideal of individual liberty is very apparent. The honesty of the judges who wrote them and the courts which promulgated them is entirely beyond question. They expressed ideas which for decades had been regarded as unassailable; especially the idea that the American worker stood on an even plane with his employer, that he was just as free in his choice of an employer as his employer in the choice of an employee, that he was a true

<sup>1</sup> *Braceville Coal Co. v. People*, 147 Ills. 66.

sovereign who needed no favors but only a fair field. It had not yet been perceived that there was a huge fallacy in this reasoning; that the employee was not always, nor often, actually free in his choice of an employer; that grim necessity, in the shape of a family to be supported or some other circumstance making change of location or employer practically impossible, deprived the employee of any real choice.

The end of these decisions was not yet, however. A similar act requiring all employers to redeem in cash all store orders or evidences of debt given to their employees was held constitutional by the Supreme Court of Tennessee in 1899. In the opinion in this case the principle of the right of the state to correct inequalities of position is fully recognized. The Fourteenth Amendment was duly invoked, but the court said, among other things:

The legislature evidently deemed the laborer at some disadvantage under existing laws and customs, and by this act undertook to ameliorate his condition in some measure by enabling him . . . . to demand and receive his unpaid wages in money rather than in something less valuable. Its tendency, though slight it may be, is to place the employer and employee upon equal ground in the matter of wages, and, so far as calculated to accomplish the end, deserves commendation. . . . . The first right of a state, as of a man, is self-protection, and with the state that right involves the universally acknowledged power and duty to enact and enforce all such laws not in

plain conflict with some provision of the Federal Constitution as may rightly be deemed necessary or expedient for the safety, health, morals, comfort, and welfare of its people. The act . . . is neither prohibitory nor penal; not special but general; tending towards equality between employer and employee in the matter of wages; intended and well calculated to promote peace and good order, and to prevent strife, violence, and bloodshed. Such being the character, purpose, and tendency of the act we have no hesitation in holding that it is valid both as general legislation without reference to the state's reserved police power, and also as a wholesome regulation adopted in the proper exercise of that power.<sup>1</sup>

This case was carried to the Supreme Court of the United States and that court in October, 1901, affirmed the decision, quoting with approval a considerable part of the opinion of the lower court, including the extracts just quoted.<sup>2</sup> The Federal Supreme Court had, however, met and determined a cognate question a little earlier as we shall see.

To sum up on this subject, and without going into tiresome details, there seems to be direct conflict in the decisions of the state courts on the subject as to whether legislation of this character is constitutional but the Supreme Court of the United States has settled the question that such legislation is not forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment and this must go a long way toward

<sup>1</sup> *Harbison v. Knoxville Iron Co.*, 103 Tenn. 421.

<sup>2</sup> *Knoxville I. Co. v. Harbison*, 183 U. S. 13.

removing the doubt thrown upon the question by the contrariety of opinion in the state courts. The strong presumption must be that future decisions in the state courts will follow the federal lead.

Another and more far-reaching class of labor laws are the laws limiting hours of labor and the conditions under which children may labor. So far as minors are concerned such laws have been generally conceded to be constitutional, but so far as adults are concerned the attacks upon them on the ground of interference with the free right of contract have been very numerous and the results have been successful in some jurisdictions, but unsuccessful in others. The story is a very long one and only brief consideration can be given to it here, interesting as it certainly is.

One thing perhaps may be safely affirmed: Wherever it can reasonably be said that restriction of the hours of labor as to either women or men is necessary for or conducive to the preservation of the health of the employees the courts will sustain the statute as a valid exercise of the police power. This result has not been reached, however, without serious opposition on the part of some of the courts.

The case in this field which must ever be considered as a landmark, or perhaps rather as marking a turning point in judicial thought, is the case of *Holden v. Hardy* decided by the Supreme

Court of the United States in February, 1898.<sup>1</sup> The legislature of the state of Utah had passed an act limiting the hours of labor in mines and smelters to eight hours a day and this act had been sustained by the Supreme Court of that state as a proper exercise of the police power on the ground that the occupations named were dangerous and unhealthy and hence that the state could rightly step in and limit the hours of daily labor in the interest of the health of its citizens. The case went to the Federal Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment was strongly relied on. The decision of the lower court was affirmed. Mr. Justice Brown wrote the opinion and his name would be entitled to be held in grateful remembrance to the latest generations had he written no other. The following excerpts contain the meat of it:

The legislature has also recognized the fact which the experience of legislators in many states has corroborated, that the proprietors of these establishments and their operatives do not stand upon an equality, and that their interests are, to a certain extent, conflicting. The former naturally desire to obtain as much labor as possible from their employees, while the latter are often induced by the fear of discharge to conform to regulations which their judgment fairly exercised would pronounce to be detrimental to their health or strength. In other words, the proprietors lay down the rules and the laborers are practically constrained to obey them. In such cases self-

<sup>1</sup> 169 U. S. 366.

interest is often an unsafe guide and the legislature may properly interpose its authority. It may not be improper to suggest in this connection that although the prosecution in this case was against the employer of labor, who apparently, under the statute, is the only one liable, his defense is not so much that his right to contract has been infringed on but that the act works a peculiar hardship to his employees, whose right to labor as long as they please is alleged to be thereby violated. The argument would certainly come with better grace and greater cogency from the latter class. But the fact that both parties are of full age and competent to contract does not necessarily deprive the state of the power to interfere where the parties do not stand upon an equality, or where the public health demands that one party to the contract shall be protected against himself. The state still retains an interest in his welfare however reckless he may be. The whole is no greater than the sum of all the parts and when the individual health, safety, and welfare are sacrificed or neglected, the state must suffer.

Here is succinctly and forcibly stated the new principle that the state is entitled to protect itself by protecting a class of its citizens against their own acts.

Notwithstanding adverse decisions in some states the view taken by the Federal Supreme Court has already prevailed in the greater number of states where the question has been brought before the courts, and there can be little doubt that it will become more and more dominant as time goes on.

What seems on its face to be a step backward was taken by the Federal Supreme Court in 1904

in the *Lochner* case<sup>1</sup> where a law of New York limiting the hours of labor in bakeries, which had been held constitutional by the Supreme Court of that state, was held not a legitimate exercise of the police power and an unreasonable and arbitrary interference with the right of individuals to contract, hence void under the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision was by a bare majority of the court and there was a very vigorous dissent. Justice Peckham, who wrote the opinion of the court, based the decision on the ground that the law was not really a health measure because it was common knowledge that working in a bakery was not a specially unhealthy employment hence there was no legal foundation for making a discrimination between bakers and other trades or occupations. I doubt if such a decision would be made by that great court now; however, the opinion does not overrule in any way the foundation principles of the *Holden* case but simply decides that it appeared as matter of law that baking was not an unhealthful employment and consequently there was no ground for discrimination between it and other employments.

Legislation limiting the hours of labor of women has been quite generally upheld on the ground of the difference in their economic and social duties and the importance to the state of con-

<sup>1</sup> 198 U. S. 45.



serving their strength. This view has not been universal, however, as is evidenced by the decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois in 1895 by which it was held that an act limiting the hours of labor of women in factories to eight hours a day invaded the fundamental right of a citizen to make his own contract.<sup>1</sup>

This seems now like a voice from the distant past though only a score of years has gone by. Those years, however, have been eventful years. In 1910 a law limiting the hours of woman's labor in factories to ten hours a day was sustained by the same court on the principle that the physical structure and maternal functions of women justify the discrimination between men and women, and hence that the act was a valid exercise of the police power of the state.<sup>2</sup> The earlier case was not overruled in terms. It was "distinguished" (lawyers will readily understand what that means) but the principle that it was an indefensible violation of the right to contract, announced with such earnestness in that case, was unceremoniously relegated to the lumber room of the law.

Oregon and California passed similar laws and both were sustained by the respective home courts and taken to the Supreme Court of the United

<sup>1</sup> *Ritchie v. People*, 155 Ills. 98.

<sup>2</sup> *Ritchie v. Wayman*, 244 Ills. 509.



States where the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution (though it had been working more than ten hours a day for many years) was again relied on to defeat the laws. Both statutes were, however, sustained; the Oregon statute in 1898<sup>1</sup> and the California statute in 1915.<sup>2</sup> A single extract from the late Mr. Justice Brewer's opinion in the first of these cases will show its quality and also show how fully the idea of the power of the state to protect itself and correct inequalities of opportunity and ability among its citizens has now been accepted by the highest court in the land. He says,

That woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is obvious. This is especially true when the burdens of motherhood are upon her. Even when they are not, by abundant testimony of the medical fraternity, continuance for a long time on her feet at work, repeating this from day to day tends to injurious effects upon the body, and as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being becomes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race.

The question whether laws limiting hours of labor for men in employments not specially dangerous or exceptional in some other way are within the police power cannot be said to be set-

<sup>1</sup> *Muller v. Oregon*, 208 U. S. 412.

<sup>2</sup> *Miller v. Wilson*, 236 U. S. 373.

tled. There certainly are a considerable number of decisions in the negative. In 1914 the Supreme Court of Oregon sustained a law providing for a ten hour day for males in factories.<sup>1</sup> The court said that it could not be said that the law would not promote the peace, health, and general welfare of the citizens of the state. This judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States in April, 1917.<sup>2</sup> In Massachusetts, however, in 1915, a law which provided that employees in and about railway stations should not be employed for more than nine working hours in ten hours time, the additional hour to be allowed as a lay-off, was held to be an unwarrantable interference with individual liberty and property rights and therefore contrary to constitutions which secure these fundamental rights.<sup>3</sup> The language sounds familiar. I venture to hazard a guess that it will grow less familiar as the years go on.

The material at hand relating to this class of legislation is very large in amount and very interesting in character but the limitations of space will not permit. Nor can I attempt to review the various other classes of laws which have been put upon the statute books in recent years in-

<sup>1</sup> State v. Bunting, 71 Ore. 259.

<sup>2</sup> Bunting v. State, 243 U. S. 426.

<sup>3</sup> Com. v. B. & M. R. R., 110 N. E. 264.

tended to ameliorate the condition of the laborer, or to remove the real or supposed handicaps under which he labors. Reference may perhaps be made to one very significant class of laws which has come into being within a very few years in very many states, i. e., the workmen's compensation or social insurance acts.

These laws were passed in response to a very widespread public demand. Prior to their passage, whenever a workman was injured and could not agree with his employer as to the responsibility for the injury or the terms of settlement, he was obliged to sue the employer, go through all the courts, divide the verdict (if any) with his lawyer, and come out at the end of long months and probably years of waiting either with a sum of money more or less adequate or with a decision that he was entitled to nothing, because he himself had been negligent, had assumed the risk, or had worked with a negligent fellow-servant. This remedy was a relic of earlier and much simpler days; the days of manual labor, of the small shop with few employees, simple machinery, and infrequent accidents. Modern industrial development requires, however, that the workman carry on his toil in company with veritable armies of fellow-men, many of whom he can neither know nor see; it surrounds him with mighty and complicated machinery driven by forces whose relent-

less strength rivals that of the thunderbolt itself, and it requires him to labor day by day with faculties at high tension in places where death lurks in ambush at his elbow awaiting only a moment's inadvertence before it strikes. It has created an army of injured and dying with constantly swelling ranks marching with halting step and dimming eyes to the great hereafter. Legislate as we may along the line of stringent requirements for safety devices this army will still increase. To speak of the common law personal injury action as a remedy for the problem is to jest with serious subjects, to give a stone to him who asks for bread.

To meet this burning question the Workmen's Compensation Acts have come into being. Different in their details, they have some characteristics in common. Generally speaking they provide that all industrial accidents resulting in injuries to workingmen shall be compensated for by the employer at specified rates during the time of disability, those rates being determined upon a basis of a given percentage of the wages of the injured person; if death results, other definite standards of indemnity to be paid to the surviving dependents are provided. The procedure is simple; a claim is made before an administrative board or judge, and the matter is taken up quickly and without legal machinery, the award is made and can only be attacked on the ground of fraud or

because there was really no evidence to sustain it.

These acts have been generally, though not universally, sustained when attacked as unconstitutional. The reason, doubtless, is that they have generally been made elective in form, i. e., employers could elect whether they would come in under them or not, and thus if they chose to come in they could not complain of any infringement of their rights to have due process of law because they had voluntarily consented to come under the terms of the law. It is true that election to accept the law was made attractive by a somewhat ingenious provision having some of the characteristics of a club, to wit, a provision that the employer who chose to remain outside of the law should not have the benefit, in a personal injury action, of one or two or all of the time-honored defenses, known as contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and negligence of a fellow-servant.

These laws have worked well; nominally the employer pays for all injuries, in reality he insures himself in an accident insurance company (which takes charge of and pays the claims made) and adds the cost of insurance to the cost of his manufactured product. In the end, therefore, the public pays, and when all of the states have similar laws all employers will be on an equal basis.

Such laws are already in force in forty-one states and territories and the Federal Government has an act for its employees. The New York law did not have the elective feature as to certain employments and was held unconstitutional by the highest court of that state in the year 1911,<sup>1</sup> because it deprived the employer of property without due process of law in that it imposed on him a liability without his consent and without his fault. Since that decision was made, however, the state constitution has been amended so as expressly to authorize such a law and another law of similar nature has been passed and upheld by the court of appeals of New York.<sup>2</sup> The compensation laws of New York, Washington, and Iowa have been sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States and have thus survived the acid test of the Fourteenth Amendment. The first two of these laws are compulsory and the last one elective.<sup>3</sup>

Much more might, and really ought to be said, concerning labor legislation, but I must pay attention to some other fields of legislation before closing this paper. I stop now only to observe that the idea that safety and health should be promoted in all working places has taken full

<sup>1</sup> *Ives v. S. B. R. Co.*, 201 N. Y. 271.

<sup>2</sup> *Jensen v. S. P. Co.*, 215 N. Y. 514.

<sup>3</sup> *N. Y. C. R. Co. v. White*, 243 U. S. 188; *M. T. Co. v. Washington, Id.*, 219; *Hawkins v. Bleakley, Id.*, 210.

possession of the public mind and to this end legislation providing for the use of the best safety devices, the guarding of all dangerous machinery, the prevention so far as possible of occupational diseases, the providing of safe, sanitary, and healthful shops has become practically universal, nor has such legislation been seriously attacked in the courts. Its validity as a proper exercise of the police power is quite beyond question. In the more advanced states these laws are framed in general terms requiring in substance that places of employment and exposed machinery be made safe and the administrative details are committed to a permanent body or commission which has power to inspect and determine what is safe and what is not safe. This commission calls to its aid the experience of both employer and employee as well as the knowledge of the expert and formulates the administrative details in the shape of regulations which have the force of law. Thus the adjustment to new conditions and changing methods becomes easy and prompt. There need be no long waiting for legislative action.

The subject of labor unions, strikes, lockouts, boycotts, and other contests between employer and employee covers so large a field that it is manifestly impossible to give it treatment. I would not be understood as minimizing its vast importance but that very fact makes a mere brief



discussion all the more unfitting. Furthermore the controversies on these subjects are still acute. Only in the most general way can there be said to be any general public ideals. It may be safely asserted that the general public desires to be fair both to employer and employee; it believes that the employee has a right to organize, to strike if he be dissatisfied, and to be free from black-listing; it does not believe that he is entitled to resort to violence to gain his ends, nor does it believe that it should be possible for the whole public to suffer great inconvenience and loss because of a disagreement between employer and employee.

The laws which will work out substantial justice to employer and employee while protecting the public have not yet been perfected although there has been much legislation. The historian or essayist of the future may perhaps be able to record the satisfactory solution of these questions. Certainly it is not possible now.

Passing from the consideration of labor problems and conditions, I would direct your thought for a moment to the very general public awakening on the subject of housing, sanitation, and living conditions in the great cities. The slum and the crowded tenement house are in many respects the foulest products of modern civilization, for in them the race is poisoned at the source; yet for



many years they passed practically without notice; they were hardly fit subjects to be mentioned in good society; nor was it realized that the state owed any duty to its poorer citizens to make conditions of life more healthful or endurable, and still less was it realized that the state had a selfish interest in the health of its citizens which would demand that something be done to remove such ulcers as these from the body politic. In most, if not all, of the states containing large cities where these problems are acute, the regulation of tenement building is now quite complete; human habitations must be provided with certain specified sanitary fittings and be built under certain rules as to light, ventilation, and ground space. Legislation in this line is rarely questioned in the courts, nor is it perceived how it could be successfully attacked. Playgrounds are appearing where there were none before, the old-time slum is certainly being crowded out, the city child is to be given a chance, the city worker is to have light, air, and healthful surroundings, the city itself is ultimately to become, not perhaps a place where every prospect pleases, but most certainly a place where even the poorest may live comfortably and happily under sanitary conditions and freed from repulsive and degrading surroundings.

The city of the future is still a dream city; its

domes and lofty towers gleam only in the imagination of the enthusiast, but they will come in time.

The Federal Supreme Court recently rendered a decision which goes far to remove the bogey of the Fourteenth Amendment from the path of the city planner. The city of Los Angeles passed an ordinance prohibiting the manufacture of brick within a certain specified section. Its constitutionality was attacked under the due process and equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court held it valid as a proper exercise of the police power, and used these very forcible words:

It is to be remembered that we are dealing with one of the most essential powers of government, one that is least limitable. It may indeed seem harsh in its exercise, it usually is on some individual, but the imperative necessity for its existence precludes any limitation on it when not exerted arbitrarily. A vested interest cannot be asserted against it because of conditions once obtaining. . . . To so hold would preclude development and fix a city forever in its primitive conditions. There must be progress and if, in its march, private interests are in the way, they must yield to the good of the community; the logical result of the petitioner's contention would seem to be that a city could not be formed or enlarged against the resistance of an occupant of the ground, and that if it grows at all it can only grow as the environment of the occupations that are usually banished to the purlieus.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Hadacheck v. Los Angeles*, 239 U. S. 394.

No more categorical and emphatic statement that private interests, even though vested, must give way to the good of the community has been made anywhere than this pronouncement made by the tribunal which has the last and decisive word on the subject. That this tribunal has responded to the thought of the time there can be no doubt.

Among the prevailing ideas of the present day enumerated at the beginning of this paper, was the idea that public utilities must be regulated by law both as to their rates and as to the quality of their service if the great public is to be properly served. Of this I would speak very briefly although the subject is one on which volumes might be written.

The prevalence of the idea is due to our dependence upon our public utilities and this is comparatively a modern development. A century ago the public utility had not come; life was simple, individual wants few, and individual resources generally sufficient to provide for them. The ordinary citizen knew little about gas and less about electricity; he drove his own horse, if fortunate enough to possess one, drank water from his own well, had no telephone, sent no telegrams, used no railroad, sent no express packages, and practically was independent of any public utility. No such life is possible today, however. We must catalogue our public utilities and try to imagine how

we would get along without them if we would realize our dependence on them. Neither modern business nor modern life could go on without them. The urban citizen of today goes to his business upon the city traction system, transacts his business with the aid of the telephone and telegraph, the express company, and the commercial railway. Gas and electric companies light his home, cook his meals, furnish his power for domestic operations, while water companies furnish him with water and telephone companies put him in communication with friends at home or abroad.

Many of these utilities are and must be monopolies and the necessity that the public be safeguarded from imposition, extortion, or poor service on the part of the utilities is patent to anyone. The power of the legislature, both to regulate the service and fix the rates of service is fully and freely admitted, subject only to the exception that rates must not be put so low nor service regulations made so drastic as to be confiscatory, and to the further limitation that no state regulations can affect interstate commerce.

Most, if not all, of the states have legislated in this direction and so also has the Federal Government. Time will not permit any review of such legislation; in most instances the laws are administered by a board or commission which has power to make regulations and administrative or-

ders, thus applying to particular cases and concrete facts the abstract provisions of the basic law. So long as such provisions are not confiscatory the acts of the commissions are fully sustained by the courts.

It is manifestly impossible for me to do more than mention the legislative activities, both state and federal, framed and intended to conserve our great natural resources in the way of minerals, waterpowers, forests, coal, and land; to provide for reforestation of cut-over areas; to provide for larger contributions to the public revenues by graded income taxes, inheritance taxes, and privilege taxes of various kinds; to introduce more humane and scientific methods into our administration of the criminal laws; to make the administration of justice generally more efficient, rapid, and satisfactory by improving the quality of the bench, removing the pitfalls in practice, and making procedure a means and not an end; to prevent monopolistic combinations of capital and restraint of competition; to prevent adulteration of food and the fraudulent imposition of quack medicines on the people; and to prevent the exploitation of corporate stocks and bonds with no value behind them. All of these activities bear witness more or less directly to the awakened public conscience of the last quarter century. Any one of them would furnish material for a separate chapter.

This paper should not close, however, without at least a reference to the drift toward a more pronounced democracy which we have witnessed during the last score of years, especially in the western states. This drift is evidenced by the very general adoption of the direct primary for the nomination of all elective officers; the constitutional amendment for the election of United States senators by popular vote; the establishment in some states of the initiative and referendum in very comprehensive form; the institution of the recall, including in some instances the judiciary as well as other officers; and the adoption of equal suffrage in many of the states. Much of this new legislation is hasty and to the last degree experimental. That any such direct and extensive control of governmental processes by the body of the electorate as is provided for by many of these laws will improve governmental conditions or be practicable in operation is a subject open to grave question. The argument in its favor is an attractive one; it appeals to the pride of the people to be assured that all political and governmental defects can be removed by giving the people direct control, but the truth of the proposition has yet to be demonstrated and it will take many years to demonstrate it, if indeed it be capable of demonstration. Speaking for myself I simply say that on these subjects (except

the single subject of equal suffrage) I am not yet convinced.

To me the future of triumphant democracy lies not that way, but rather in the way of less frequent elections, a shorter ballot, the election of a few officers specially fitted by education and training for their offices, invested with power to appoint and remove subordinates and made responsible for results. The people will retain their power by retaining control of the heads of departments, not by attempting to select and remove all subordinate officers.

We are certainly living in a time of great mental activity. There is much hurrying to and fro; a Babel-like confusion of voices arises from the great field of human endeavor; there seems little concerted movement; reformers arise here and there proclaiming the virtues of their own particular measures of reform and denouncing the nostrums of others. Some are doubtless real reformers and patriots while some are merely self-seekers, but the distinction is not always easy to be made. There is everywhere a confusion of tongues, the currents of thought seem to cross each other and unity of action seems impossible. Are we mere pleasure lovers and dollar chasers? Have we any high and dominating ideal? Is there any elevated purpose, any lofty conception of human betterment which is in control and which



is being worked out in spite of the confusion, the contradictions, the garments rolled in blood, the thunder of the captains, and the shouting? It is not easy to say, yet I have faith to believe that, after all the great American nation is sound at heart and that we have some visions which are being expressed in law. Among them is pre-eminently the vision of a real equality of citizenship; not the abstract equality before the law proclaimed by the declaration of independence and the constitutions, but an equality resulting from the frank recognition of the fact that men are born unequal in opportunity, ability, and environment, and that it is the greatest function of the state to equalize the conditions as far as may be possible, not merely by the philanthropic work, but by the curbing of privilege of any kind and by subjecting the unrestrained individual liberty of former years to the limitations necessary to accomplish the greatest good to the community. In other words, by putting into complete operation the maxim of the Roman law, *Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas*.

Can this be accomplished? I think so; but surely not unless God shall give us men and women cast in heroic mold; men and women endowed not only with the understanding heart, which feels and appreciates the conditions of the present, but with the philosophic mind which weighs with just



discrimination the accumulated experiences of the past; men and women who can withal lift up their eyes in abiding faith to the hill tops of the future which even now are touched and glorified by the light of the approaching day.



## IV

### Ideals in Labor



## IV

### IDEALS IN LABOR

By John P. Frey, *Editor International Molders' Journal*

IT HAS seemed to some superficial observers that organized labor's ideals consist of nothing more than higher wages, shorter hours of labor, more control, and additional rules and regulations affecting employment. Perhaps the ideals which have guided the trade-union movement of our country are not generally known to the public because trade-unionists have been more busily engaged in working for their attainment than in crystallizing them into set phrases.

In discussing labor's ideals, or the ideals of any other group, it must be borne in mind that human activities are influenced by more than one motive and that it may be possible to lose sight of the ideals which have influenced men because other motives also may have actuated them. We justly honor and approve the ideals of freedom and independence which inspired the American colonists during the Revolutionary War, yet without doubt some of those who were genuine patriots did not lose sight of the broad acres they

might be able to secure or the public offices which they might hold should the effort for independence succeed. These motives, however, if they existed, did not necessarily dim the high ideal for which they risked their fortunes and their lives.

One Sunday, soon after I became a member of my local union, I went to Boston to secure advice from John F. O'Sullivan, who, in addition to his newspaper work, was actively engaged in organizing and assisting the trade-union movement in Massachusetts. At his home I was introduced to Frank K. Foster, one of the most brilliant laymen whom the American trade-union movement has produced. While we were talking, a rap came at the door and I had the pleasure of meeting Henry Abrahams, who for over twenty-five years had been secretary of the local Cigar Makers' Union and who had served the Central Labor Union of Boston as its secretary for over twenty-five years.

It seemed strange to me to find an Irishman and a Roman Catholic, a descendant of the old New England stock and a Protestant, and a man whose ancestors had heard the thunders of Mt. Sinai, greet each other as though they were members of an affectionate family and then devote an afternoon to the discussion of ways and means of obtaining legislation which would prevent injustice from being done to the wage earners of Massachusetts, male and female, union and non-

union alike. I was able to understand that something which these men had acquired as trade-unionists enabled them to feel that there was no division between them because of ancestry, race, religion, or political affiliations, but that in the interest of all those who toil, they were as one.

The public gathers its limited knowledge of trade-unionism mostly from newspaper items and editorial comment, particularly when some acute industrial dispute is in progress. It knows little, if anything, about the activities which are carried on every day, year by year. Practically all trade-unions, for instance, have committees who visit sick members, attend to their wants, and see that comforts and necessities are provided. The newspapers seldom tell of the beds endowed by trade-unions in the hospitals of our cities. The public is unaware of the enormous sums of money contributed voluntarily by trade-unions for the purpose of assisting the distressed of their own and other organizations.

What is implied by these activities? Is it not that the trade-union movement has *brotherhood* as one of its ideals, brotherhood so broad and so deep that it obliterates the lines of nationality, race, creed, politics—brotherhood which extends without reservation to all of the toilers of the world? The space at my disposal will not allow me to present the unbounded material evidence

which indicates the existence of this ideal of brotherhood, but I cannot pass without calling attention to some evidences with which you should be made familiar.

For many years, members of the Typographical Union have maintained a home in Colorado Springs, where without cost members afflicted with tuberculosis or whose health has been otherwise impaired are given the care of skilled physicians and a home where comfort and kindness surround them like sunshine falling upon the flowers. The Pressmen's Union maintains a similar institution in Rogersville, Tenn.

Many of our unions pay out enormous sums each year in sick and death benefits to their members. The International Molders' Union of North America up to December 31, 1918, had paid out \$3,303,564.85 to its members in sick benefits alone; other large sums had been paid for death and disability benefits. In the year 1917-18, the national and international unions affiliated with the American Federation of Labor paid out to their members \$3,658,000 in death, sick, traveling, and unemployment benefits, and this sum does not take into account the enormous amounts paid out to members from local treasuries.

Trade-unionism in America is international. The boundary line to the north does not exist so



far as our unions are concerned. The delegates from Canada and the United States meet as members of but one organization. They have but one trade-union constitution; they have but one set of officers; there is but one treasury into which their dues are placed, and so far as their activities as trade-unionists are concerned, they are members of but one organization. But in a still broader sense the American trade-union movement is international, for it has always maintained friendly cooperative relations with the great labor bodies of the world. These conditions serve to indicate the progress which the trade-unionists of the world have made toward their ideal of brotherhood.

If we were to examine the constitutions of those trade-unions representing skilled or semi-skilled trades, we would find they contain provisions for the education of apprentices. Some, we would discover, provide that the apprentice, after a certain time, must be placed at work between two journeymen, so that he can have their assistance in qualifying himself as a craftsman. We would find other organizations providing for the technical education of apprentices. Again, we would discover local efforts, such as that in Chicago, through which some of the unions, the carpenters for instance, have made special provision for the education of their members, as well as of

the apprentices, in the theory and practice of their craft.

Some of the international unions, finding no other satisfactory medium, have established schools of their own, one of the best known being that organized by the Typographical Union, in which through a correspondence course the members are taught the theory and the art of their craft. The Pressmen's Union has established a school at its headquarters and members from all over the United States and Canada go to Rogersville, Tennessee, to increase their proficiency and acquire a broader knowledge of their trade. During the winter months, many local unions hold courses of lectures for the education of their members.

For reasons which it is unnecessary to discuss at this time, the trade-union movement of the United States has never been given the degree of credit to which it is entitled for the prominent, if not predominant, part which it has played in the establishing of our public school system. But a few years ago, the wage-earner's child was practically a charity pupil, the opportunities for an adequate education being confined almost exclusively to the children of the well-to-do. The history of trade-unionism in this country from 1825 to 1835 is filled with evidence that the trade-unions of that period were carrying on a tremen-

dous campaign, which had for its purpose the establishing of a public school system, supported and directed by the state, which would guarantee to every wage-earner's child the opportunity of obtaining at least an elementary education.

At a mass meeting of trade-unionists held in New York City in December, 1829, the following resolution was adopted:

Resolved: That next to life and liberty, we consider education the greatest blessing bestowed upon mankind.

Resolved: That the public funds should be appropriated to a reasonable extent for the purpose of education upon a regular system that shall insure the opportunity to every individual of obtaining a competent education before he should have arrived at the age of maturity.

In September of the same year, a mass meeting of trade-unionists in Philadelphia adopted resolutions of like import, the preamble of which read:

No system of education which a free man can accept has yet been established for the poor, whilst thousands of dollars of public money have been appropriated for colleges and academies for the rich.

At a trade-union meeting held in Boston in 1830, it was resolved:

That the establishment of a liberal system of education obtainable by all should be among the first efforts of every lawgiver who desires the continuance of our national independence.

And shortly afterwards the general trade-union movement of Cincinnati issued an appeal to the West stating that their efforts would be directed toward elevating the condition of the workmen and obtaining a national system of education. The trade-unions have been foremost in working for the passage of legislation providing free textbooks. One of the prime motives which has led to extended trade-union activities for the prevention of child labor has been the intention that the children of the poor should secure at least an elementary education before facing the problems of life.

But the trade-unions go further than this in their efforts to educate their members. Their literature includes the discussion of civic problems, civic duties and responsibilities, economics, sociology, and industrial history. Continual efforts are made to teach members those principles of self-government which are essential to every citizen. No group in the community has realized more keenly that education is essential to their welfare and that without education their ideals are unattainable. Trade-unionists look upon education in its broadest sense as one of the cornerstones upon which the structure of trade-unionism is erected.

Education then, in its truest and broadest sense, is one of the ideals of labor. As evidence, let me

quote a few sentences from the report of the Committee on Education which was unanimously adopted at the convention of the American Federation of Labor held in San Francisco in 1915. The committee reported:

Education is necessarily the foundation of any republic. Education is necessary to the perpetuity of any republic; it is therefore the essential duty of this republic to guarantee every child an adequate education. Everybody believes in education. Differences arise, not upon its value, but upon the questions of what a true education should consist of, who should be educated, how far and by what methods they should be educated, and what persons should conduct such education.

Education should include whatever we do for ourselves and whatever is done for us by others, and for the express purpose of bringing us nearer to the perfection of our nature. In its largest conception, education should comprehend even the indirect effects produced on character and on the human faculties by things by which the direct purposes are different, by law, by forms of government, by industrial arts, and by modes of social, economic, and civic life. Education should comprehend the culture which each generation gives to those who are to be its successors, in order to best qualify them for at least keeping up and, if possible, for raising the improvement of humankind which has been attained.

It may appear to those who have not seen beneath the surface that the trade-union ideal is simply higher and higher wages, shorter and shorter hours of labor, more control in industry and additional rules and regulations affecting la-

bor. It has even been held by some economists that the wage earner in securing an advance in wages is in effect acquiring what the stockholder secures when dividends are increased.

But what we must understand, if we are to grasp the trade-union ideal, is the trade-union viewpoint. What is it that the trade-unionist aims to secure through an advance in wages? What do shorter hours of labor mean to him, and why does he struggle so persistently and courageously to secure both? What are wages? What do they mean to the wage earner?

They are not so many dollars and so many cents—they are the man's life, they are the factor which determines what measure of decency, of comfort, and of opportunity the wage earner will have in this life. The amount of these wages determines whether the home shall be a back room in a crowded tenement district or whether it shall be a separate dwelling surrounded by pure air and sunshine and conducive to health and comfort.

These dollars and cents which come in the weekly pay envelope determine the quality and the quantity of the food which shall enter the home. They determine the comforts and conveniences and opportunities which the wage-earner's family can enjoy. They determine the wage-earner's standard of living. They deter-

mine whether his body shall be nourished and vigorous or whether it shall be underfed and weakened. These wages determine still more—they determine the physical, the mental, and the moral standards of the overwhelming majority in all of our industrial centers. If there is anything in the realm of human activities which has been incontrovertibly demonstrated by scientific investigation during recent years, it is that wages profoundly influence physical and mental standards.

The vital statistics of both Europe and America demonstrate that the home environment and the quality of the food largely determine the physical and mental characteristics of the toilers and determine also the degree of vitality with which their children enter into this world.

A recent federal investigation in Montclair, N. J., indicated that the average infant mortality was eighty-four per thousand, but in the homes where the lower-paid workers lived the rate was one hundred and thirty per thousand, that where the income to the family was twelve dollars per week the death rate was twice as large as where the income was twenty-three dollars or more. Analyzing still further, it was found that where the fathers were business or professional men the infant mortality was but forty-one per thousand. Among the higher-paid workers the infant death rate was seventy-four, while in the families of



the less skilled and lower paid it rose to one hundred and one.

In Johnstown, Pa., in a residential ward where comfort and wealth abound, the infant mortality was but fifty per thousand, while in the tenement district, where the lower-paid workers were forced to live, the death rate was two hundred and seventy-one per thousand. The report of the medical officer of Finsbury, London, for 1906 shows that the death rate of adults in the one-room tenements was thirty-nine per thousand while in tenements of four or more rooms it was but sixteen and four-tenths per thousand. The same report indicated that the infant mortality in the one-room tenements was two hundred and eleven per thousand while in the four-room tenements it was but one hundred and twenty-one. In the inquiry made by the Local Government Board of London in 1910, it was found that the death rate was fifteen per cent greater in back to back houses built in long rows. Statistics compiled in England some years ago indicated that the children of the lower-paid workers, at sixteen years of age, weighed nineteen and a half pounds less and were three and three-quarters inches lower in stature than the children of the well-to-do.

What do wages mean to the worker? They mean his very life, the quality of the blood that flows through his veins and nourishes his body,



the degree of vitality with which his children shall enter this world. They determine his physical and mental welfare in a predominating manner.

Why does the trade-unionist struggle for a shorter work day? Let the trade-unionists speak for themselves. They desire a shorter work day among other things so that there may be opportunity for leisure and recreation. They desire to terminate each day's labor with sufficient vitality left to enjoy the society of their fellow-men, to prepare themselves better, through study, for the problems which face them as wage earners, to enjoy some of the blessings which the Almighty has so bounteously spread at every hand.

The American wage earner knows from practical experience what it means to labor from sun to sun, what it means to give most of the waking hours to hard manual toil, what it means to return home so tired, so exhausted from the day's labor, that all his being cries out for rest. The trade-unionist has learned that housing conditions, the quality and quantity of the food, the sanitary conditions of the shop, wages, and the hours of labor not only affect his immediate physical well-being and reflect themselves in the well-being of his offspring, but that they also very largely influence his length of life.

I know of no more convincing statistics on this point than those presented by the Cigar Makers'

and the Typographical Unions from their records of death benefits paid to members. In 1888, fifty-one per cent of the deaths among union cigar makers were from tuberculosis, in 1911 this had been reduced to twenty per cent. In 1888, the average age at death of members of this union was thirty-one years, four months, and ten days; in 1911, the last year from which this data has been worked out, the average age at death had been increased to fifty years, one month, and ten days. In 1900 the average age at death of members of the Typographical Union was forty-one years and three months, and in 1915 it was practically fifty years and eleven months. During these periods the eleven, ten, and nine hour day had been displaced for the eight hour day, better sanitary conditions had been established in the shops, and the wage rate had been considerably advanced, in some cases almost doubled. These improved conditions had reduced deaths from tuberculosis over fifty per cent; they had lengthened the average life of union cigar makers nineteen years, and the average life of printers over nine years.

It is because of such facts that the trade-unionists see something more than dividends in wages. They see their very life and that of their descendants determined by the money in the weekly pay envelope and profoundly influenced by the hours

of labor during which they are called upon to toil. The trade-union movement believes that man was made for something more than mere labor, eating, and sleeping. It believes that opportunities for self-development are as important as labor and that, unless the wage earner is afforded opportunities for recreation and self-development, the standards of the mass of our people will go downward and backward instead of upward and forward.

The term I am about to use may not adequately describe the ideal which the trade-unionist has in mind when he endeavors to increase his earnings and shorten his hours of labor, but for the present let me call it "the ideal of a standard of living." The trade-unions believe that childhood should be dedicated to growth, play, and education, youth to character building, and manhood to the development of the highest qualities of citizenship. The wage-earners' standard of living, which rests so largely upon the wages received and upon the hours of labor, determines the physical, mental, and moral foundations of the masses upon which the structure of our American institutions must rest.

The masses of those who labor in our industries constitute the foundation upon which our American institutions are erected and the trade-union ideal aims to make this foundation deeper,

broader, more secure than it ever has been in the past, by continually elevating and advancing the standard of living through higher wages and shorter hours of labor.

There is but one more ideal which I desire to place before you at this time, and this is the ideal of freedom—human freedom, freedom in the industries, democracy in the government of industry, equivalent to democracy in the government of our country. No ideal has urged organized labor forward more energetically than that of industrial freedom. The trade-unionist's ideal is the full application of the principles and mechanisms of democracy in the industries and in the relationship between employer and employee. Freedom is essential to the workers' development and the trade-unionist can see no practical way of establishing industrial liberty except through the methods of industrial democracy. Labor's ideal is freedom—freedom to work out its own salvation. Brotherhood and education are essential ideals, but without industrial freedom it would be impossible to achieve the ideals of a steadily progressing standard of living.

Since the Dark Ages there have been three great struggles for the ideals of liberty. One was for religious freedom, the right to worship the Almighty according to the dictates of one's conscience, and some of the bloodiest wars which his-

tory records were fought for liberty of conscience and the right to worship the Almighty as men pleased.

But liberty of conscience was not enough. While one set of men had it within their power to determine the laws under which others must live, men could not develop as they should and tyranny flourished. And so other wars were fought, thrones were overturned and dynasties passed away in the struggle which men made for the right of political freedom, the right to have their voices count in the making of the laws under which they must live.

And while these contests were being waged, labor passed from slavery to serfdom, serfdom to peonage, and peonage to freedom, but the freedom accorded to workingmen in the industries was not that same quality or degree of freedom which was theirs in religion and politics. The wage earner is not industrially free, cannot be industrially free, so long as employing capital, by itself and without let or hindrance, fixes the terms of employment and the conditions of labor. And so the trade-union movement has exerted itself in the past and is using its efforts today without ceasing to establish a condition under which government in the industries, like the government of our country, shall exist only by and with the consent of the governed.

The trade-union ideal is equality for employer and worker, equality before the law, equality in daily practice, equality of rights and opportunities and responsibilities, at all times and under all circumstances. We hold that any people who would allow themselves to be governed by others without protest or who would waive their right to a voice in determining the laws under which they are to live would be servile and unworthy. We are equally justified in holding that workers who would be willing to have their terms of employment and conditions of labor determined wholly by the employers or who would consent to work under conditions in the fixing of which they were not allowed a voice, would be servile. The employer would be a master and the worker would not be a free man in the full sense of the term.

The ideals of brotherhood, education, a standard of living, and industrial freedom animate trade-unionism and it must be apparent that, to the degree that these ideals are realized, the physical, mental, and moral quality of the masses of our people in the industries will be raised. These ideals, which steadily have guided labor, have shone like a beacon light while labor has been tossed by the storms which sweep over our industrial seas. They are the ideals which have held trade-unionists together during their darkest


hours. They are the ideals which have inspired men to devote their lives to the trade-union movement with the same zeal, enthusiasm, devotion, and self-sacrifice which marks those who have some higher purpose in life than their personal comfort and self-interest.

It is these ideals, animating the army of organized labor, which hold out the brightest prospects for the future of our social structure and which give assurance that trade-unionism is a constructive force, accomplishing for labor what no other institution has been able to achieve.





V  
Ideals of Science



## V

### IDEALS OF SCIENCE

By Professor John Merle Coulter, *Head of the Department of Botany, University of Chicago*

IT IS necessary to define the term "science" as used in this paper. It has come to mean a method rather than a subject, a method which may be applied to any subject. There is a science of language, of literature, of history, of politics, and even of religion, as well as a science of chemistry, physics, geology, biology, etc. In fact, in academic circles every subject claims to be scientific, which means a point of view in reference to the materials of a subject. Just as such a claim may be, it is clear that in this series of papers, the current connotation of the term is intended, which restricts it to the so-called "natural sciences" that deal with material things. It would be unjust to the widening application of the scientific method, however, not to call attention to this restricted use of the term "science" as employed in this paper.

It should be remarked in the outset that nowhere in the world are the ideals of science

higher and more nearly on the way to being realized than in this country. We are no longer the pupils, but the colleagues of our foreign brethren. Science, however, knows no national boundaries.

The ideals of science at present are expressing themselves in three general ways, each of which must receive consideration. They are not mutually exclusive, but complementary. Opinions may differ as to the relative importance of these three ideals, but there is probably no difference of opinion as to their value. I shall present them in what I conceive to be the order of their importance.

The first ideal of science is *to extend the boundaries of human knowledge*. It sets up as its goal to understand nature. We speak of "conquering nature" and of making her a servant to minister to our needs, but this first ideal contains no such thought. To know nature, simply because it is wonderful and worth knowing, is what it means. In the presence of this ideal, nature may be likened to a great masterpiece, enjoyed by those who know how to appreciate what it means. To them its market value is no factor in their appreciation. To such an investigator, nature resembles a huge unexplored continent whose secrets are gradually, very gradually, dis-

covered. Something of the enthusiasm of the original explorers of our great western territory takes possession of him. Every advance into the new territory impresses him with the fact that it is far more extensive than he had dreamed. Every trail is worth following, for it means additional knowledge. Some trails may lead to rich farm lands and gold mines, but in exploration these are only incidents. To understand the new country, all trails must be followed and mapped. The figure has suggested the fact that this ideal of science is the ideal of the explorer, the ideal which makes all exploration worth while. Without it, this nation would have had the Alleghanies for its western boundary. Without it, nature would have remained a region of mystery, prolific in superstitions.

This general exploration of the unknown was once appreciated more than it is now. The original explorations appealed to the wonder instinct of a people to whom the new territory was a revelation. But after the territory became mapped in its rough outlines, the wonder instinct subsided, and people turned their attention to the farm lands and the gold mines and came to imagine that exploration stands primarily for these things. Recently, however, the tide has turned and exploration in science is coming into its own again. This is indicated, perhaps most

significantly, by the change of attitude in the scientific work of the government. The Bureau of Plant Industry, for instance, during the last few years, has been adding to its staff scientific explorers, so that more and more of its work is coming under the category of our first ideal. The reason for this has been the realization of the fact that practical application is sterile unless there is a continuous discovery of something to apply. Practice in an old territory is useful, but the discovery of new territory that demands new practice is far more valuable. If it had not been for exploration we should have been farming in New England today, instead of in Illinois; and if it had not been for scientific exploration our practice would have remained that of a century ago. This shift in the attitude of a government bureau indicates a shift in the attitude, not of the representative men engaged in the scientific work of the government, but in the attitude of the people, who through their representatives permit such work.

This attitude of the government is expressing itself also in the developing ideals of agricultural experiment stations, which were formerly schools for apprentices, but which are now becoming rapidly schools of science. It is expressing itself also in the endowment of institutions for research, such as the Carnegie Institution and the Rocke-

feller Institute. Furthermore, the general growth of this ideal is being felt in the universities, those notorious hotbeds of pure science, in the increasing attendance of practical students who have discovered that they must know science and must be able to explore.

Cooperation in research is the scientific slogan of today, and we are moving rapidly toward the time when every man who has the ability to explore shall have the opportunity. In other words, this country is entering upon its second period of exploration; this time not of territory but of nature.

That scientific exploration is entering upon an advanced stage of its development is shown by the fact that it is proceeding in its method from analysis to synthesis. Until recently, progress in science was marked by an increasing segregation of subjects, so that scientific men were distributed into numerous pigeon-holes and labeled. A man in one pigeon-hole knew little of the work of his colleagues, and cared less. This segregation was immensely useful in the development of the technique of science, by which results are secured. But now we realize the fact that nature is not pigeon-holed, but is a great synthesis; and we know that to understand nature, which is to synthesize our results, all of our so-called sciences must focus upon the problems. Using my own

field of work, botany, as an illustration, we have discovered that to know plants and their relation to the synthesis we call nature, we must know not only their structure and habits, but also the chemistry of the materials that affect their living, the physics of the variable conditions that they must face, the geological record of their former history. In short, botany has become the focusing of all the sciences upon the problems of plants.

In one sense, scientific exploration is a luxury, just as is music or art or literature, and must be recognized in the same way as a response to a high human impulse, the impulse to know, an impulse which is developing the human race into greater intellectual efficiency.

A second ideal of science is *to apply the results of science to human welfare*. It sets up as its goal the service of man and expresses itself in what has been called "applied science," the science of our first ideal being distinguished as "pure science." It is this expression of science that the national government and the state governments have been fostering almost exclusively until recently. As indicated in connection with our first ideal, the public has begun to recognize the fact that pure and applied science are not mutually exclusive fields of activity, but complementary, and therefore public support for pure science is grow-



ing. Even yet, however, a general appreciation of the vital connection between these two ideals is lacking, and a compact statement may be useful. It will serve to distinguish the two ideals and at the same time to emphasize their interdependence.

The idea that there are two distinct kinds of science, pure and applied, not only exists in the public mind, but also is reenforced by published statements from colleges and universities. An attempt to define these two kinds of science reveals the fact that the distinction is a general impression rather than a clear statement. If the impression be analyzed, it seems that pure science is of no material service to mankind and that applied science has to do with the mechanism of our civilization. The distinction, therefore, is based upon material output. In other words, pure science only *knows* things, while applied science knows how *to do* things. This impression, rather than distinction, has been unfortunate in several ways. The public, as represented by the modern American community, believes in doing things; and therefore to them pure science seems useless and its devotees appear as ornamental rather than as vital members of human society, to be admired rather than used. The reaction of this sentiment upon opportunities for the cultivation of pure science is obvious.

On the other hand, the universities, as repre-

sented by their investigators, believe in knowing things; and therefore to them applied science seems to be a waste of investigative energy and its devotees appear to be unscientific—very useful, but not to be acknowledged as belonging to the scientific cult, the cult of explorers. The reaction of this sentiment sometimes has been to avoid the investigation of problems that have an obvious practical application and to justify Lowell's definition of a university as "a place where nothing useful is taught."

In recent years, however, a new spirit is taking possession of the public, and it has invaded the universities. In fact, so conspicuous have the universities become in the movement that they seem to be the leaders; certainly they furnish the trained leaders. The new spirit that is beginning to dominate increasingly is the spirit of mutual service. It is called by a variety of names, dependent upon the group that proclaims it; it is narrow or broad in its application, dependent upon the moral and intellectual equipment of its promoters; but it is the same enduring idea. The university is no longer conceived of as a scholastic cloister, a refuge for the intellectually impractical, but as an organization whose mission is to serve society in the largest possible way. Furthermore, this service is conceived of not merely as the indirect contribution of trained minds, but also as

the direct contribution of assistance in solving the problems that confront community life.

As an introductory illustration of the relation between pure and applied science, there may be outlined the usual steps that science has taken in the material service of mankind. An investigator, stimulated only by what has been called "the delirious but divine desire to know," is attracted by a problem. No thought of its usefulness in a material way is in his mind; he wishes simply to make a contribution to knowledge. No one can appreciate the labor, the patience, the intellectual equipment involved in such work unless he has undertaken it himself. The investigator succeeds in solving his problem and is satisfied. Later, perhaps many years later, some other scientific man discovers that the results of the former may be used to revolutionize some process of manufacture, some method of transportation or communication, some empirical formula of agriculture, some practice in medicine or surgery. The application is made and the world applauds; but the applause is chiefly for the second man, the one who made the practical application. Any analysis of the situation, however, shows that to the practical result both men contributed, and in that sense both men, the first no less than the second, were of immense material service. The ratio that exists between scientific men of the

first type and those of the second is not known, but there is very great disparity.

Another illustration is needed as a corollary. In this case an investigator, stimulated by the desire to serve the community, is attracted by a problem. He also wishes to make a contribution to knowledge. He succeeds in solving his problem, perhaps makes his own application, and is satisfied. Later some other scientific man discovers that the results of the former may be used to revolutionize certain fundamental conceptions of science. His statement is made and the scientific world applauds; and this time also the applause is chiefly for the second man, the pure scientist. The analysis of this case shows, however, that to the scientific result both men contributed and that both men were of large scientific service.

A third illustration is needed to complete the historical picture of progress in scientific knowledge and in its material applications. A practical man, not trained as an investigator, faces the problem of obtaining some new and useful result. His only method is to apply empirically certain formulae that have been developed by science, but with ingenuity and patience he succeeds. Although he is not able to analyze his results, his procedure reveals to a trained investigator data that lead to a scientific synthesis of the first order.

With such illustrations taken to represent the actual historical situation, what may be some of the conclusions? It is evident that responsibility for the material results of science is to be shared by those engaged in pure science, those engaged in applied science, and those not trained in science at all. The only distinction is not in the result, therefore, but in the intent. In fact, the difference between pure science and applied science in their practical aspects resolves itself into the difference between murder and manslaughter; it lies in the intention. So long as the world gets the practical results of science, it is not likely to trouble itself about the intention. In every end result of science that reaches the public there is an inextricable tangle of contributions. Between the source of energy and the point of application there may be much machinery; perhaps none of it can be eliminated from the final estimate of values, and yet the public is in danger of gazing at the practical electric light and of forgetting the power-house.

Another conclusion is that all application must have something to apply, and that application only would presently result in sterility. There must be perennial contributions to knowledge, with or without immediately useful intent, that application may possess a wide and fertile field for cultivation.

A third conclusion is that there is nothing inherent in useful problems that would compel their avoidance by an investigator who wishes to contribute to knowledge. While such an investigator should never be handicapped by the utilitarian motive, at the same time he should never be perversely nonutilitarian. There is no reason why a university, for example, especially one dominated by research, should not include among its investigations some that are of immediate concern to the public welfare.

A final conclusion may be that all science is one; that pure science is often immensely practical; that applied science is often very pure science; and that between the two there is no dividing line. They are like the end members of a long and intergrading series; very distinct in their isolated and extreme expression, but completely connected. If distinction must be expressed in terms where no sharp distinction exists, it may be expressed by the terms fundamental and superficial. They are terms of comparison and admit of every intergrade. In general, a university devoted to research should be interested in the fundamental things of science, the larger truths, that increase the general perspective of knowledge, and may underlie the possibilities of material progress in many directions. On the other hand, the immediate material needs of the

community are to be met by the superficial things of science, the external touch of more fundamental things. The series may move in either direction, but its end members must always hold the same relative positions. The first stimulus may be our need, and a superficial science meets it, but in so doing it may put us on the trail that leads to the fundamental things of science. On the other hand, the fundamentals may be gripped first, and only later find some superficial expression. The series is often attacked first in some intermediate region, and probably most of the research in pure science may be so placed; that is, it is relatively fundamental, but it is also relatively superficial. The real progress of science is away from the superficial, toward the fundamental, and the more fundamental are the results, the more extensive may be their superficial expression.

A notable illustration of this connection between fundamental science and its superficial expression is that given by the study of organic evolution. Before the beginning of the nineteenth century, evolution was a speculation which was as old as our record of human thought. During the nineteenth century it came to be based upon observation, and thus became a science, but its appeal was simply to those who wanted to understand nature. At the beginning of the present century it became a subject for experiment, for



observation had reached its limit and it was necessary to know through experiment whether one kind of organism can produce another kind. This experimental work began to uncover the laws of inheritance, or of heredity, as we have come to call it. The discovery of these laws suggested methods of securing practical results in plant-breeding never dreamed of before, and a revolution in agriculture was the result. It is a far cry from a speculation concerning evolution to a solution of the problem of food production, but the continuity is unbroken.

It is the proper balance between the two ideals that must be maintained. The physical needs of man, great as they may be, must never obscure the intellectual needs of man; especially as the trained intellect is the speediest agent in meeting physical needs. On the other hand, the intellectual needs of man, noble as they may be, must never lose sight of the fact that the speediest results are often obtained by the enormous increase of experimental work under the pressure of physical necessity.

A third ideal of science is *to develop a scientific attitude of mind*. It sets up as its goal a more effective citizen and expresses itself in the results of science in education. The scientific attitude of mind is probably nothing more than trained



common sense, but a fuller definition will indicate more clearly the significance of this ideal. In the first place, it is a spirit of inquiry which recognizes that we are surrounded by a vast body of established beliefs that need a thorough going over to distinguish heirloom rubbish from the priceless results of generations of experience. It is also a spirit that demands a close connection between a result and its claimed cause. Failure to develop this spirit provides the soil in which political demagoguery, destructive charlatanism, and religious vagaries flourish like noxious weeds. It is a spirit that keeps one close to the facts.

One of the hardest things in my teaching experience has been to check the tendency to use one fact as a starting point for a wild flight of fancy. Such a tendency is corrected somewhat, of course, when facts accumulate, and flight in one direction is checked by a pull in some other direction. Most of us, however, have the tendency, and the majority are so unhampered by facts that flight is free. There seems to be abroad a notion that one may start with a single well-attested fact, and by some machinery of logic construct an elaborate system and reach an authentic conclusion, much as the world has imagined for more than a century that Cuvier could do if a single bone were furnished him. The result is bad, even though the initial fact has an unclouded title, but it too

often happens that great superstructures have been reared upon a fact that is claimed rather than demonstrated.

Facts are like stepping stones. So long as one can get a reasonably close series of them he can make some progress in a given direction; but when he steps beyond them he flounders. As one travels away from a fact its significance in any conclusion becomes more and more attenuated, until presently the vanishing point is reached, like the rays of light from a candle. A fact is really influential only in its own immediate vicinity, but the whole structure of many a system lies in the region beyond the vanishing point.

Such "vain imaginings" are delightfully seductive to many people whose life and conduct are even shaped by them. I have been amazed at the large development of this phase of emotional insanity, commonly masquerading under the name "subtle thinking." Perhaps the name is expressive enough if it means thinking without any material for thought. An active mind turned in upon itself, without any valuable objective material, seems to react upon itself, resulting in a sort of mental chaos.

In short, the scientific spirit is one that makes for sanity in thought and action, a spirit which is slowly increasing in its influence, but which as yet does not control the majority of citizens. Any

subject that can be used to cultivate this spirit is of the greatest importance.

Of course the methods introduced by science are now being developed in connection with other subjects, and the same result may be obtained through them; but it still remains true that the scientific spirit just described is more easily and effectively developed in contact with the concrete materials of science.

A stronger claim for science, however, can be made, in that it gives a training peculiar to itself, and it is this contribution that expresses the ideal I wish to emphasize. I shall assume that any peculiar result of science in education must be obtained, not through information in reference to the *facts* of science, but through contact with the *materials* of science. However valuable information may be, it can hardly be regarded as a substitute for knowledge. Information is always at least second hand; while knowledge is first hand. The real educational significance of personal experience, which is a better name for what we call the laboratory method, is very commonly overlooked, even by teachers of science.

We were first told that science teaches the laboratory method, the inference being that the content of science is of no particular educational advantage in itself, but is merely useful in teaching a valuable method. Of course this method

holds no more relation to science than do algebraic symbols to algebra; they both represent merely useful machinery for getting at the real results.

Then we were told that science cultivates the power and habit of observation. Of course it does, but this is not peculiar to training in science, for it belongs to any subject in which the laboratory method is used. Then it was claimed that the study of science trains the power of analysis. This is certainly getting the subject upon higher ground, for the power of analysis is of immense practical importance, but to imagine that analysis is the ultimate purpose of science in education is not to go very much further than to say that the ultimate purpose is the laboratory method. The latter is the method, the former is but the first step in its application and is by no means peculiar to science.

Beyond analysis lies synthesis, and this certainly represents the ultimate purpose of science. The results of our analysis are as barren as a bank of sand until synthesis lays hold of them; but even synthesis is not peculiar to science. To pass by the incidental and the temporary and to reach the real and permanent contribution of science to education is to discover that it lies, not in teaching the laboratory method, in developing the power of observation, in cultivating the spirit of analysis, or even in carrying one to the heights of syn-

thesis, but in the *mental attitude demanded in reaching the synthesis*. In this regard, the demands of science are diametrically opposed to those of the humanities, for example, using this term to express the great region of literature and its allies. The general effect of the humanities in the scheme of education may be summed up in the single word *appreciation*. They seek to relate the student to what has been said or done by mankind, that his critical sense may be developed and that he may recognize what is best in human thought and action. To recognize what is best involves a standard of comparison. In most cases this standard is derived and conventional; in rare cases it is original and individual; in no case is it founded on the essential nature of things, in absolute truth, for it is likely to shift. It is the artistic, the esthetic which predominates, not the absolute. The whole process is one of *self-injection* in order to reach the power of *appreciation*. If the proper result of the humanities is appreciation, whose processes demand self-injection, the proper and distinctive result of science is a *formula*, to obtain which there must be rigid *self-elimination*. Any injection of self into a scientific synthesis vitiates the result. The standard is not a variable and artificial one, developed from the varying tastes of men; it is an absolute standard founded upon eternal truth.

Two such distinct mental attitudes as self-injection and self-elimination are not contradictory, but complementary. The exclusive development of either one must result in a lopsided development. Persistent self-injection tends to mysticism, a confusion of ideals, or even vagaries, with realities, a prolific source of all irrational beliefs. Persistent self-elimination narrows the vision to a horizon touched by the senses, and clips the wings that would carry us now and then beyond the treadmill of life into a freer air and a wider outlook. The two processes and the two results are so distinct and so complementary that any scheme of education which does not provide for the definite cultivation of both of these attitudes is in constant danger of resulting in mental distortion.

You have now the reason for the statement that the scientific attitude of mind is trained common sense, and also for the claim that this ideal of science is related to the better equipment of the race for meeting its increasingly complex problems.

To summarize the whole situation: the ideals of science are: (1) to understand nature, that the boundaries of human knowledge may be extended, and man may live in an ever-widening perspective; (2) to apply this knowledge to the

service of man, that his life may be fuller of opportunity; and (3) to use the method of science in training man, so that he may solve his problems and not be their victim.





## VI

### Ideals in Education



## VI

### IDEALS IN EDUCATION

By Ernest Carroll Moore, *Professor of Education,  
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IN THESE distressful days when each one of us at times feels that the way of life which we call civilized may be lost and forgotten it is imperative that we take stock of the forces which we can employ to perpetuate it among men. Surely the name for our age is that which Fichte gave to his, "the age of completed sinfulness." Such horrors as are now known, such suffering as is now felt, the race has never known before. Indeed if all the other wars, pestilences, famines, cataclysms and devastations which have afflicted mankind since the beginning of recorded time were added together into one great horror, it is a question whether their sum total would equal this single one which goes on now. Have they who did this thing no pity, no bowels of compassion, no care for the one little life which is all we have, that they make nothing of it and crush it out so ruthlessly? Surely colossal madness has done this thing, for sanity could not even imagine

it. But no, it is all due to ideals, all the result of teaching.

Yet there is another side to the picture. It has been met by something stronger than it is. Never before since history began has the irresistible and triumphant power of an idea so manifested itself as now. Thought is again made flesh and dwells among us and we who are so fortunate as to be alive now behold its power. Such devotion to the old fidelities, such eagerness to serve, such patience under suffering, such a sublime surrender of goods, of cherished plans, of friends, of self itself, that an idea may live, that an ideal may triumph, as takes place at every instant of time in Europe, this world has never seen before. We may indeed say to each other what Aeschines said to his fellows who were alive in the day of Alexander, and we may say it to each other with better right than he said it: "We live not the life of mortals, but are born at such a moment of time that posterity will relate our prodigies."

When the Homer shall arise to tell of these great deeds as half-forgotten things, he will not sing of wrath or power of armaments or overconfident, long-labored efficiency. He will sing of ideals, of human hatred of wrong, of sacrifice for social laws, of irresistible love of liberty. These are invisible things, but they are stronger than visible things and determine them. Ideals

are always that, they are personal; they exist nowhere but in minds; they do not float in the air or belong to things. They always belong to folks. They are the thoughts, the hopes, the plans, the resolutions of people. They are not fancies or opinions, but purposes, principles, resolves. The ideals of this nation are the thoughts of what this nation is going to do, has got to do, that you and I and the rest of folks in it have; and the ideals of education in this country are the thoughts of what education is for, and must do, that you and I and the rest of folks in our land have.

I have sometimes fancied a visitor coming to Harvard University and asking to be shown the real university. One of the guides might take him into the Yard and point out the buildings to him and say: These are the real university; or another guide might produce for him a list of the endowment funds and say: This is the real university; or another one might show him a book which contains the history of the university—Harvard guides are, I regret to say, rather too prone to do that. He might take him to Mt. Auburn and show him certain rather numerous plain and simple graves there, and say: This is the real university; or might show him the roll of the alumni, or the assembled student body, or the faculty gathered in faculty meeting, or the laboratories, and the library; and I have imagined the

visitor turning away in each case and asking: What brings all these together here? What is the purpose that built these buildings, that brought this money, that constituted this history, that assembled these professors both living and dead, that collects these students? Show me that, for that shapes all the rest, that is the real university. Or, I have imagined that same discerning visitor coming from Europe and asking to be shown the real United States, and when pointed to the land bounded on the east by the Atlantic, on the south by Mexico, on the west by the Pacific and on the north by Canada, saying that was all here before Columbus came, yet he did not find any United States here. That is the territory of the United States. Show me the real United States. And next he would, perhaps, be directed to go to Washington and look at the White House and the Supreme Court and the assembled Congress, but would at once say: No, that is the government of the United States. Look then at all these one hundred million people, he would be told. But no, they are the people of the United States. I want to see what makes these states and what unites them. And Socrates-like he would then go about from this man to that saying to each of them, "Speak that I may see thee," and from what he found that they desired with all their hearts, souls, minds, and strength he would decide

whether there is indeed any real United States. Ideals are our very life blood; they pay our debts; they send us to our work in the morning; they keep us from taking our neighbors' property, from turning destroyer and pillaging, burning, and trampling out lives.

You are that discerning visitor. You ask me to show you the real education of our country. You do not want to be shown the buildings, or the funds or the teachers or the textbooks or the students. This is to be no tabulation of plant, equipment, resources, personnel or results, no journey through a museum to look at specimens. It is the animating purpose of this great enterprise that you wish me to consider and I most gladly comply, but with a reservation. France is a real thing; you cannot touch it or see it or hear it; it is a mental thing, a desire, a thought, a determination that men by thousands set aside life for nowadays. Suppose you were to go among the soldiers who were at Verdun and among the women that worked and prayed for them at home and ask the question of each one of them: What is France? You would get strangely different answers. I, too, am a private, or at most a drill sergeant in a vast army. I cannot speak with certainty for the others. I can tell you only what education is to me and what I believe it is to them.

Education itself is an ideal. When our ancestors were still "extreme gross," to use a phrase from Francis Bacon, they took no thought for it. Indeed we can imagine a world in which grown folks in cataclysmal selfishness practised destroying all their young as soon as they were born. Our race has, you know, at various times and in different ways destroyed a good many of them. A race which followed that practise would soon die out. But why not? If we were in fact as completely selfish as many of our makers of opinion give us credit for being, we would not and could not care. But we do care. We want them to live. All education is rooted in that unselfishness, is grounded in that ideal. It is that something in us which makes us child-keepers, that makes schools and teachers and meetings like this, and child-labor laws, and horrible revulsion when young lives are wantonly trampled out.

Again we can imagine a society in which every parent took the greatest pains to teach his child to lie, and to teach him to steal and to teach him to kill, and to do no work for himself but to force others to do everything for him, to be a destroyer, to delight in anger, to value brawling, to indulge every passion as his right, to disobey all laws, to turn a deaf ear to all pleadings, to look upon compassion as cowardice, and not to fear death but to look forward to endless aeons of joy in



another world provided only that he took the precaution to die fighting. Such a training would bring up children to rend their parents and destroy each other. The result would be exactly the same as if the parents destroyed all the children at birth, only it would be longer in coming.

There would not be the slightest difference in the long run between this method of bringing up children and destroying them outright. But just this kind of education has been solicitously inculcated in various places and at various times in the world's history. Why is it not given now? It is, not all of it, but part of it, in every country. Why do you object to it? Because it threatens us, because it destroys lives. The education which we seek must not be of that kind. It must have just one object, to serve life, and one justification, that it serves it. By life we do not mean mere existence but a certain kind of existence. Our want of it is more real than anything else we know. For the sake of it men suffer wounds, are torn asunder, are impaled, yet count imprisonment, loss of possessions and agonizing death as little things beside the loss of their conviction that the good of men must be served. For the educator that alone is the real thing. And the only reason we have such a thing as education at all is because of the value we put upon human lives. We talk much about our institutions of learning,

about the subjects which we teach in them and about our devotion to the sciences. That is not what most of us mean at all. We use such phrases as "you must get knowledge for the sake of knowledge," "you must pursue science for the sake of science," but they are for most of us only a circumlocution. What we are really concerned for is the good of folks. In the service of education it is much easier to assign reasons which will satisfy our fellows and quiet objections than reasons which will do the business and produce the fruit of helping men to new and better experiences. What we are concerned with is knowledge as a means, not an end.

Some time ago Professor Dewey told me that when he began to write his last book on the philosophy of education he made what was to him the startling discovery that all philosophy is philosophy of education. For, what other reason can there be for striving to have folks learn philosophy than that they may learn to think about life sanely? Is not the same thing true of all literature, all art, all science, all industry, all government, all religion, all morals? Have we any reason for caring for them save that our efforts in them conserve and augment human forces and make life a better thing? Has industry any other warrant than the production of goods for human use? Has science any other

motive than that indicated by its motto, "I serve?" Has religion any other purpose than to inculcate helpful lessons about God and the life of our own souls? Has government any other reason for existing than to devise and secure the welfare of folks? All these exist to teach men to be free. I am therefore going to be more demanding than Professor Dewey was. I am going to say that all literature, all art, all science, all government, all religion is for education, that they have no other reason for existence than to teach folks to live well. We who teach are fabricating the future. We must build it out of all the discoveries concerning the life of man that man has made.

But I must not, without stating the other one, allow you to commit yourselves to the view that all knowledge is nothing but a series of discoveries which men have made as to the best ways to think and act in order to live well here upon this planet; that it has all grown out of the race's experimenting with life, that every single one of its formulations is only a body of recipes or guideboard directions advising us what to do or which road to take when certain conditions are met, and that every book is a guidebook to a country that the mind of the reader is likely to visit. This is the pragmatic view of the nature and function of knowledge, the only view which, as I believe,

makes education either worth while or possible. For if all philosophy is philosophy of education, all education is an outcome or effect of philosophy and this philosophy of consequences is the only one which provides the parent and the teacher with a working definition of knowledge, which will tell him how to distinguish unerringly what lessons the child must learn from the infinite mass of pseudo-lessons which he might spend his time upon and be none the better or wiser for having done so. Let me give you some illustrations of just this need for distinguishing knowledge from facts, for selecting the matter which children should be taught from that which they should not be taught. This selection must be made in every subject and the principle or ideal of utility is the only principle which helps us to make it.

All children who go to school in our country must be taught to spell. But there are four hundred thousand words, more or less, in our language. Shall they be taught to spell all of them or only a part of them and if only a part, which part? What does a knowledge of spelling mean? What does the teaching of spelling require the teacher to do? There are two views: According to one, spelling is spelling, and to be a good speller means to be able to spell every word, or since that is absurd, almost every word and at least most of the hard words in the

language. Those who take this position say that spelling is for the sake of spelling, the more of it one learns the better. The other view is that spelling is a very practical matter, we must all take pains to spell the words that we write. Each one of us has at least four vocabularies and of these our writing vocabulary is by far the smallest. The words which folks are likely to use in letters after they leave school, we should take particular pains to teach each child to spell while he is in school. That number of words careful tests have shown to be more than about two thousand, while the number of words which everybody uses is hardly more than five hundred. Now if we should follow the Cleveland plan of putting but two new words into each spelling lesson together with eight old ones, since there are more than one hundred and fifty days in each school year, we could perhaps in four years teach children to spell all the words which they are likely to have occasion to write, and to spell them correctly. As soon as we take the position that spelling is not for spelling but for use we can teach it successfully. As long as we cling to the view that spelling is for spelling we are so confused and uncertain that we get nowhere and no one is pleased with our attempts, ourselves and the children least of all. That we are not pleased may make but little difference, but that the children

should because of our misguided efforts learn to hate learning is a tragedy more terrible and devastating even than the World War.

An examination in geography was given in Boston a little while ago to 593 eighth grade students, 165 third year high school students and 87 normal school students. The list which was submitted to them was carefully prepared and included such questions on the geography of the United States as: Locate New York City on the map. Locate San Francisco on the map. Why do the states just east of the Rocky Mountains receive less rain than Massachusetts? Explain the way in which the flood plains of the Mississippi River have been formed. Why are these flood plains good for agriculture? And on the geography of Europe such questions as: Locate on the map two seaports of European Russia. Why does England import large quantities of wheat? Why has Germany become very important as a manufacturing country? Out of the 845 pupils tested on the geography of Europe not a single pupil passed. In the test on the United States 8.7 per cent of the elementary school pupils, 4.8 per cent of the high school students and 1.1 per cent or one of the normal school pupils passed. Your conclusion is, doubtless, that they were either pretty poor students or that their teaching had been poor. That is not my

conclusion. A few days after this test had been given I was present at a meeting where these results were discussed. Everyone had practically reached the conclusion which you just now reached, when one of the men present asked, "How many facts would you say are brought to the attention of a public school child in his study of geography each year? As many as ten thousand?" "Yes," was the reply, "fully as many as ten thousand." When we study geography for facts you see we do not learn geography.

The view that we study spelling for the sake of spelling, geography for the sake of geography, science for the sake of science, and knowledge of all kinds for the sake of knowledge, is due to the anti-pragmatic philosophy known as intellectualism. It says that the highest function of our minds is to know in order to know—that a subordinate function of them is to know in order to do. That knowledge in its truest form is knowledge wholly unmixed with volition or knowledge that, as somebody has said, thank God, nobody can possibly do anything with. "God hath framed the mind of man as a glass capable of the image of the universal world. . . . For knowledge is a double of that which is," said Bacon. According to the pragmatists he has done nothing of the sort, and we would be enormously handicapped and wholly helpless if he had. The



fact that it is impossible for us to attend, with the same intensity, to everything which goes on indicates that the mind is not a mirror to reflect images of everything which is, but a selecting device which works by picking out that which is worth while from that which is not worth while. This philosophy then commands educators to abandon their attempts to treat all that is known as equally valuable, and to impart universal knowledge to the young. It says that knowledge for the sake of knowledge, science for the sake of science, or art for art's sake, are monstrous shibboleths, that only confusion, misdirected effort, and a wretched wasting of life result from them, that knowledge, science, and art are all for man's sake, are tools, and must never be hypostatized into self-existent realities.

So much for ideals about what we should teach. Next comes the question, what result should we seek when we teach it. What does teaching these various lessons that the race has learned, and values, do for the learner? Or, in other words, what is education? Here so many ideals are held by teachers that I cannot examine them all. I will select three for your consideration. The first is that education imparts knowledge—that teachers have it and students do not have it and students go to school that teachers or textbooks or both together may pass it over, hand



it out, impart it, or deliver it to them. Many people think schools are knowledge-shops, where pounds, ounces, pennyweights of knowledge are transferred to the young. They do this perhaps because they see teachers constantly engaged in testing their students to find out how much of what has been delivered to them they retain and can hand back again. But if you will stop for a moment and consider what sort of a thing knowledge is, you will see that no teacher can hand over or share his knowledge with his pupil any more than he can hand over or share his headache or his toothache with him. My knowledge is the body of sensations, perceptions, memories, images, thoughts, feelings, and volitions that I am aware of, somewhat reduced to order, classified and arranged so that when something happens that calls for a reaction from me I am able to make that reaction and do what should be done next. If you speak to me in English I can answer you in English for I have a knowledge of English words, but if you speak to me in Italian I cannot answer you in Italian for I have no knowledge of that language. If you ask me what two and seven and nine make I can tell you, but if you put me into the midst of a battle and ask me what to do next, I cannot tell you, nor can I do it if you give the commands for I have not learned how to work by that action-system. We go to

school to learn to use our own minds in the several most important ways in which the race has found it necessary to use minds, to learn to work by the action-systems that the race has learned to prefer. It is always our own thoughts that we learn to work with. If the teacher tells me that three and five make eight, I must think three and then five and I must combine them. If she says that Christopher Columbus discovered America in 1492, I must form a notion of what is meant by Christopher Columbus, by discovered, and by America, and I must work out or make my own notion of what 1492 means. The teacher does not give me her thoughts. She cannot. Nobody can. All she can do is to put me into a condition in which I must generate and make use of my own.

The mistaken notion that education is the imparting of knowledge, the delivering or conferring or handing out of knowledge, with all the confusion and waste that follows from it in schools, is due to certain foolish statements which we allow ourselves to make concerning language. We say that it imparts thought or vehicles thought or expresses thought or conveys thought. It does nothing of the sort. Thoughts cannot be sent from one person to another. They never pass through the air. They do not ride on words or leave us when we move our lips and disturb

the air about us in such a way that that disturbance reaches the tympanum of an auditor. If I speak to you, you feel a sound, but you make your own meaning to fit that sound. If the sound is of a language strange to you, you say you cannot make out what I mean. Language is only a system of signals. When I can make them out, I can understand what you mean, but the thought which I make to fit your sounds, your words, is my own thought, not yours. In place of saying that language imparts thought or conveys thought, we should say that language demands thought, or requires thought or necessitates thought or arouses thought or provokes it. The teacher is a provoker of thought, not one who purveys or supplies it, and the thought and knowledge which the student makes are his own. Education then simply puts him into conditions in which he, using what men have said and done in past time and what men say and do now as raw material for his own constructing, makes up his own mind about the matter and so builds up his own knowledge.

The other mistaken ideal of education to which a great many teachers devote themselves and their students, as I believe altogether in vain, is not concerned with the imparting of knowledge but with the creating of mind. Those who follow this ideal seem to say that our minds are very imperfect things at birth, that they must be made

over, improved, renovated, disciplined, sharpened, drawn out, made supple, developed, and perfected. Do you remember the story of the man who went about the streets of an ancient city crying "new lamps for old." You say there never was such a man. Do not be too sure about it. The professors who hold this view go about crying: New minds for old, new minds for old. They say that certain studies are valuable, not because we cannot possibly get along without knowing their content, but because they form a sort of grindstone on which we must sharpen our intellects. I believe that this doctrine is a superstition and a baneful one, and that no other educational ideal begins to take such a toll of young lives as this one does. It is an idol which is worshiped chiefly in our colleges, but they make both enforced and voluntary converts to it in the high schools and voluntary converts to it in the elementary schools of our country. Ask the teacher of spelling or arithmetic or geography why he believes in spelling for the sake of spelling, or arithmetic which no one outside of school uses, or geography which one will never again refer to in life, or grammar the use of which no student understands, and he will tell you that it is because these lessons are good for the mind, they strengthen it, make it facile, increase its power, and sharpen the wits of the young. But no

teacher ever has to get inside the mind or do any burnishing or repair work there, no teacher ever has to add any cubits to its stature or build any additions to it. That simply cannot be done. "I have hardly ever known a mathematician who could reason," says Plato. "Learning Greek teaches Greek, and nothing else; certainly not common sense, if that have failed to precede the teaching," said Browning. In the Harvard Club in Boston there is a room set apart for the use of the graduates of the Medical School and over the fireplace in that room is an inscription, a motto which states in a sentence the ideal, the philosophy of the medical profession. It is this: "We dress the wound, God heals it." Now if we were to try to make a sound ideal for the teaching profession, a philosophy which we could all unite in following, what form should it take? This I think: "We train people to use their minds; God makes them." That training is always specific, never general. It is always learning to do this, that, or the other particular thing, never learning to act in general.

What specific things shall we train them to do? You see, just as soon as you give up intellectualism with its mirror-up-to-nature ideal and its knowledge-for-the-sake-of-knowledge slogan, you must take the position that knowledge is not a luxury, but an indispensable human necessity. It

is not having it that makes it valuable, it is doing by its aid or with it. Knowledge therefore becomes different from fact; it is what we do about facts; it is learning to work with facts, making them come our way or getting ready for them by foreseeing them. That is, knowledge, real knowledge, is always a kind of skill. The person who has it is different from other folks in what he can do. To know French means to speak, write, and read French; to know ethics means to be constrained to ethical thought and action; to know science means to maintain the suspended judgment rather than the snap judgment, to collect the necessary information and try out our mental conclusions before we assert them or act upon them. Though studies have curiously different kinds of names, some of them names ending in *ing* and other names ending in *ic*, *y*, or *ry*, this is due to some false notions on the part of the men who named them. They are all really *ing* studies and serve no other purpose than to train us to use our own minds upon the matters of which they treat in the ways that the race has thus far found it most useful to work in its struggles to master these matters. According to this ideal every child goes to school for exactly the same reason that an apprentice goes to a blacksmith shop, i. e., to learn to work with or operate or use certain highly important social tools which the race

has wrought out with which to perform its work.

Every society teaches its children to think about the things which it cares for, to do the things which it values. The school is simply society's most conscious effort to keep itself alive and to renew itself. It cannot be the same in the different countries, for it is the chosen agency for realizing the national ideal. When Socrates was in prison awaiting execution his friend Crito came to him and said: "I have arranged everything. The prison doors are open. You can escape and cross the frontier of Attica to safety if you will." But, said Socrates, nothing is worth doing that must not first be thought about. Let us think about this. Injustice and death are of slight concern to a man who is innocent, but doing injury to his own soul is of great concern. And then, as you will recall, he imagines the personified Laws of Athens coming to him and asking him if he can be planning to destroy them. They say to him:

Did we not bring you into existence? Was it not by our authority that your father married your mother and begat you? Are not those of us reasonable which commanded your father to train you in music and gymnastic? . . . . No one of us has hindered you or any other citizen after he comes of age and has examined our management of the city and finds that it does not please him from taking all that belongs to him and going wherever he pleases. . . . But whoever among you who after



examining and seeing how we give judgment and manage the other affairs of the city, chooses to remain, pledges himself in very deed to abide by us and perform whatsoever we command.

Sir Henry Jones says:

The greatest discovery ever made by man was made by the Greeks when, cutting themselves free from the traditions of the ancient world, they alighted upon the conception of a civil state where citizens should be free. The most momentous experiment of mankind is that of carrying out their conception to its ultimate consequences in a true democracy.

That most momentous experiment we are carrying out. The means which the Athenians, though not of our blood our true ancestors, chose are the means which we choose. Our laws compel the parent to have his child trained in the elements of education. In this we try to carry on the early Athenian practice, to put into effect the advice of Plato and of Aristotle and to realize the effort which Charles the Great and Alfred the Great, with unerring vision of what is necessary to a state, made in vain. The child does not belong to his parents, but to the state, to organized society as a whole. The parents have duties to him but no property in him. He must, whether his parents are willing or are not willing, spend his earlier years as an apprentice to certain social activities which he will have to continue to per-



form as long as he lives. He must be taught to read and write and use the language of our country and to work with the aid of numbers. He must build up his own notions of the world, become familiar with the songs and stories of his race, and come to a realizing sense of what sort of an undertaking he has inherited and what has already been attempted and accomplished in it before he came.

These things have become so much a matter of second nature to us that their real meaning is overlooked. Is it of overwhelming importance to the people of the United States that every child shall learn to read? Well, let us see. Many things are happening in this world and in the lurid light reflected from other lands we are able more clearly to discern the features of our own life. In the United States 96 per cent of the people can read, in Mexico 80 per cent of the people cannot. Because of that, and because of that only, certain things happen in Mexico which could not possibly happen in the United States. One of them is that spoken words have an undue power there. If an orator stands on a street corner in Mexico and makes a fiery speech to the people telling them that their liberties are being stolen from them, that they must arm themselves and march against the tyrant and destroy him, the chances are perhaps about ninety to ten

that a number of them will rush to arms at once and a new revolution will be on. Why? Because not having the means to be critical, little arises in their minds to challenge and dispute that which they hear so convincingly uttered. Not being able to read they are the unwilling dupes of unprincipled adventurers who trade upon their eager credulity and buy and sell them to suit a private advantage. Surely the ability to read the yellowest journal in existence would make one more self-protective than that. Education exists to make men free, and teaching folks to read arms them with a means of self-protection by which they can checkmate the schemes of impostors. With a free press it makes public opinion possible. Teaching folks to write is not so clearly indispensable, but it does enable us to talk to our friends who are beyond the reach of our voices, it provides a nearly indestructible memory and is a requisite in many callings. Teaching them to number gives a sense of security against being cheated in the simple reckonings of life and enables us to understand the social arrangements of time and space.

These are the three Rs. The cry perpetually goes up in this land, now from this critic of the public schools, now from that, that they constitute the whole duty of elementary education, that whatsoever is more than these cometh of faddism

and should be driven out. Is this sound? Let us go back to Mexico again. John Stuart Mill used to say that social and political theories cannot be tested in a laboratory, they do not lend themselves to experimental control. Yet political theories do display themselves upon a great stage, and if we will but take note of what is happening all about us, we shall find that it corrects our own theories and tells us much about our problems. Even the person among us who is least informed about Mexico must have concluded from what he has read that at least one trouble with that unhappy country is lack of education. "Schools for the people" is a cry of the revolutionists, and despite the fact that they claim to have created fewer schools than they destroyed and that these schools lead but a precarious and fitful existence, the problem of Mexico no matter what else happens, whether home recovery or intervention, must be solved by her schools. What do we mean when we say that? What is the problem of Mexico? It is an Indian country. Of its sixteen million people 38 per cent are pure-blooded Indians, 43 are mixed, and but 19 per cent are whites. When Cortes came there in 1519 he found the Indians living in tribes throughout the land and having few relations with their fellows of other tribes, save to make nearly incessant war upon them. Talleyrand said a hundred years ago

that war is the national industry of Prussia. Well, war was the national industry of Mexico. When the Spaniards came they did not fuse the Indians into one people. They were not one people themselves. Even to this day the king of Spain is not crowned king of Spain, but king of the Spains. Catalonia, Castile, Aragon, Granada and all the other Spains sent their contingents to Mexico. They grouped themselves together, the men of each of the Spains by themselves in different parts of the country; they maintained their own customs and their differences, and thus upon the antagonisms and repellencies of the ever-warring native tribes were superimposed the antagonism and repellencies of mutually jealous conquerors who had never been one people. These differences did not heal themselves; they multiplied. The ills of Mexico are due to lack of unity. "The trouble with us," says one distinguished Mexican, "is that we cannot trust each other." The problem of Mexico is to create unity, to bring it to pass that her people shall learn to value the same things, to desire the same things, to hope for the same things, to strive for the same things; that is the problem of Europe also, and that is the problem of the United States.

Each one of us is born a being separate from his fellows and from the surrounding things of nature. We must make two conquests and keep

making them as long as we live. One of these is the conquest of nature, the other is the conquest of social relations. The conquest of nature is relatively easy, but the conquest of social relations is so difficult that as yet but a mere beginning has been made in it. The earth produces food enough and to spare for all of us, but at this moment hundreds of thousands starve and millions go to death in paroxysms of unspeakable anguish. There is but one way out of it. It is the final word of religion, philosophy, literature, political theory, and morals. It is the problem of education; men, all men, must learn that they are brothers.

How can we be brought to value the same things, to desire the same things, to hope for the same things and to strive for the same things? The problem of Mexico cannot be solved by opening schools throughout the Republic and teaching every Mexican boy and girl merely to read, write, and cipher, in them. Many of the most frantic destroyers of lives there have had that training. Teaching them to read may decrease their over-susceptibility to deception, but no amount of zeal in instructing them in the three Rs only or of instructing our people in them will convert them into one people, with a common consciousness, striving for a common ideal and helping each other to realize it. The state, said

Aristotle, is a mutual undertaking of friends. It does not exist for the sake of alliance and security from injustice nor yet for exchange and mutual intercourse, but for the good life. Animals and slaves cannot form it for they have no share in happiness or in a life of free choice. Christianity enlarged this Greek lesson to include the entire family of mankind. God is the Father of all; all are his children; life is the mutual effort of common humanity to assist each other, to value the same things, to desire the same things, to hope and work for the same things. Only as the state enables its citizens to do this can it be a state and only as the people of a nation assist the peoples of other nations to do this can it be a nation.

Unity of desire, unity of plan and aspiration, unity of resolution and of action, the lesson of unity must be taught in the schools of Mexico, and in the schools of England, France, Germany, and the United States, and it must be the chief lesson which is taught there. In the light of this principle we see what the real studies are. They are not reading, writing, and arithmetic; they are not the sciences or mathematics, valuable as these all are. They are not the languages studied merely for their disciplinary effect. They are those studies that take us up, as it were, on a high mountain and show us the kingdoms of this world, and the great pulsing vivid panorama of

human effort and striving that goes on in them. The mission of these studies is to make us ever mindful of what in its long struggle mankind has attempted, hoped for, and done, that—in that most moving phrase from the trenches—we may “carry on.” I have often thought and often said if I were compelled to choose from among all the studies we teach one and only one for my child to learn I’d rather have him learn the songs of our country than any other thing; for there are certain sentiments too precious and too dear to be entrusted to the every-day forms of communication or even to be entrusted to that extraordinary form which we call poetry. We give those sentiments a more compelling power over us. We sing them and thus secure for them the peculiar privilege of saying themselves over and over again in our hearts. I’d choose these songs first, and after them poetry, stories, history, geography, ethics. In later years philosophy, literature, and science would assert their claims. Disciplinary studies would be banished. Physical training would call for more attention even than it got in Greece. Each child would be taught the elements of a trade. No child would be taught anything that he could ever as long as he lived feel that he was through with. Efficiency would be the object, but not that lop-sided and deformed efficiency that comes from the ability to control



things only, but that larger efficiency that seeks first the welfare of the kingdom of men. What is taught would not be handed down on authority. Instruction would not be a militarizing of the minds of the young. Each student should use his own mind, should think his own thoughts, should put his own values upon things and men and be convinced by his own conviction. Each student would study reading in order to read, arithmetic to become an arithmetician, geography in order to be his own geographer by continually studying the earth and man's relation to it, history that he might learn to work with and by the aid of historic facts, science in order to himself be scientific by employing the methods of science, literature that he might make out its message and be his own critic and appraiser of that which is written, and ethics that he might make up his own mind about human conduct and guide his life accordingly.

He must of course become self-supporting, but it is even more important that he become society-supporting. These are indeed but two aspects of one and the same requirement. He must pull his own weight and must meet the standards of living, but he must also do his part in improving and raising the standards of living. It is not enough that he be trained to fit into his environment. He must be trained to make it over into a




better social environment. There is, in short, but one ideal of education. It is, and everywhere must be, the process by which each child of the race guided by his own interest, employing his own attention, and using his own mind in comprehending the process of human living, becomes a person who thinks, desires, and acts as the embodiment of social laws.



## VII

### Ideals in Business



## VII

### IDEALS IN BUSINESS

By Arthur E. Swanson, *Dean Northwestern University  
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**I**DEALS in business! What an array of conflicting ideas this phrase provokes in the minds of the various persons who come in contact with business in one way or another. And the number of such persons is great, for there are comparatively few people who are not touched by business in some way. In this respect business differs from other professions or vocations. It is, in a way, everybody's concern.

The nature of the ideas which any one person has depends largely on the relation of that individual to business. The laborer has his opinions, the business man his, the farmer his, the social reformer his, the socialist his and so on. It would be comparatively an easy task to state the ideals of business as interpreted by almost any one of these groups. They have been presented *ad infinitum* and are classic. But to interpret the ideals of business in an unbiased manner is a very

difficult task. There are, at least, no precedents to be followed.

If any headway is to be made, it is essential that there be some common understanding of the subject we are discussing. "Ideal," as a term, is used in so many connections that it fairly brims over with associated meanings from the various fields of human experience. The meaning that will be ascribed to ideals in this connection can best be summarized in the phrase—standards of action and conduct to which the leaders in business seek to conform. By this I do not refer to a few individuals, but to that large number of individuals who in their own communities are regarded as the leading business men. Reference is had not to such standards of action which these men, as individuals, might philosophize about, but to those, which, in their business life, they seek to realize as a practical and attainable goal today or in the immediate future.

A legitimate question to ask at the very start is: "Can we assume that there are any ideals in business?" To me the answer lies in the fact that the human individual seems incapable of living without ideals. Social groups, in all the stages of their development, give abundant evidence of ideals which crystallize into custom, law, and accepted practice. It is safe to say that no social group has been found without its accepted

ideals. Many of them are inadequate from the point of view of our present thinking but, nevertheless, they are standards for the respective groups. It would be only reasonable to assume that human individuals, who have been so certain to develop their ideals in so many other spheres of life, should also do so in business. Observation further leaves no doubt in my mind that there are ideals in business.

Ideals in business are the resultant of the interaction of the ideals of individuals as members of society with the purposes of business. Men bring to business their personal ideals. There they come in contact—sometimes in conflict—with the conditions that grow out of the purpose and nature of business. Whether the contact is mild, moderate, or violent, depends largely upon the character of the personal ideals of the men who engage in business. On the whole, those ideals are fairly representative of the ideals of the mass of people, with perhaps a practical touch added. So that there is a sense in which we can speak of personal ideals as social ideals.

The purpose of business, as we shall observe later, though definite, is subject to considerable modification as time goes on. Business ideals consequently are the resultant in which both personal ideals and the purpose of business figure. It is this partial dependence of business ideals on per-

sonal ideals which gives rise to the notion that the personal ideals of persons engaged in business are also the business ideals. Our approach, accordingly, is made from two directions, one the personal or social ideals of the men engaged in business and the other the purpose of business.

Volumes have been written on personal and social ideals. One of the dominant personal ideals in our country during the past one hundred years or more has been individualism. Our national history has, until the very present day, been a history of pioneers. Pioneering conditions, economically, socially, and politically, were conditions which could have but one result in determining the ideals of a people, namely individualism. The great natural resources lay ready to be converted into wealth. All that the individual needed was the privilege to apply himself to the task and to rid himself of all obstacles and hindrances that stood in his way. Economic independence and the concomitant social isolation translated themselves readily into independence socially, politically, and even religiously. This personal and social ideal of individualism has made a deep imprint on business ideals. There is no mistaking the fact that there has been and is now, in business, a worship of individualism.

Another common ideal, more personal than individualism, is that of trust or confidence in



human relations. It is evident that this personal ideal has thoroughly permeated business, since the whole credit system, in which business has its being, is founded upon it.

The approach from the purpose of business itself is not so well understood and calls for a more detailed treatment. There are two kinds of business, public and private. But since private business dominates the industrial world, it is the purpose and limitations of private business in which we are interested. The purpose of business, meaning private business, is from the viewpoint of the persons engaged in it, profit or gain. Socially speaking or thinking, the purpose of business is to supply human beings with the various kinds of goods that they may want. This accounts for the fact that society permits business to go on. From the point of view of the person engaged in business, this social point of view is largely incidental. He is in business for an acquisitive purpose and not for a social purpose. He is, in many cases, happy that he is performing a social good. It depends on his personal ideals whether he is altogether conscious of it or not. His purpose as a business man is to make a profit. This fact has such a materialistic ring that it embarrasses many persons in business and they seek to disguise it in one way or another. There can be no denying, however, the basic fact that

the object of business is profit. If a business is run for any other purpose than profit, an inglorious end in bankruptcy will soon indicate what has happened. But it is one thing to say that the purpose of business is profit and another to say that it is profit at any cost. It is largely the conditions that are laid down in this game of gain and profit-making that indicate the ideals that have been realized in business. The point I wish to make here is that, in our search for ideals in business, we must be aware of the fact that these ideals must, because of the purpose of business, be capable of realization in a sphere of action where gain is the dominating motive. Thus the very purpose of business places a limitation on the ideals that can dominate it.

As we proceed from these two angles, we find not one but a group of ideals—a resultant, as we have said, of the interaction of personal ideals with the purpose and character of business. One of the ideals of this group, perhaps the dominating one, is success in business. Usually this means to succeed while respecting the rules of the game—usually, but not always, for man is too ready to forgive or to forget infractions of rules if the result is achievement. Success as an ideal in business means success not only in securing profit and amassing wealth, but in gaining power and personal prestige. The business world worships the

man who has succeeded in business. Frequently the success is gauged by the wealth accumulated, but instances are numerous where it is measured largely by power and position gained. The personal ideal of individualism finds expression in this ideal.

In the past the ideal of success has often meant success at any cost, but higher standards have gradually been established, sometimes by public opinion, and more frequently by law, to determine the conditions which must be observed in profit seeking. It cannot be said that it has been a very prevalent ideal of business to establish and to raise these rules of action. Business men are as a whole worshipers of existing conditions and are apprehensive of changes. This is a natural condition as a great part of business activity consists of the successful meeting of risks. Anything new or different introduces an element of uncertainty which the business man does not know how to measure, wherefore he seeks to maintain the *status quo* and to avoid change. As a consequence, although we usually find a small group of business leaders in favor of establishing new and higher standards of action, we find business men as a whole opposed to these changes. The social reformer has interpreted this opposition as reactionism and standpatism. I believe that a more adequate interpretation is hostility to any

influence that disturbs the *status quo*. Thus many of the rules that embody the ideals maintained today have been projected into business from without. It is interesting to notice how business adopts many of these rules of action, forced upon it from without, as an expression of its own ideals. Government regulation of railroads is an instance in point.

In this connection, it can almost be said that an ideal of business is to maintain the *status quo* and to oppose change. It is not difficult to understand how such an attitude of mind is a natural one in business. The importance of reducing risks so that they can be taken with safety is always impressed upon the business man by the very nature of business.

A second ideal in business is control or partial elimination of competition. It may seem anomalous to speak of this as an ideal in the face of the oft repeated slogan, "Competition is the life of trade." It appears to be a fact, however, that in every business, when left to itself, there is invariably a tendency to reduce or control competition. There are various ways in which this tendency works. Sometimes it takes the form of the practices made familiar to us by so-called trusts, when a business either attempts by direct or indirect means to stifle competition. At other times, it takes the form of associations of competitors

which have for their purpose the control of competition by establishing common standards of procedure, thereby making the competition more intelligent. This sometimes takes the form of open price associations. Again it takes the form of open advocacy of government regulation of competition, as in the case of the railroads. This ideal of business has in the past been regarded as antisocial and has been opposed by public opinion. For that reason it has worked itself out in surreptitious ways. It is my opinion that this ideal might be constructive and pro-social if we would permit it to express itself in authorized business associations, supervised by the government and with definite powers and responsibilities.

The third ideal is that of efficiency. This ideal is, in a way, a relative one as efficiency is ordinarily desired for the purpose of making a business successful. It cannot be said that efficiency has always been an ideal of business, but I think that it can be truthfully said that it is an ideal of modern business. It is true that external institutions have frequently shown business how to be efficient. But, granting this, the business men of today are quick to take advantage of this help as soon as they come to understand how it will contribute to the success of business in a practical way. In many instances, the ideal of efficiency today almost stands by itself, apart from the pur-

pose of business. Business men regard it as an ideal to have their business well organized and managed, even if it be possible for them to succeed with less efficiency. In such instances the ideal of the business man is not only to succeed but to have the work involved in his business performed in the most efficient manner. If such an ideal becomes prevalent, it bodes well for America's industrial future. Certain it is that, nationally, the greatest promise lies in having business so organized and controlled that the emphasis is placed not only on profit-making but on efficiency.

A fourth ideal in business is that of service. Service is a very much used and abused term in business. The meaning I intend for it is in the phrase, "Make the customer wholly satisfied with his purchase and more satisfied, if possible, than he could become by doing business with any other organization." This ideal is clearly a relative one and could almost be taken for granted as being essential to the very nature and purpose of business. The fact is, however, that it has not always been an ideal of business. There was a time when the ideal of *caveat emptor* prevailed in business. This ideal is now almost wholly superseded by the reverse ideal, that of service.

In connection with this ideal of service, there is an ideal which we meet with quite frequently in

business, but which we cannot say is prevalent. This ideal is the aspiration, entertained by many business men, to make of their business a permanent institution which will continue after they are gone. This ideal of permanency harmonizes well with the ideal of service, as the thought underlying the latter is that, while service may not be immediately profitable, it will be so in the long run.

In introducing, as a fifth ideal, the social responsibility of business, it may be that the wish is father to the thought. As stated, it is evident that the social purpose of business is to supply the wants of people. It can rightfully be assumed, furthermore, as a part of this social purpose, not only that these human wants be satisfied in the most efficient and economical way, but also that in this process the happiness of the individuals engaged in business, including the workers, be promoted.

The presence of an ideal of social responsibility in business, if there be such, would indicate that business men recognize the social function of business and regard themselves as responsible for the performance of that function. With such an ideal dominant, the business man will regard as primary demands upon his business, first, that he give the customer the best value obtainable at the prices set; second, that he definitely promote the



welfare of all persons engaged in his business; and third, that he cooperate with the government in such a manner as to promote the national welfare. This ideal of social responsibility is a very comprehensive and inspiring one. It cannot be said that it is a dominating one in business, but likewise, it cannot be said that it is foreign to business. As an outcropping of personal ideals, it has been present in individual instances in business. In every generation there have been some individuals who have not only understood the social function of business but who have sought to realize it. These instances, however, have been scattered. In modern times there can be no doubt that the ideal of social responsibility, though still limited, is appearing in an increasing degree. Evidences of its presence in business exist, for example, in the shape of new policies in regard to labor, which are finding their place in business.

Many business men now consider themselves responsible for the health of their employees and for the maintenance of at least a living wage. It may be objected that these policies have a source not in an ideal of social responsibility, but rather in an enlightened self-interest. Taken from a paternalistic view, if this objection holds, it is pertinent to inquire if enlightened self-interest is not in itself a forced recognition of the social responsibility of business. The attitude which



many business men have shown toward the government in relation to the war indicates, it seems to me, a very keen sense of social responsibility, particularly in a national crisis or emergency. Some, undoubtedly, believe this is a temporary attitude and that when once normal conditions are fully restored the former attitude will be resumed. Personally, I do not believe that this will be so. On the contrary, I am of the opinion that the experience these men have had will give them a keener appreciation of social responsibility and will throw into business, when normal conditions are resumed, a greater sense of social responsibility.

In the interpretation of ideals in business, it has not been assumed that business men are as a rule conscious of these ideals. It has not been our aim either to include all the ideals, mainly personal, that find expression here and there in business. It has been our purpose to present the most important underlying ideals which, whether business men be conscious of them or not, dominate in business life. Summarizing them in the inverse order of their prevalence, they are, social responsibility, service, elimination of competition, efficiency, and achievement or success in business.



## VIII

### Ideals in "Society"



## VIII

### IDEALS IN "SOCIETY"

By Elsie Clews Parsons, *Author of "Fear and Conventionality,"  
"The Old-Fashioned Woman," etc.*

I HAVE been asked to describe in this paper a group of social facts for which there is no term, for which the best descriptive device the sophisticated few have contrived is a capital letter and quotation marks. The lack of a term for a social phenomenon is in itself an arresting fact. It is probably significant of some special attitude, perhaps an attitude of indifference, or an attitude of assumption. The Illinois Indians are said to have had no other name for themselves but *Illinois*, a word meaning men, "as if," adds their historian, "they looked upon all other Indians as beasts." Somewhat similar, I think, is the popular use among us of the term "Society." Just as outside of the Illinois tribe men are not men, it would seem, so social intercourse outside of "Society" is not social intercourse. In both cases we have an assumption of the supreme value of a group of persons or of activities. It is this para-

mount or egocentric society life, not life in society, I am to describe.

Before we conclude this discussion, we may find a new term or two of service, but for the moment I shall make use of such popular expressions as, "society life," "in society," "society woman," "society man." But in using these convenient expressions we must remember that like other slang phrases they are merely verbal short cuts. The "society man" is quite as non-existent as the "economic man" of a past century. Anyone who led a society life all his life, day in and day out, could qualify for a freak museum. Nor is the society life itself ever completely detached from life at large — except in the society notes in the newspapers. Even there, society reporters and editors probably realize that they too are taking short cuts even if they keep this realization fairly covert from the public.

I am to describe society life in its American setting. No modern community, I surmise, is as yet without society life. There is no community but what has rigidly prescribed ways of meeting, but what gives ceremonial parties of some kind or other, birth or wedding or funeral parties, or gives "purely social" feasts or dances, no community but what holds to ceremonial visiting or entertaining as requisites of good form, and in all such organized social contact or entertainment

there are undoubtedly a sufficient number of principles of selection and of leadership to constitute within the group at large a "society group." From community to community the principles of selection vary, the type of society leader varies, in details the psychology of the society group varies. Having these differentiations in mind, we speak of London society, of society in Rome or Vienna, of New York or Chicago society.

The society life of Chicago differs somewhat no doubt from the society life of New York, the society life of San Francisco differs from the society life of Philadelphia, but these differences I am to ignore and direct attention to the common traits of American society life. It will not be difficult, I take it, to avoid being too particular; I am more fearful that I may be too comprehensive. In describing American society life, I may be describing, in part at least, the society life of other modern communities. This is the more likely as I am undertaking the description in terms of desire—not merely of distinctive American desires but of generic human desire.

Analysis of desire is never a negligible task in any study of social facts, but in this connection it is imperative, for the foremost distinctive character of American society is, it appears to me, its composition on the basis of effectual desire. In other words the society group of any American

community is composed of persons who are sufficiently desirous to be in the group, in society, to pay the entrance fee, so to speak, and the fees to sustain membership. By these fees I mean, of course, psychologic adaptations, not pecuniary contributions.

Not that adaptations or performances costing money are not expected of those in society. Comparatively few persons can belong to society without having some source of revenue. Without means of their own they must be kept by some one—by a father or a husband or a wife—for their costs of getting about, of dress, of “paying back,” must be met. Now and then in the larger cities may be found a small class of men who get their living out of being in society, men who dine out for the sake of the dinner. But there are so many easier ways of earning a dinner than by making yourself agreeable at one that this society bread line is never long. At best the position of this type of diner-out is insecure.

The society position of persons with either a limited or an uncertain income is also somewhat insecure. Unless they are exceptionally industrious from a society point of view, exceptionally available or useful, they are readily relegated to the group of persons whom one knows but who are not fashionable. An assured social position requires an assured and a comparatively large in-



come. It requires too the spending of that income in certain conventional ways, a society woman or man must live up to her or his position. This does not necessarily mean expenditure for the direct amusement of others in society. Once a social position is secured, society people do not need to entertain, to entertain on any scale, either large or small, but spending in elaborate or conspicuous ways is expected of them. They are supposed to keep a yacht or a racing stable or patronize the arts or build a hospital or found a university.

It may be said, therefore, that conspicuous expenditure, or, to use Veblen's term, "conspicuous waste," is a desideratum if not a requisite of a stable social position. At any rate it is evident that the society life is more concerned with the processes of consumption than with those of production. Not that it is not economically advantageous to certain types of producers to be in society. For real estate men, brokers of various kinds, for house decorators and certain architects, for portrait painters and drawing-room musicians it is good business to be in society; their best customers are there. For other groups, for college presidents, let us say, or for lawyers, the advantage of being fashionable is not unmixed. College presidents and lawyers have to do with a large number of persons who are not only out-

side society but who never expect to get into it. When such persons form the bulk of one's *clientèle*, as in the case of physicians, of clergymen, of politicians, it may be a positive disadvantage to be reputed a society man—an unfashionable patient, or parishioner, or voter may resent the classification. Even to be possessed of a fashionable wife, even to be in society thus vicariously, a privilege sometimes allowed the college president or the lawyer, is a dangerous indulgence for a doctor of medicine or divinity or for a statesman.

On the whole, although there are persons in "Society" who are economically on the make, although the element of business in "Society" contributes to its dullness, as Mr. Chapman long since pointed out, it is fair to state, I think, that "Society" does not to any considerable extent gratify economic desires, i. e., the desires of subsistence.

Without a society life people would be as well off economically as with it, perhaps more so. Their consumption might be more in accordance with their personal comfort and tastes. In fact we sometimes see the desire to spend one's income to suit oneself rather than to suit "Society" competing successfully against the desire to get into "Society" or to stay in "Society." Living contrary to one's tastes, the high cost of

"Society," is now and again rebelled against—by men.

What of the other primal human desire, the sex desire? Does American society life contribute to its gratification? Society life favors the sex desire, I think, even less than the desire for subsistence. That men and women fall in love in society is merely evidence that they can fall in love anywhere, that lovers know no obstacles. Prudent lovers, however, withdraw their love affairs from the society life as far as they can. According to circumstances, they may be described as too domestic to want to go out or as afraid of scandal. In various ways they are indeed made to understand that if they are really in earnest they are a nuisance, a nuisance intolerable to "Society." An exception to "Society's" intolerance of lovers is made in the case of those young or immature enough to remain even in their love-making under the rule of their elders. Elderly match-makers find in "Society" a convenient marriage market, a place of exhibition and a bargain counter, and so they suffer courtships which are brief and which are conducted strictly according to rule.

A society man will carry on his love affairs not only outside of "Society" but even with women who do not belong to "Society." A society woman for whom this meandering is more

difficult may forego love-making altogether. I suppose that kind of negation is generally easier for a woman at any rate than for a man. A society woman is like the saloon keeper who does not drink; she knows that to one in her position love-making has particular risks, risks not only for the love affair itself but to her position. So she eschews it. In philandering or in flirting she seeks a substitute.

Real love-making is disadvantageous to a woman's social position. Flirting may be not only innocuous, it may be a help. It provides her with retainers. Retainers are a society asset, always an asset to the society woman, sometimes an asset to the man who supports her, her father, or her husband. Such retainers may be a part of that vicarious profit expected by men whose families are in "Society."

It is notable here as in other connections that the sexes appear to play different rôles in the society life. Women are the leaders. Men, we see, are merely their backers or their followers. What is the explanation of this distribution of rôles? It is not hard to find. "Society" means more to women, as we say, than to men. It appears to satisfy desire more fully in women than in men. For women it satisfies the desire for achievement and the desire for prestige, i. e., it gratifies ambition. Whether or not this is due

merely to the reason that men have other means of gratifying ambition, more attractive means, I do not attempt to say. The fact is that men do satisfy their desires for achievement and for prestige in other ways. The fact is too that women who satisfy those desires in other ways are apt to lose or never to acquire "social" ambition.

To be attractive to women a society life must impart a sense of achievement. Aims and goals both extensive and detailed it must supply. Staying in "Society" as well as getting into it must be arduous; they call for enterprise and skill. The American society life has answered these requirements. That art of conspicuous wasting it relies upon is in itself exigent. Other "social duties" are laborious, often exhausting. They require a kind of self-devotion which verges on asceticism. They appeal to the energetic and the self-denying spirit of the American woman. Take the ceremonial, for example, of leaving cards. Afternoon calling gives a woman, I believe, a quasi-mystical sense of acquiring merit. I remember driving one lovely spring afternoon in Washington with a lady who was leaving cards. She paid little or no attention to the charms of forsythia or maple tree blossoms but each of the twenty-five calls she made appeared to give her the kind of satisfaction a Catholic or a Buddhist takes in telling the beads on his rosary.

The ceremonial of calling has reached its apogee, I suppose, in Washington. So has the dinner party, or as the phrase goes in parts of the country, "the dinner company." But outside of Washington the dinner party, if not "social calling," affords women opportunities for self-exhaustion and for the concomitant feeling of accomplishment. A successful dinner party leaves its hostess with a poignant sense of achievement—and a sigh of relief. That the strain of entertaining is severe, we may infer not only from the run-down condition of the society woman at the close of the season but from the alacrity with which she sometimes goes to Europe or goes into mourning, her social responsibilities being for the time suspended by circumstance. She welcomes the chance of not "going out" without losing caste.

The routine of dining out and of elaborate consumption in general is fatiguing, but so is stone-cutting or cotton-spinning. Possibly the life of the steeple jack is as trying as that of the social climber. The "social caller" might find making or mending the clothes she calls in quite as laborious as leaving cards or she might be even more exhausted at the end of the afternoon if she had been calling as an agent for a charity society. In other words an enterprising woman could find other jobs just as hard as paying calls or putting

in an appearance or cultivating desirable acquaintances, jobs as hard if not harder. Arduousness is not the only charm, then, attaching to "social duties." To be attractive, social duties must be more than merely wearing. What other character must they have? Obviously enough they must bring prestige.

Prestige does attach to the society life. Why? Because its activities are those of elaborate consumption, Mr. Veblen would tell us, and the ability to consume wastefully has always brought prestige, be the consumer an Indian rajah, a giver of potlaches on the Northwest Coast, or a plutocrat in other parts of America. True, but in so far as not all lavish consumers are in society, in the United States at least, there must be another source of prestige besides wasteful consumption<sup>1</sup> attaching to the society life. This source, I take it, is exclusiveness. Exclusiveness is the greatest of all factors in making any group prestigious—exclusiveness makes royalty prestigious to commoners, the church to laymen, men to women, elders to their juniors. It is upon its exclusiveness

<sup>1</sup> If Veblen had been more attentive to American facts he would not have underestimated woman's direct part in wasteful consumption. To him she is ever the vicarious consumer. In American life at least it is her will to power and not primarily that of her male supporter that is gratified by elaborate consumption. The average American woman wants to be in society and she knows that the more elaborate her consumption the better chance she has to satisfy this social ambition. Is it necessary to look further for a clue to our high cost of living?



that the society life most depends for its charm and for its power. By keeping people out it makes them want to get in. Wanting to get in, they become willing to comply with the entrance conditions—entrance conditions first of a comparatively large circle and then of circles within circles. To be in society is one thing, to be in smart society is another thing. But in either case the entrance conditions largely conform to the standards set by those within—standards, as we have noted, of consumption, but also non-economic standards in special modes of living, of dressing, of eating, of talking, of feeling, and of thinking, and first and foremost standards of exclusiveness, i. e., of willingness to exact conformity of others. Obviously we are dealing here, are we not, with caste psychology, with a caste complex? As in any caste in India or elsewhere, in "Society" conformity is required in matters of dress, of food (eating in accredited places or having food served in accredited ways), in matters of shelter or of place of shelter (living in fashionable streets or fashionable parts of town, going for the season or the summer to fashionable resorts), in matters of language, of occupations, and of mating.

Conformity is as necessary in this American caste as in castes elsewhere, but between it and other castes there are two important distinctions. The first distinction is one that keeps us as a rule



from recognizing this social classification as a caste at all. Since its membership is composed on a basis of effectual desire, as we have noted, made up of persons possessed of fitting desires and free from desires that might embarrass or complicate, the caste appears exempt from some of the more blatant forms of caste rigidity, from the rigidity of membership through birth, for example, or through family connection. In the same family can we not see one brother in society and another in the church or in the army, one sister, the height of fashion and the other described as too serious or too literary or too artistic to enjoy going out—a decent paraphrase for her outcasting?

The second distinction about this particular American caste has to do with sex. This American caste requires a far less degree of conformity from its men than from its women. I can't recall ever sitting at a dinner party next to a barber or dancing at a smart ball with a barkeeper, but on the whole occupation taboos are much lighter upon men in society than upon women. So are dress taboos. An unfashionably dressed man is put up with. So is a man who lives in a cheap lodging in an obscure street. So is a man who ordinarily uses correct English, or occasionally eats in an unfashionable restaurant, or even in a fashionable restaurant with unfashionable friends. In women these offenses are hardly tolerated.

For it is the women in society who are responsible. Not that the men are given greater freedom theoretically, they are merely more negligible. It matters less what they do. The society woman must live according to the rule she makes because she counts. She it is who counts, she it is who reigns. There are no kings in American "Society," there are only queens. American "Society" is a gynocratic caste, a woman-controlled caste.

As requested I have thus far been describing social facts not as they might be but as they are. It has been suggested, however, that the final aim of this City Club symposium should be a reconstruction of social ideals. If you accept the analysis of "Society" as a gynocratic caste, the only ideal it ought to entertain, you will of course argue, is the ideal of suicide. There is no opportunity open here to idealists for the reconstruction of an institution. As democrats, as feminists, as humanists, they must contemplate suicide or, from the point of view of outsiders, murder.

As a matter of fact, this sociological murder is in process. Together with other bits of an archaic social system even today the society life is being scrapped—scrapped by women for themselves just as long since men began to scrap it for themselves. In a growing democracy (and the suffrage movement if nothing else is proof that this

is a growing democracy) it becomes more and more difficult to make yourself count through keeping others from counting—to work the principle of exclusiveness. In this country exclusiveness based on family lingers on only in isolated New England or Pennsylvania communities, in certain Boston or Philadelphia or Baltimore circles. Exclusiveness based on wealth, or rather on its expenditure, remains a more workable principle. And yet, given such opportunities for acquiring wealth as we possess and no sumptuary laws on expending it, caste exclusiveness through consumption is but a flimsy principle. The would-be exclusive caste becomes inevitably a mere economic class whose boundaries are too readily crossed to be thought of as boundaries at all. Nor is it any easier for our gynocratic caste to keep to itself non-economic distinctions in language, in bearing, in dressing, in ways of living in general. American habits of imitation make such caste distinctions short lived. A caste which fails to exclude and which cannot keep to itself any cultural monopoly is certainly in danger of its life.

Imitation and economic elasticity—these are the enemies of our gynocratic caste from without. Within its organization are other perils. It faces a shortage of leaders. Increasing outlets for feminine energy and ambition operate upon our gynocratic caste as increasing social opportunities

for the will to power among men have been seen to operate from time to time on politics or upon the church or upon the army. Other jobs prove more attractive. Moreover once a leisure-class woman has become a producer or inventor consumption ceases to be her supreme concern. Spending becomes simplified because its elaboration is too great a drain on her energy and attention. Moreover spending no longer appears to her as a kind of maker of values—the curious pseudo-production it appears to the “born shopper.” Her sense of achievement through proprietorship is lessened.

Nor does a woman interested in her work prize the kind of prestige elaborate consumption brings her. She does not care to make that particular appeal to women nor does she like the relationship to men it involves. She is likely to want something more in a man than a backer or a retainer. She wants a companion. She soon finds that there are no “interesting” men in “Society,” as we say, or that if they are met there from time to time for fortuitous reasons the “Society” background is not favorable to acquaintance. If she has once belonged to the caste, she does not of course deliberately cut loose from it. Somewhat like an irresponsible man she drifts in and out of it, naturally from a caste point of view a demoralizing factor. Demoralizing, disintegrat-

ing or not, at least to the organization of the society life she contributes nothing. Her talents are lost to it. Above a certain economic class level, every thoroughly converted feminist is, to the extent of her vitality, a loss in vitality to the gynocratic caste.

If the feminist bent is taken in youth, the circumstance may not only deprive the gynocratic caste of a potential leader, it tends to depress its value as a marriage market. Not only is the girl not prepared at a finishing school to take her proper place in society, she begins, in another type of school or in college, to acquire the seeds of revolution against the gynocracy, in so far as it is a gerontocracy, a control by the elders, and particularly a control of her through her sex or her sex relations. She begins to make up her mind to mate to please herself, not to please her seniors. Among the many ways this decision is disintegrating to the rule of the elders is its effect upon the desire of the young to go into society. It means that girls will not feel so "crazy about society" because there only can they meet men—such as they are. Youthful feminists like older feminists want to meet all kinds of men, not only the men admitted into society by their mothers, but the men who never think of applying for admittance. These men, girls will meet in their work and in their social intercourse at large. As for

those young men who go into society but who go only from time to time and reluctantly at that, they will go still more sporadically when the bait that attracts them, the girls they can't meet anywhere else, is withdrawn. And so the circle revolves. The fewer the young men in society, the less attracted are the girls, even the old-fashioned girls. The more aberrant the girls, the more unwilling the men to "go out." Given a few more such revolvings and "Society" as a place for making marriages will be quite neglected, the last vestige of marriage by service, so to speak, subservience to the fashionable dowager, having disappeared. This escape from society's match-making machinery is, I need hardly say, part of that general escape of the young from the old which is the most important, if but little noticed, social fact of our times.

The gynocratic caste suffers in its human composition from the revolution of youth and from the social development in general of women. It suffers in its institutional frame-work from another development peculiar to modern culture. I refer to the modern change of attitude towards what we may call life's crises. In early societies changes in life are met with ceremonials—with maternity, birth, adolescence, mating, and death rites. In modern life this crisis ceremonialism is passing—much of it has passed. Upon it the

gynocratic caste has depended for part of its significance, i. e., it has put these ancient social ceremonies to its credit. Coming-out parties are "society events," weddings are described as "fashionable," funerals as "representative." During the last few years, however, *débutante* entertainments have been considered rather ridiculous affairs and fashionable weddings a little vulgar. Funeral rings and scarfs and gloves are no longer presented to the mourners; mourners are even asked not to send flowers. It will not be long before a wedding breakfast will be as *bourgeois* as throwing rice in a railway station or as a funeral feast, and standing up all afternoon with a "bud" as antiquated as sitting up all night with a corpse. In other words, the occasions upon which the gynocratic caste can make both a public justification of its existence and attract attention to itself are diminishing.

Within the caste itself too there is rebellion now and again or pseudo-rebellion against self-manifestations. "Functions" are derided by the fashionable. To be seen at a "tea" is an *affichément* that you are not to be seen anywhere else. To be asked to women's lunch parties, the most characteristic form of entertainment American "Society" has produced, has come to mean in certain circles that you are not asked to dinner parties. A really smart woman not only never



leaves dinner cards; except as an act of condescension she never goes to a "real dinner party." As for seeing her name in the society columns of a newspaper or her picture in the Sunday supplement, she greatly resents such newspaper impertinence. It is a blow to her social prestige, she feels, to be made so common. A social leader, lives he or she in the Vatican or in an American palace, cannot afford to be inspected at the option of others. This attitude of safeguarding prestige through safeguarding privacy, through objecting to newspaper notoriety, may be expected to spread. Like other fashionable attitudes it will be imitated. Then the wretched society reporter will not only feel himself more of a detective than ever, but more of a fakir. His accounts of the outermost circles of "Society," of its fringes, of life for example at fashionable hotels, will be less and less heeded and more and more curtailed until one day the society column will find itself among the historic curiosities of journalism.

Without boundaries, without leaders, without matrimonial baits, without means of accrediting or advertising itself through crisis ceremonials or through newspaper notoriety, what hope of a future existence is there, we may well ask, for the gynocratic caste?

But surely along one line at least there lies hope or vitality for the society life, the conserva-



tive may urge. However undemocratic and anti-feminist it may be, however unworthily it gratifies the will to power of idle women and irretrievable snobs, however neglectful it is of other primary desires, does it not meet after all one of the most urgent of human impulses, the gregarious impulse, the desire for company? The society life does satisfy the desire for mere company—among women. Perhaps men have less of this desire, perhaps they care more for the companionship which is more than mere company. But even women's desire for company the society life satisfies only in a timid, half-hearted way. A degree of segregation, as we have noted, the privacy of exclusiveness, is so necessary to a prestigious position. Besides, as women acquire other forms of human association, association with fellow-workers, with professional colleagues, with *bona fide* playmates, the various forms of association men have, they too will be bored, much as men are, by those less personal ways of being together characteristic of the society life. Small sets of men and women with common interests and sympathies will form spontaneously to work and play together—a grouping that occurs already in Europe and appears to be on the eve of occurring in New York. There it may be said to await only the disposal of what, for lack of a less flippant term, we must call the "tagger-on spouse prob-

lem," a problem that, humorously enough, even the gynocratic caste cannot keep from trying to solve although solution will contribute so importantly to its own undoing.

But outside of "sets," of intimate groups of fellow-workers and playmates, salt of life as they are to many, is there no need of other forms of social intercourse, of more general meeting places, of opportunities for the chance encounter? Certainly there is, and here at length is a definite and concrete opportunity for the constructive humanist. All kinds of general meeting places are in order—for all kinds of persons—city and country club-houses, gardens, parks, beaches, boat-houses, skating-rinks, outdoor and indoor dancing floors, lobbies in concert-hall and playhouse—in short the very meeting places that are springing up everywhere under our eyes. These places are increasing rapidly. They will increase more rapidly and they will gain distinction once the need of them begins to appeal to the imagination of the social artist, of the lover of pleasant backgrounds and quiet outlooks. Even today places of assembly are becoming more decent and more beautiful in form, although they are dominated as yet both by commercialism and by the old spirit of group exclusiveness and of group apprehensiveness. A new democratization, a new fearlessness, and a new freedom will pervade them in

time, however, and then they will properly fulfill their social functions, alike for the adventurous individual who seeks in them a setting for the chance encounter and for the gregarious lover of his kind to whom the sense of the herd is comforting.



## IX

### Ideals in Music



## IX

### IDEALS IN MUSIC

By Edward Dickinson, *Professor of the History and Criticism of Music, Oberlin College, Ohio*

LOTZE, having the history of music before his eyes, declared music to be the most social of the arts. A distinguished French scholar asserts that all the forms of music "are tributaries of social life. From one end of its history to the other it has an evolution parallel to that of society."<sup>1</sup> But the directors of education in this country, not having the history of music before their eyes, have hitherto neglected to take full advantage of the power that music possesses for mental and moral discipline, and have left it to wander to its rightful position in the educational scheme through unregulated and devious channels. In recent days, however, with a celerity that would be astonishing if we were not accustomed to the suddenness with which ideas start up and spread in this country, music, both as an abstract art and also in alliance with poetry and the drama, is flooding our collective life, and the call for

<sup>1</sup> Combarieu, *Music, its Laws and Evolution*, authorized translation.

music as a sort of inherent right is becoming so peremptory that such philistine bodies as common councils and boards of estimate are giving heed to it, and colleges and universities that have long been scornfully indifferent are becoming aware that here is a challenge which they cannot prudently continue to ignore.

And so the message I bring in respect to musical conditions in America is one of high satisfaction, because I see in rapid progress a movement which is the product of a strong purpose aimed at an object that is clearly conceived. The musical currents which have so long been cross currents rather than parallel, are now flowing together. The activities which may be summed up as creative, reproductive, and educational are moving into step with one another, with the educational motive at the front. The leaders of musical progress are coming more and more under the control of the will to make music serviceable to the many rather than a gratification to the few; to make music a factor in popular education and a stimulating force in social life. There will be no reaction against this tendency; the problem is not how to keep it alive, but how to bring it under wise control; how to unify the various activities involved and develop and systematize the methods by which the great end may be most completely attained.



The obstacles that have delayed the fulfillment of the ideal which the best musical minds in this country have long cherished are of two kinds: first, the disorganization in the ranks of music teachers and the absence of scientific methods, and, second, the blindness of the leaders of general education to the social and educative values of music which the nations of Europe recognized centuries ago. In view of the first we should be cautious in condemnation of the second. The fact that musical instruction, unlike any other element in education, was for a long time, and is to a great extent now, mainly in the hands of private teachers explains much of the difficulty of the situation. These private teachers, although for the most part conscientious and zealous to accomplish good things, have been, in a multitude of cases, imperfectly trained even in the technique of their art and still more so in pedagogic method, and until recently have been but little inclined to establish any organization for mutual help. Even now there is only the faint beginning of an attempt to bring about cooperation between their work and that of the public school. The directors of the public schools were likewise ignorant of the aims and the means of solid musical education. Judging by what they saw of the private methods or lack of method around them, they assumed that music teaching was merely designed for the

purpose of making players and singers. "This," they implicitly declared, "we could not do if we would, and we would not if we could, and there's an end."

In course of time, however, a new light broke upon the music teachers and the public-school authorities. Both parties came to see that, as Hermann Kretzschmar has said, "instruction in song in the folk schools is not merely a musical question, it is a universal culture question," and they set themselves to work to devise a system that would helpfully combine with the courses already established. No one will assert that musical instruction in the public schools of the country at large is yet much beyond its infancy; methods are still imperfect and a standardized system is not yet attained. But there is probably no other department of our national educational scheme that is being more eagerly overhauled with a view to bringing it under the control of reason. In place of the old custom of merely teaching a few songs by rote, to be quickly forgotten, music is taught as a language,—it is animated by intelligence, it becomes a conscious expression of emotion, and it is made to react in a vitalizing way upon the emotion and the understanding. It is widely recognized that one who directs the instruction in music in the common schools must have as specific and thorough preparation as one

who teaches in any other branch of learning. He must know not only his subject but also the nature of the child mind; in fact child psychology *is* his subject. The whole method rests upon the child's instincts and natural aptitudes, so that his musical taste and proficiency grow simply and naturally with his general growth, and music becomes a joy because it is a very constituent of his budding life. I appeal for respect and encouragement to those skillful, broad-minded, and devoted men and women who are finding a congenial place in constantly increasing numbers among the supervisors of music in our public schools.

Musical instruction in the schools is enlarging its borders. Until recently only vocal music was taught, but now instrumental music is added. So far has progress gone that it will soon cease to excite surprise when a high-school or even a grammar-school orchestra performs a program of classic works in a manner to give pleasure even to a professional musician. These orchestras join on occasion with the school chorus, and oratorios and cantatas of the great masters are performed by high-school girls and boys to the admiration of city fathers and the proud relatives of the young musicians.

The leaders of the new musical education in the public schools are not content with performance as a sign of progress. They believe that

musical intelligence and good taste are of still more value in the nurture of youthful character, and hence courses in musical theory and the history and appreciation of music are insisted upon as a prime necessity. "The better half of musical training," a distinguished educator has said, "is good listening." The adoption of this idea in the curriculum of our schools will help to raise a barrier against the tide of vulgarity which encompasses them on every side, and to cultivate a wholesome taste which, rather than the drilling of performers, must be the aim of musical instruction among the masses of our young people.

As in all phases of life, so it is in popular musical education—as soon as one problem is solved others appear. It is very evident that the private teacher can never be dispensed with, for the work of the public schools must be with children in groups—that is, classes—and cannot deal at all with those who desire a separate, individual training. Under the conditions that generally prevail, the child must be balked in his effort after proficiency or else he must add a heavy, often injurious weight to the labor required of him in the public school. The solution of this difficulty lies in some kind of cooperation between the schools and the private teachers. The schools must consent to allow the outside work to take the place of one of the established school depart-

ments, and credits to be given therefor. The practical difficulties in the way of this arrangement are obvious, for the school hesitates to assume responsibility for teaching which it does not control, and the outside teacher objects to having his methods dictated to him by a body of which he is not a recognized and privileged part. The school must be sure that this work is solid enough to be entitled to its credits, and how can it be sure of this unless it oversees it and examines its results? Notwithstanding these impediments, the experiment is under trial in many places, with results that are claimed to be wholly satisfactory. The benefits of this plan, it is easily seen, work in two directions, for the inevitable tendency must be to weed out the incompetent private teacher, to discourage the indifferent pupil, to bring about an increased cooperation between pupil and music teacher, between music teacher and school, between parents and school, between one teacher and another, together with a more serious view, among all four parties, of the value of music as a character-builder and social tonic.

The whole subject of public-school music teaching received a new illumination in the report upon music in the public schools of the United States prepared by Mr. Earhart of Pittsburgh, chairman of the music committee of the National Education Association. In writing to the Secretary of the

Interior, to whom this report was sent, Dr. Claxton, United States Commissioner of Education, said: "Sooner or later we shall not only recognize the culture value of music, but we shall begin to understand that, after the beginnings of reading, writing, arithmetic, and geometry, music has greater practical value than any other subject taught in the schools."

Equally significant in a survey of contemporary ideals in music is the homage which the art is beginning to receive from the colleges and universities. I say beginning to receive, for the long hostility of the "higher education" to music and its sister arts is a cause of sadness to those who are aware of the place which the fine arts hold in the history of civilization. The reluctance of the college to welcome music may be to some extent ascribed to the lack of agreement among musicians as to what constitutes musical education, the weakness of music teachers on the pedagogical side, their frequent lack of broad general culture, and the difficulty of adapting an art which appeals so powerfully to the sense and the emotion to a copartnership with studies which aim primarily at the discipline of the intellect.

Musicians are fond of offering another explanation less creditable to the intelligence of the college governing bodies. A few years ago the president of a prominent New England college,

when it was proposed to introduce courses in musical science, inquired if there was enough in the subject to occupy a student for a term. On another occasion, the executive committee of the trustees of a very distinguished institution put themselves on record as holding the opinion that the training of the powers of expression through musical performance should be classed with box-making or any of the simpler processes of manual training, and hence was not compatible with the high dignity of the college tradition.

These absurd instances, however, must already be considered as belated survivals of worn-out prejudice. The long reluctance of the college is fast breaking down under the stress of a larger conception of the function of the college in a fluent democracy. If the democracy feels the need of art, it should be taught to look toward the college for aid in guiding its choices. No less does the college itself need the humanizing influence of music; and the musical profession, which is ever coming more deeply into sympathy with the whole people, needs the scholarly inspiration which the college can afford. That these two educational factors are offering to one another the right hand of fellowship is a promise of advantage to both the contracting powers.

It is inevitable that music in entering the classic—shades, shall I say—no, the open air and the



sunlit spaces of our American colleges, should enter hand in hand with the drama and the arts of design, also long banished from what should always be their home and sanctuary. The art museum and the theater are taking their places upon the campus beside the concert hall, and all of them not far from the chapel. So it should and must be. Is not Mr. Ralph Adams Cram a true seer when he says in his inspiring book, *The Ministry of Art*: "The day is not far distant when the school of art will be not an accessory or an adjunct to a university, but as absolutely and intimately a part of its prescribed curriculum as the ancient languages or philosophy or letters?" For "art is a great language for the voicing of the greatest things, and he who is not learned therein, either in its active or its passive aspect, is to that extent ignorant, unlearned, uncultured."

Mr. Cram's allusion to art in its passive aspect is a reminder that the colleges at present incline to the view that the music course, like the aesthetic courses in general, should have a cultural rather than a vocational purpose. The question is still open, however, and opinions as well as practice differ. With some institutions the conception of the function of music in the higher education is in accord with that which generally prevails in the universities of the continent of Europe, which "are concerned chiefly with the intellectual train-



ing which is necessary for all those who would gain a broader grasp of musical art than the mere technical view."<sup>1</sup> In America the increasing strength of such a conception does not necessarily exclude the teaching of music as a practical art. Some of our colleges give credit toward the A.B. degree for playing and singing; others only for work in musical theory or history or both. Some maintain music schools with pupils who take no work in the department of arts and sciences; others merge the department of music in the general college scheme on the same terms as the department of literature. Notwithstanding the fact that the cultural ideal must in the nature of the case be uppermost, the fact that a large and increasing number of young men and women, whose tastes and talents lead them into the musical profession, likewise desire the liberal culture which the college gives tends to force the college into a line of action which will minister to this double need. For why, it may be asked, should the college not train teachers for music as well as for literature or dramatic expression? Nevertheless, while Professor Baker of Harvard may train playwrights and actors, while successful composers may issue from the classroom of Professor

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Otto Kinkeldey, *Music in the Universities of Europe and America*; Proceedings of the Music Teachers' National Association, 1915.

Parker at Yale, and skillful pianists receive their training at Smith or Oberlin, these results will always appear as by-products, and the college, leaving the training of composers and virtuosos to the professional schools and private teachers, will find its chief mission in diffusing the refining influences of music throughout the academic body, in striving to convince its students of the necessity of art as an agent of civilization, in order that they may go forth ready to lend their prestige in aid of all the influences that tend to promote sound musical education everywhere and to diffuse taste and intelligent enthusiasm among the people.

Musical education in America is already feeling the guiding hand of the college graduate. The number of college graduates in the musical profession in this country would surprise most of us. Glance over the reports of the proceedings of that very influential body, the Music Teachers' National Association, for the past ten years, and see how many of its leading spirits are connected with colleges, universities, and theological seminaries.

A similar tendency to bring musical educational leadership into the control of liberally educated men and women would meet us in examining the discussions at the national conventions of public-school supervisors.

Emanating from these and other centers of scholarly investigation and practice we discover remarkable progress in strengthening musical instruction in all directions. The state associations of music teachers are rapidly gaining in the character of their papers and debates. There are efforts in some of the states to permit or even require private teachers to offer themselves for examination before boards appointed by the state or the state teachers' association, with certificates of competence in return for satisfactory responses. Throughout the country there is in progress a powerful effort to reduce the inevitable waste by demanding higher qualifications on the part of teachers and effecting something like unification and standardization.

You would expect that a professional musical educator would give a prominent place to the phenomena of progress in the higher institutions and public schools. Permit me now to lay before you what I might almost call the romance of recent musical progress in our country. Indeed is there not something that is stirring to the imagination, something quickening to the heart, in the rush of musical art to regain its old rights of citizenship and become a possession of the common life? Music in the last few years has seized upon the affections of the people at large as it never has before in the history of this country.

It is striving to become a constant feature in the national life and habit. From its former shelters in the opera house, the concert hall, the detached music school, and private studio, it is extending not only into the common school but also into the city's crowded streets, into the park and playground, joining hands with the outdoor festival and pageant, and now at last inspiring whole communities to proclaim a new-discovered social consciousness in verse and melody. So rapid is this movement of music back to the people that even while I gather the facts for its illustration my story is already old.

This movement has taken forms which cannot be wholly distinguished from one another because they are integral parts of one large impulse. The developments in the schools and colleges of which I have already spoken are a characteristic feature of it;—the manifestations of which I now proceed to speak are found in the establishment of musical settlements in the poor quarters of our cities, the free concerts for the people provided by city and town administrations and benevolent organizations, and latest of all the rise of what is called "community music." These developments are all factors in the reaction of music (and in this case reaction means progress) away from the exclusive control of professional and commercial interests to its old status as a universal social

interest, brought directly to the people and adopted by them as the expression of a common inherent emotion. Such music was in its original condition. It was inseparably bound up with poetry and the dance—these activities not, as afterward, delegated to individuals detached from the mass, but constituting, however crude, a composite art which was communal, the expression of religious or other sentiment by means in which the whole group could participate. In the stage of intellectual development next above the primitive condition, that represented by the more refined folk song, music was still the passion and joy of the community, where the poet and composer were lost in the aggregate, the performer for the moment in no way distinguished from his neighbors in function or experience.

With the rise of the opera, the development of the concert system, the increasing complexity of musical science, and the appearance of composers and virtuosos who raised music to a brilliancy which required trained specialists for its full exercise, musical practice was concentrated into centers where wealth and fashion ruled, and the naïve music of the people shrunk away and timidly withdrew into obscurity. Even in the music of the church a process quite similar may be observed.

Notwithstanding these centralizing and specializing tendencies a reaction was bound to come.

Music can never thrive if it is severed from its sources in the popular heart. In spite of the enormous technical developments of the nineteenth century, its greatest composers, with the exception of the writers of grand opera (for grand opera has always been an aristocratic, unsocial affair) never quite lost touch with the music of the people. The most significant fact, as I consider it, in the history of European music in the last twenty or thirty years is the instinctive turning of the current of artistic creation back to the people for new refreshment, and the revival of a definite nationalism in place of a vague cosmopolitanism in musical style and practice. This reaction is characterized by a renewal of the study of folk song on the part of composers as well as scholars, the increased effort for the diffusion of musical culture among the masses of the people, the entrance into the current of progress of the less musically developed outlying peoples, such as the Finns and the Roumanians, and the determined efforts of the nations of long musical traditions, particularly the French and the English, to throw off the dominance of foreign example, and develop styles which the aroused national consciousness may recognize as conformable to its own needs and ideals.

All the phases of this popular, nationalizing tendency—even the last mentioned, the effort to

attain musical independence—are making extraordinary headway in America at the present moment. Distinguished in many ways, certainly, from the analogous phenomena in Europe, as our conditions are different, this American movement is urged onward by similar motives and is equally a sign of vigorous health. Its purpose is to bring music more intimately into the constant life of the whole people, to make music a potent factor in education, to add a new charm to the life of the home, and to give freer opportunity to the American composer, performer, and director. And now, especially observe in this connection that the best promise of this American movement lies in the fact that it involves a conception of music as an art that serves interests other than its own separate advantage. The German historian Kretzschmar distinguishes two orders of musical art—music as a free art, and music that serves. Music is free, according to his definition, when the art work is loosened from all outer interests and flourishes alone as art for the sake of art. This function of music, he admits, must be acknowledged; healthful growth does certainly require scientific training in private studios and conservatories, generous patronage of the professional musician, and the public exhibition of technical mastery in composition and execution. But something more is required. Music must also have



other motives than self-assertion for delight in its own beauty; it must enter into the larger life of the time and unite with other efforts whose ends are found in the extension of individual and collective welfare. Music should be a servant and not a master. "Music, like all the arts," Kretzschmar asserts, "needs the closest connection with culture and life; the people cannot draw their aesthetic nourishment, their love for art and their sense of it, from museums and galleries and concert halls, but it must be offered to them in the streets and squares and the church; it must mingle richly in their labor, their education, their emotional life."<sup>1</sup>

The new "community music" is allied to the work of the "community center," which is extending all over the country. Church music is the one form of the art which in its conception and uses can never be "free," although it has sometimes perversely lost sight of this truth. But the music of the church does need a discipline which will bring it into more perfect harmony with the spirit of devotion to which it is tributary; and in this direction also we find progress, slow and discouraging as it often may seem. The surprising recent development of that most beautiful of communal enterprises, the outdoor pageant,

<sup>1</sup> Hermann Kretzschmar, *Musikalische Zeitfragen*.



would be impossible without the aid of music, for rhythm in movement and rhythm in sound are the very breath of its being. We must also believe, I think, that the astonishing growth of "free" music in the multiplication of concerts of every description and of composers and performers, in the enormous development of all the musical manufactures and trades, is vitally related to the social and philanthropic movement. We may find here convincing evidence of what I believe to be the truth, that music attains full mastery of its nobler powers only when it consents to become a servant.

It was recently my privilege to visit the Music School Settlement on the lower east side of New York. Here I found a full-grown conservatory of music in the most squalid section of the city—a conservatory with more than eight hundred students representing over twenty nationalities, and a large and efficient faculty. The institution is supported by the income from a moderate endowment, tuition fees which range from ten to fifty cents, and gifts from regular and irregular patrons.

I was cordially received by the director who gave me the history of the school from its origin in a little violin class that was started a few years ago by an adventurous and charitable young woman. Then we proceeded on a tour of inspec-

tion. Adjoining the director's office was the library with seven thousand musical compositions and twenty-two hundred books. I went into some of the teaching rooms and felt the atmosphere of earnestness that pervaded them. In the concert hall the school orchestra was tuning up for its weekly rehearsal. I read in the annual report the long list of gifts of money, of tickets to concerts, operas, plays, and lectures, and a delightful record of miscellaneous contributions, from musical instruments and books to apples, doilies, Christmas greens, and—most charmingly suggestive—"wood for the Christmas fires" from the Story-hour Children.

Other beneficent ministries attach themselves by natural affinity to this musical benevolence. There are athletic, dramatic, social, and literary clubs, ranging from adults down to the youngest club of boys, who dubbed themselves "The Peter Pan Club" after that glorious day when Maude Adams gave them a magical trip to the "Never Never Land." There are Sunday night "At Homes," aesthetic dancing classes, a Mothers' Club, a Parents' Association, the Music School Guild of young people who work in any way that may promote the interests of the school and its clientele, summer camps and excursions into the country. The whole institution throbs with healthful, joyful life. Outside is a seemingly end-

less wilderness of cheap shops, factories, and dingy tenement houses, narrow streets thronged with roughly clad toilworn men and women, and with children whose only playground is the dirty pavement. "How far that little candle throws his beams!" says Portia to Nerissa in *The Merchant of Venice*: "So shines a good deed in a naughty world."

In thirty cities of this country musical settlements similar to this in New York exist. They are centers of light in places that would be dark indeed without them. They throw their beams afar, and draw not only the children but men and women of all ages, who in the midst of the sordid dullness of their lives feel a divine hunger in their souls.

One Sunday morning, in the days of a former director, Mr. David Mannes, there appeared before the school assembly a little group of medaled veterans representing a post of the G. A. R. They came to present the school with a flag. The bright emblem was unfurled; the audience, led by the school orchestra, sang *The Star-spangled Banner*. Mr. Mannes made a brief speech of acceptance. "Let us close," he said, "with the chorale, *A Strong Fortress is our God*. Then, with his baton raised he exclaimed: "This flag is the symbol of our ideal of government, a government by the people, for the people. So must our

ideal of music be a music by the people, for the people."

It is not too much to say that the ideal thus proclaimed by Mr. Mannes is the guiding star of a host of musicians and music-lovers in this country today. As the demand goes up from the professional for better education *in* music, an answer comes from the mass of the laity in a call for a richer education *by means of* music, an education that will help to make more active those faculties that have a social value. The essential purpose of the national movement to extend the love of music among the people, and engage them in cooperation in its production and support, is not simply to afford them a means of entertainment of a better sort than the vulgar show in which multitudes of our people find their only recreation; that alone would be a worthy motive, but it is not all. Music has one power which no other form of art expression possesses in equal measure, that of bringing a mass of people under the spell of a single uplifting emotion and thereby welding them together as a unit in the fellowship of a common experience.

This two-fold result is certainly the aim of those who have established free open-air orchestral concerts in our cities. The effect of these concerts upon their untrained audiences is of the most interesting character. The statements of

Mr. Arthur Farwell, former supervisor of Municipal Concerts in New York City, would apply as well to any other locality: "That these crowds get the greatest satisfaction from the greatest music on the programs there is not the shadow of a doubt. It is the great works that sweep them out of themselves, exalt and rest them, and bring their being again into harmonious relations with life after the toil and sordid struggle of their days. It is no longer the separate minds which listen, it is the over-soul of the mass. In the occurrence of this phenomenon the people receive the essential nourishment that resides in the composer's inspiration, and receive the fullest revitalizing of soul which it is capable of bestowing. It is for this spiritual resolvent and revitalization that the concerts are visited by the thousands who are to be found there day after day."<sup>1</sup>

These efforts for civic betterment through music take various forms. The outdoor music in the parks and on the docks must be confined to a part of the year. How shall the ministry of music be continued in the cold season also? Why should not the schoolhouses, "the only available club-houses for those who can afford no other," be utilized? Here and there an enlightened public opinion is forcing open the schoolhouses to larger

<sup>1</sup> Proceedings of the Music Teachers' National Association, 1913: *Municipal Music in New York*, Arthur Farwell.

services than those for which they were originally designed; they are becoming social centers for the poor, with music as an ingredient in their invigorating atmosphere.

The latest phase of this truly democratic movement is found in the so-called "community chorus," which, it is claimed, made its first appearance in Rochester, N. Y., only a few years ago. At least the name had its origin there; the thing itself might properly be called an expanded and glorified singing school, as known to our New England forbears, which in turn was the parent of the "musical convention" of quaint yet honorable memory. The country singing school and the musical convention, being somewhat undisciplined and crude, were absorbed and lost in the specialized musical culture that came to us from Germany. But the desire, always latent among the people, to express their social feeling in song cannot long be repressed anywhere, and in these latter days we see it bursting forth once more. "The community chorus idea," as it is described by one of its leaders, "is a step in the social evolution of music beyond the traditional forms of choral organization. It convokes all the people, without discrimination or exception, and without regard to previous musical knowledge or training, to join together to sing. While a community chorus may and does give concerts, its

purpose is not that of the usual choruses of the concert world." It does not "interpose any of the usual intellectual processes of musical education between the people and their singing. It deals with any and all of the people in the mass, and its aim, while musical, is not so much artistic as social and spiritual."

If this "community chorus" movement stood alone I should not be entirely confident that it would not prove a passing fad. But it does not stand alone. It is buttressed by the public school, the church, the women's clubs, the municipal musical enterprises, the dramatic movement, by the many tendencies in social life which find in the universal love of music a power which unifies at the same time that it idealizes. Moreover, it is allying itself with the "community center" movement, through which, as Dr. Luther Gulick states it, "neighborhood self-activity is being restored in city life, and community consciousness is being created in rural life."

In all the manifestations I have cited of a new spirit at large in our country—the development of musical education in the public schools and colleges, the growth and waxing influence of musical clubs, the music school settlement, municipal concerts, the community orchestra and chorus—we have once more revealed that irrepressible socializing power which, after all is said of the



glory of the works of the great masters, is the chief title of honor which history bestows upon the art of tone. We students of the history of music look upon this musical movement among the people with mingled hope and apprehension. Will it continue to spread until all the waste places are visited; will it transform the life of our people? History, it is said, teaches that as artistic professional music develops, the music of the people declines. So it has been, or so it seemed to be. But history has a way of varying her lessons, and loves to put historians to shame when they become over-confident in their generalizations. There are two kinds of music to which we may apply the term "popular," viz.: the music that originates among the people, and music that comes to them from various sources and is adopted by them because it meets their wants.

The popular music that diminishes with the growth of individual creative and executive action is the music that emanates from the common people—that branch of music which we call "folk song." This phase of music retains characteristics that testify to its communal origin, and like the popular poetry it is inevitably supplanted by the specialized forms of individual creation. We Americans never had a really national form of music, and the conditions that produce folk song will never exist here. In the musical countries of



Europe it is dying out. America will never be a musical country as England was a musical country in the age of Elizabeth, as Austria was a musical country in the eighteenth century. The term "a musical nation," if it can ever be applied to us, will involve a new connotation, as signifying a country in which music has become a common institution, accepted by the leaders of thought as an essential ingredient in education, employing its intensifying power everywhere in the service of religion, of patriotism, of everything that helps to create a civic consciousness and add sweetness to the common life.

There is a group of enthusiasts who find in figures and statistics evidence that we are on the high road to becoming a musical nation. We are reminded of the prodigious increase in the number of concerts, the multiplication of orchestras and choral societies, the enormous output of pianos and organs, the well-nigh universal use of mechanical piano players and phonographs on the part of those who can afford them, and, as a crowning testimony to the national love of music, we are told by a competent authority that the American people spend for music, musical instruments, and musical instruction over six hundred million dollars every year. The musical independence of America is proclaimed as an ideal and a rapidly realizing fact. The national musi-

cal consciousness, we are told, is so far awakened that the efforts of native composers and performers are receiving an encouragement hitherto refused, and the gratifying history of American painting promises to be repeated in the field of creative music.

This chorus of self-gratulation is met by an outcry of very shrill solo voices which assert that these signs of progress are fallacious, that the vast patronage of concerts on the part of the wealthier class has the same significance as the craze for the photo play on the part of the less opulent order, that only a very small proportion of those who buy concert and opera tickets receive any lasting intellectual benefit. They tell us that the increase in the extension of bad music is greater than that of good music, that the one order of music which immensely overtops every other in the quantity of sales is the coarse, silly, inane "popular song." They see, or think they see, a progressive degeneration in the public taste, they group together all the shortcomings in our musical, literary, dramatic, and pictorial output, and declare with Mr. William Marion Reedy that these vulgar manifestations are the reflection of our national life in general, and believe with Mr. Percival Chubb that our whole system of education is at fault in that it communicates no quickening sense of the poetry of life.

Wherever the balance of truth may lie, there is no question that we are in the midst of intense and unprecedented energies which express themselves in literature, in music, in the drama, in architecture, and all the arts of design. American life is determined to express itself vigorously in some way. The main question of interest is, in what way shall that be? Shall our art strive merely to show us life as the artist thinks he sees it, literally, elementally, photographically, or life as it strives to be when it is seized with the diviner impulses? Shall our art aspire, as Walter Pater says it should, towards the condition of music, or towards that of the naturalistic novel? However we may answer these questions, in our coteries and in our newspaper contributions, we know that Art herself will have the final word, and that her decision will be shaped by mighty forces that are beyond our ken. I have tried to show the grounds of my belief that the forces that are operative in the music of this country are, on the whole, working for true progress. Evidences which I have not had time to give in detail plainly show that those who love music are taking it more and more seriously. They desire to know as well as to enjoy. The lecturer is almost as much encouraged as the star performer. The production of books on music and the circulation of the highest-class musical magazines are increasing by

leaps and bounds. I know that these educational influences I have described as yet reach only a fragment of our population, that multitudes in our congested cities and our scattered rural communities have no music in their lives, that whereas in earlier ages throughout the world every form of labor had its song, today in our country the only sound heard in our factories is the whir of machinery, and the husbandman catches no welcome of instruments and voices when he brings his harvest home. Yet the musical revival in this country is real and genuine, as I have tried to show. A wise man judges a movement not by its present accomplishment, but by its tendency. I draw hope from the recent musical development in this country because its ruling spirit is so largely educational; because it is rapidly becoming organized and unified; because it is coming daily under the control of men and women of culture who believe with all their hearts in its necessity and beneficent power. It is, I verily believe, a force that will have an influential place in the efforts that are in progress to build up a new and fairer democracy.

# X

## Ideals in Religion



## X

### IDEALS IN RELIGION

By George Albert Coe, *Professor of Religious Education, Union Theological Seminary, New York*

IF YOU had asked an Athenian in the age of Pericles, "What are the religious ideals of Athens?" he would have had not the slightest difficulty in replying. For Athens was the state, and the state maintained in the Eleusinian mysteries an annual revival of religious consciousness. Here the youths who had reached an appropriate age gazed for the first time upon certain sacred objects and upon a solemn drama symbolical of the soul's progress, while from the lips of the hierophant fell instruction concerning the ideal meaning of life.

When we endeavor to say what are the religious ideals of our own people, we are in no such happy situation. America is not the state. America has no hall of sacred mysteries, no initiation of its youth into an American conviction as to the destiny of man. There is no American church, and there will be none. The spirit of America speaks in no creed, through no priestly

voice. It is, rather, a certain ethereal essence that thrills our souls when we meet one another simply as citizens. Of it we may say:

There is no speech nor language;  
Its voice is not heard.  
Yet its line is gone out through all the earth,  
And its words to the end of the world.

The audible voices of religion are not one, but many; we have not a church, but churches, and these are contrary, the one to the other. Possibly some future historian, free from all our biases, will see in our sectarianism a real unity, a spiritual division of labor. Let us hope that we shall yet discover that each of our sects is but laying a separate stone in a single temple of the spirit. But to us of the present, trying to understand ourselves and to be true to ourselves, the ideals of our religious bodies are contradictory, irreconcilable. Our America is the scene of a warfare of the spirit.

I state this conclusion at the outset, in advance of the evidence, partly in order that the evidence may be the more sharply scrutinized and partly in order that there may be no illusion as to what is involved in our assumption that we are competent to scrutinize religious ideals. Are we sure that our present scrutinizing attitude does not already contradict some of the ideals that we are sure to meet? We are assuming, are we not, that



the religious divisions of our populace are so many sects, each of which we regretfully see going on its own way. We desire that all of them shall discover some common or inclusive principle, following which each may contribute to the unification of American purpose. If, indeed, these sects would acknowledge themselves to be sects, if each one would seek to transcend itself in some inclusive truth or purpose, if ecclesiastical institutions understood themselves to be subject, as individuals are, to the spiritual law that he who seeks to save his life loses it—then the search in which we are at this moment engaged might regard itself as non-partisan and judicial.

But what if our religious divisions should deny that they are sects? What if each one should say, "I have already settled the question that you are ultimately interested in. The only possible basis for the unification of the spirit of America is that which I prescribe?" Then, in truth, our condition would be that of spiritual warfare, and at once the problem would arise whether any genuine neutrality is possible, whether we have not already taken an unneutral attitude by beginning this inquiry.

We who now agree to gaze upon the holy things of one another's faiths may well require of ourselves both high sincerity and absolute frankness with one another. This places upon me an

obligation to confess that the spirit in which I survey our contemporary ideals permits me to doubt whether any religious group among us is more than a sect. I assume the liberty of questioning whether any ecclesiastical body has committed itself in word and act to any ideal that can possibly be the rallying center for the spiritual aspirations of all America. If, now, there be neighbors of mine who would declare against me any spiritual penalty for raising this question, who insist upon prescribing my conclusion in advance and regardless of what I can observe—I take them and their ideal, to be most sectarian of all, least capable of uniting our divided souls.

Because I find ecclesiastical groups requiring of one another submission rather than mutual self-transcendence, because there are religious ideals that cannot incorporate into themselves the freedom that I am at this moment assuming, I am obliged to regard the spiritual life of America as a warfare. And because I must in this discussion assume unqualified freedom of religious inquiry, it has seemed to be the part of neighborly frankness to invite you to judge for yourselves whether this makes me also a sectary. Let me confess also without reservation that, as I gaze on the divisiveness of our religious life, there moves within me what seems to be a religious spirit that is larger, more inclusive, than all fenced-in religion.

I worship the God, not of a religious institution, not of a nation, not of a part of history but of the whole, the God who, breathing himself everywhere into the human clod, makes it a spirit, a social craving, the spirit of humanity, the spirit of a possible world society. I bow my spirit before the spirit of the world democracy that is to be.

How shall we know what are the ideals of our churches? Shall we go to their formulated creeds and confessions of faith? These symbols of faith were constructed for the most part in earlier generations, before the problems of society could be seen in the perspective that is inevitable to us. You will not find here the concepts that are current in our aspirations toward democracy.

. . . . Lo, where his coming looms,  
Of earth's anarchic children latest born,  
Democracy, a Titan who hath learned  
To laugh at Jove's old-fashioned thunderbolts —  
Could he not also forge them, if he would?

King by mere manhood, nor allowing aught  
Of holier unction than the sweat of toil;  
In his own strength sufficient; called to solve,  
On the rough edges of society,  
Problems long sacred to the choicer few,  
And improvise what elsewhere men receive  
As gifts of deity; tough foundling reared  
Where every man's his own Melchisedek,  
How make him reverent of a King of kings?

— LOWELL, *The Cathedral*.

This is a problem of religion that is simply unrecognized in the traditional forms of doctrine. We must look elsewhere if we wish to know what relation exists today between religious ideals and the ideals of democratic society. On the other hand it should be remembered that creeds do not for the most part attempt to describe the good life. Rather, each creed represents a party vote on disputed questions of Scripture and of history. Hence it comes to pass that upon the lips of many Christians there are symbols of Christianity that say not a specific word about the love that is the fulfilling of the law. Not in these ancient symbols shall we find the ideals by which men live.

Is the meaning of religion in modern life revealed, then, in the intermittent geysers called revivals? To some extent it is. A great popular revival is a holiday of the spirit, a temporary release from the dullness of the economic grind. Here springs of tears and of laughter that have been going dry are unsealed. Here for the moment the individual mind, melted into a mass consciousness, basks in the freedom of irresponsibility. By these processes, many a man is released from the iron bands of evil habits. Here, helped by social stimulus, men acquire moral courage and momentum. Loyalties of no mean quality displace for a time, frequently for a lifetime, the petty will that had developed in the individual's

narrow round. Common morality and traditional conceptions of religious duty are uniformly preached in revivals. But if we ask revivalism to show us what is to be done with the tremendous social and anti-social forces that swirl around us, its voice grows feeble. If we ask it how America shall attain to the spiritual wholeness toward which she strives to lift her eyes, revivalism becomes dumb.

There are three sources of information as to religious ideals, however, upon which, in conjunction, we may rely with some confidence, namely: The expenditures of religious bodies, the content and method of religious education, and declarations of religious bodies when they are confronted with the social problems of the day.

Let us begin with expenditures—for where your heart is, there will your treasure be also! Here we come upon some things that are common to all the faiths. Religion means to all our people, among other things, regard for those who are in sickness and distress. However numerous and deep our differences may be, the Good Samaritan has our unanimous franchise. Expenditures for education indicate another tenet of all American religion. Every child of God must have opportunity for mental growth. A third and vast item of expenditure is that for the maintenance of worship. Costly worship is practiced by all religious

bodies, but the types differ so much that no single or brief statement of the ideals that are here seeking utterance can be adequate.

Some notion of the largeness of life, and of its weakness; some acknowledgment of the majesty of duty, and of human frailty; some hope of a social future greater and better than the present; some feeling of a divine presence in these convictions of largeness and majesty and progress—these things, all looking toward ideals, are always present. But what contribution is being made by public worship to the spiritual unity of America or of the world? To enter some of our sanctuaries is to withdraw for the time being from America, struggling to become a soul, and to spend an hour in agreeable apartness. The portals of some of our temples swing between a vast and seething present, full of unsolved problems, and a reposeful past, which in magnificent attire ever celebrates anew its own complete self-sufficiency. Yet here and there prophetic individuals, having caught glimpses of God precisely in America's bewilderment about her own soul, cause the experience of worship, through prayer and sermon, to become a consecration to the great Spirit of Unity.

Still other vast sums are devoted to missions at home and abroad. What ideals does this expenditure represent? Mixed ideals, undoubtedly.

The sentiment of pity, obedience to a command of Jesus, loyalty to a denominational enterprise, desire to extend one's own ecclesiastical organization—all these are here. But something more is here, something exceedingly vital. The modern foreign missionary movement started out as an effort to rescue individuals from sin by preaching; it is transforming itself into cooperation with the socially constructive forces of other peoples to the end that the level of whole civilizations may be raised. Educative processes that form social standards are becoming basal in missionary strategy. Moreover, the original intent to add new members to our own respective ecclesiastical bodies is being converted into the policy of transferring the control of native churches as rapidly as possible to the natives themselves, and of uniting in these churches the various denominational groups, even though we remain separate in our own land.

Finally, the home base is undergoing reconstruction. Many of us can remember a time when foreign missions were an affair of ministers who extracted money from laymen by occasional appeals to their emotions. Then came a period when laymen began to study missions. As a result, a local society here and there assumed the support of a missionary. Finally, we see the laymen of today meeting in great assemblies to consider the



world situation under the assumption that the problem of a world religion is their affair. The enlargement of social horizon that is coming—that has already come—through this movement is a notable fact. Laymen are actually beginning to think of their religion, even of their personal religious life, in terms of a possible world society. After full reckoning has been made of ecclesiastical divisions and ambitions in mission work and of mixed motives everywhere, the missionary enterprise of today must be recognized as a tremendous expansion and deepening of social ideals.

A source of information more trustworthy even than ecclesiastical expenditures is religious education. For when we teach the young, we discriminate between what we are and what our ideal is. Education never says to children "Be what we are," but "Be better than we are." Here we criticize ourselves and pay something for preventing in future generations the faults of our own. This is our most practical idealism. Tell me what and how you teach the children, and I will tell you to what ideals you are really awake.

What, then, are the churches teaching their children? All of the churches, to begin with, are teaching common morality. By this I mean both the "do nots" of the Ten Commandments and also the "do" principle of merciful kindness.



Through the constant inculcation of these principles among more than fifteen millions of the population, mostly children and youth, the Sunday schools and other church schools have become a moral bulwark of incalculable significance. The public school, when it instructs and trains its pupils in morals, relies upon the open, continuous standard-setting done by the religious bodies. Imagine the plight of the public-school teachers if they could not rely upon such educational support. Think what it would mean if the state should suddenly find itself the only institution whereby society introduces children to the moral wisdom of the race, the only one that sets about awakening the heart of the child, out of which are the issues of social life! The American system of education is not identical with the public schools. Our system includes the public schools and the churches as complementary, mutually supporting parts.

In the social ideals that control religious education unanimity will be found at one point at least. All religious bodies stand for the integrity of the monogamous family. But beyond this there is variation, and there is likewise much uncertainty. To say merely that common morality is inculcated leaves the story of ideals less than half told. For one and the same moral command may represent contradictory ideals. "Thou shalt

not steal" is actually made to mean in our present life either "Hold as sacred the present law of private property" or "Revise this law fundamentally in the interest of humanity." "Thou shalt not kill" may mean either "Refrain from murder in the common-law sense," or "Take the commercial profit out of everything that depresses human vitality by accidents, disease, or overwork." "Love of neighbor" may mean either relieving distress, or removing the causes of distress, or the democracy of equal opportunity as against special privilege. Therefore we must discriminate between the different social ideals that control religious education here and there.

The extraordinary revival of religious education in orthodox Judaism is inspired by an ideal of racial solidarity. To keep the blood pure, to perpetuate ancient ceremonies, to keep alive memories that separate this people from all others—this is fundamental. Therefore instruction in the Hebrew tongue is prominent, and marvelously effective methods for teaching it to American children have been worked out. Here, then, is the ideal of a permanent cleavage in the social consciousness of America. Liberal Judaism, on the other hand, emphasizing the social ideals of the great prophets of the race, shows in varying degrees a tendency to transcend the things that separate Jews from their fellow-citizens.

Religious education in the Catholic Church is a closely articulated system that follows with unwavering fidelity certain thoroughly conscious ideals. Moral conduct is rigidly insisted upon, and much definite training is provided. But this is not all. Through every item there runs a thread that suspends the whole upon a particular view of social law. Moral conduct is obedience. It is prescribed by authority. Without any ambiguity whatever, Catholic education supports law and order. It does so with the greatest naturalness because this great Church conceives itself, in all its spiritual labors, as the authoritative administrator of fixed divine commands. To revert to an Aristotelian conception, the Church is the "form" and moving principle, while men are "matter" which is to receive impetus, direction, and particular quality from this "form." The authority of the Church depends not a whit upon the suffrage of its members.

Consider, now, that this authority includes morals as well as faith. Two things follow: *First*, the public school cannot be competent to teach morals, because it does not recognize the one authority that, as Catholics believe, is competent to say what is right and what wrong. *Second*, Catholics must oppose every social theory that seems to make men themselves the source of law. Hence Catholicism's implacable antagonism

to socialism. Catholic religious education without doubt tends to forestall social discontent not only of the impulsive sort but also of the reflective sort as far as it is inspired by any non-conformist ethical feeling.

The only ethical unity of America that Catholicism will at all consider, therefore, depends upon accepting the Catholic interpretation of authority in religion and morals. This great historic institution sees no hope for our moral distractions, our divided purposes, short of the extension of the Church itself until it becomes the one and only church of us all. This is her ideal America. She cannot participate in our public schools whole-heartedly, but only partially and as a temporary accommodation to a system that she regards as fundamentally wrong. She cannot identify herself whole-heartedly with any humanitarian reconstruction of the ethical bases of law, for she regards her authority in the moral sphere as exclusive.

There are Protestant bodies also, or at least parties, that with varying degrees of insistence teach their children to think that the spiritual unity of America is possible only through entrance into one particular sheepfold. Their church is "the" church; all others are "sects" or "denominations." Or, their creed is a finality to which all must ultimately bow. Partly by open

speech, but more largely by silent assumption, dogma still separates good men. Still the ancient art of slaying men by words is practiced among us. Yet on the whole it may be claimed that our manners are improving. They are improving partly because scholarship applied to ancient dogmas has shown how largely they are reflections of historic periods and incidents. But our manners are improving also because larger and finer social ideals are coming to be incorporated into theological presuppositions.

It is noticeable that ecclesiasticisms of the exclusive types tend to set off the sacred from the secular, giving religion a sphere peculiar to itself and thus saving it from excessive contact with the jarring ideals of society at large. I do not see how any exclusive ecclesiasticism can do otherwise. In an era of science one must not be infallible in too many things, and when laws depend upon the votes of the whole people, a particular church must not prescribe too much. But this results in the following paradoxical situation: Logically considered, every act of legislation is subject to an ethical test. In numberless cases ethical motives are actually appealed to on behalf of, or in opposition to, a proposed law. This is true not only of laws that relate to vice and crime, but also to those that concern the social welfare, to say nothing of the fundamental rights of man.

There is not an item in the law of contracts, there is not a business custom, that does not involve the ultimate question of the value of human life and the proper relations between man and man as persons. If I mistake not, some consciousness that this is so has begun to pervade the populace, and the masses are already seeking for a comprehensive principle and motive for social organization. But it must be pointed out that the religious bodies that most insist upon the possession of exclusive or unique authority for themselves or for their dogmas are the ones that have the least quarrel with the bisection of life into secular and sacred.

But Protestantism, in most of its bodies at least, reveals the presence of a contrary tendency. Most of the Sunday schools say to their children, "Here are indeed revealed truths that must surely be believed, but listen for God in your own heart, and then live from within outward." Now this emphasis upon having a right heart brings these Protestants into a peculiar relation to social agitations that proceed from the good heart. On the one hand, some of the leaders, holding that social service and social reconstruction are not religion, have insisted that the old slogan, "Get right with God," is sufficient for the church. But other leaders, pointing out that Jesus made love to God and love to men a single principle, have replied

that there is no way to get right with God except through active love, and that, consequently, the reconstruction of society into a brotherhood is the process of salvation.

Thus it comes to pass that the missionary motive with its world outlook has begun to fuse with the brotherhood-motive of our most daring humanitarianism. This fusion is already expressing itself in the Laymen's Missionary Movement and in the religious instruction of children. Not, perhaps, with the consistency of a fully matured policy, but yet with the inevitability of a life process, the new courses of lessons for Protestant Sunday schools have begun to focus life's ideals around the conception of a world brotherhood. Furthermore, the new methods of religious education include with entire definiteness the training of children in missions and social service as a single program.

What is the reaction of ecclesiastical assemblies when they face the problems of our distracted society? Do these assemblies use the dialect of a privileged or inert social class, or the intelligible speech of a genuine world brotherhood? As in the case of missions, so here ecclesiasticism cannot yet be said to have realized clearly that it must lose its life if it is to gain the world life toward which it aspires. Missions *plus* remedial philanthropy may be taken for granted; but social



reconstruction both at home and in mission fields cannot as yet. Nevertheless the acknowledged motive of brotherhood has already produced some remarkable utterances concerning current social problems. For example, the Federal Council of Churches has united upon a "Social Creed" that faces in the spirit of brotherhood a rather remarkable catalogue of our social conflicts. This confession of faith, taken in connection with parallel declarations by various denominational assemblies, makes it impossible to accept the assertion that is sometimes made that the churches are so many fortresses of social conservatism.

What would happen to our economic and political system if the spirit of brotherly love for all mankind should get control of it? The answer to this question will reveal the latent radicalism—and not altogether latent—that is in Protestant Christianity. There is, in fact, a large and increasing number of men and women whose religious convictions require the testing of every social regulation and custom by this question: "Does it build up the life of all the men and women and children concerned?" Alongside the fiscal balance sheet, there is demanded a human balance sheet that shall show the health and happiness and possibilities of character that go into industry and that come out of it. The clearer thinkers in Protestantism have seen that to be



Christians they must insist that business become organized love. To this end they intend as far as in them lies to organize men of good will into a brotherhood that shall get control of law and administration and the natural resources of the earth. These persons, and their number is growing, have the radicalism of those who are conscious of themselves as instruments of the loving will of God.

Call this fantastic if you will. Say that men cannot love one another to any such extent. Say that men have individual rights or vested interests that they will never surrender. Nevertheless the fact remains that, with fresh and enlarged application, multitudes of men believe with intensity that "God is love," and that the law for our life, a law that must be put into all laws and institutions, is, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."

Do any of our religious ideals contain healing for the terrible fever through which the world has been passing? Religion that had supposed itself to be a monotheism of universal human significance turned out, when the tide of war swept over the world, to be a collection of national religions, each with its own god of war. The subservience of religion to nationalism that we have witnessed has brought to light the social limitations of the *ante bellum* faith. With their

lips men had spoken of divine love and of human brotherhood; but men had not counted the cost of brotherhood, nor made their industrial institutions into instruments of brotherhood, nor trained their own spirits steadily to think of national boundaries or of diplomacy as so many opportunities for brotherly love. Brotherhood was a sentiment, a hope, an ethical fragrance; but the hand upon the throttle of the social engine of steel was not the right hand of fellowship.

Has American religion anything better to offer? We have pious desires for world peace, and for the permanent cessation of war. But how do our prayers differ from those of the other belligerents, all of whom desire peace? Wherein is our religion any more of a guarantee of world brotherhood than theirs? Who are our brothers? Religiously considered, what are national boundaries? What constitutes national honor or vital interest, religiously considered?

As one listens to those who stand forth as spokesmen for God, one discerns that there is unanimous approval of the ideal of universal peace. "Surely," they all say, "the land of world peace floweth with milk and honey." But here the voices become confused. Most of them appear to be saying, "We are not able to go up against national selfishness and national self-will, those great giants, the sons of Anak. The land

which we have been spying out is a land that eateth up the inhabitants thereof, and all the people that we saw in it are men of great stature; we were in our own sight as grasshoppers, and so we were in their sight." And one saith to another, "Let us make a captain, and let us return into Egypt." But a few of the forth-speakers for God use a different tone. "Let us go up at once," they say, "for we are well able to overcome. Fear not the people of the land. If only God delight in us, the God of the world brotherhood, he will bring us into the land of world peace, and give it unto us." Thus speak the few. But the congregation bids stone them with stones.



# XI

## Ideals in Philosophy



## XI

### IDEALS IN PHILOSOPHY

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AS a graduate student, I remember that whenever I chanced to ask a question in metaphysics of my great teacher, the Master of Balliol, the answer came always prompt and decisive. If I chanced to ask that same question two months later, the answer again came prompt and decisive, and in practically identical terms. I came, after a time, to feel that there were no doubtful places in the Master's philosophy. Although it was a philosophy cosmic in its outreach, the Master was equally at home in every part of its vast domain. It gave me, as a student, a peculiarly dizzy sense of the power to which a human mind could attain. To hobnob thus with the Cosmic Absolute and pass on authentic news about him to college boys—it was achievement rare and wonderful!

I question whether any American students of the present generation have the same experience with their teachers of philosophy. If they ask

of them a question in metaphysics, the answer is most likely to come with hems and haws; and if they ask the same question two months later, the answer, in all probability, comes with quite different hems and haws. American philosophers of today, apparently, are altogether in doubt. And as for being at home in their philosophic empire, they act far more like uncomfortable beings who are trying, with some desperate embarrassment, to discover just where in the whole blessed world they really are.

Has philosophy lost its way in the world? Is the day of its calm lordship of life gone by? Or is philosophy finding for itself a new way? Is it on the road to a still more splendid lordship?

To the philosopher of the closet, who looks at philosophy simply in terms of philosophy itself, there are indeed many things that bring concern in the present state of philosophic thought—its unfinality, its limited outreach, its unwillingness to take the old confident flights, its shyness of the Cosmos and the Absolute, its humble self-disparagement. To the philosopher of the out-of-doors, on the other hand, who measures his philosophy in terms of his experiential world, these characteristics of present-day philosophy bring not concern but rejoicing. To him they are the sign that philosophy is still vital; that it still draws its sustenance from the common life; that it lives



and moves with the life and movement of that common existence. For to the philosopher of the out-of-doors these characteristics of the philosophic thought of today—its tentativeness, its experimentalism, its suspicion of absolute truth—are characteristics of the life of today and show philosophy to be very near indeed to the spirit of its time.

It may seem to some, however, that this is indeed a queer kind of compliment to pay to philosophic thought—that it has changed with the times. What is philosophy if not the contemplation of the eternal verities? And what are the eternal verities if not eternal? A philosophy that changes its substance with the times must indeed be a queer sort of philosophy, a sort of presto-change philosophy, not a rock-bottom philosophy worth planting one's feet upon with firm assurance that it will not give way.

But here is precisely the significant thing about typical present-day philosophy. It actually prides itself upon the fact that it is not any longer a rock-bottom structure of truth. It doesn't believe in rock-bottom structures of truth. It rather prefers to picture itself as out on vast and precarious adventure—on rolling billows, amid veering winds, adventuring for some far-distant, unknown America.

What shall we make of all this? What is

philosophy of today driving at anyway? What is its job? What is its intent? And what are that job and that intent worth?

Those of my hearers who studied their philosophy in the eighties and nineties will remember that in those years philosophy in America was triumphantly German. No course in philosophy was complete, in the first place, or really amounted to anything without a study of Kant. And as one studied Kant, one was reminded by one's instructors continually that an even greater was still to come. In most cases one didn't reach the greater one. Kant was a big enough job in himself, and most of us were piled ignominiously upon the battle field long before we had got anywhere near to grips even with the Transcendental Aesthetic. But always there were the awed whisperings, the hushed allusions to the greater one, the world-compelling Hegel. Hegel was the Master; Hegel—with Fichte and Schelling as initiatory torch-bearers—was the Truth.

Hegel, as we learned, was himself very scornful of Kant and made unmerciful sport of the little old Koenigsberger's thin company of *Dinge-an-Sich*, and of his rather naïve dialectic. But on the whole, when we came to look clearly into Hegel himself, we found him to be not so very far different from his great forerunner. Both, we

found, were philosophical optimists. Both believed that the problem of human existence could be made a relatively simple one, if the human mind would but submit itself to a true methodology. For Kant, that true methodology consisted, on the one hand, in a humble recognition of the limited, tentative character of scientific reason, and on the other, in a triumphant and soul-satisfying recognition of the unlimited, final character of moral reason. Through that moral reason, Kant got, or believed he got, his grip on the three great realities, God, Freedom, and Immortality.

So the world for Kant was a good world. God was in his heaven, looking after the *Dinge-an-Sich*; and all was very right with the world. The human soul was free, and its destiny was to be dutifully happy *in perpetuum*.

Hegel, to be sure, had no use for Kant's methodology, for his division of the reason into scientific and moral, pure and practical. But Hegel believed with Kant that reason, if it were but the right kind of reason, could reach the truth of things. Reason could think itself through to the heart of reality. The reality that Hegel reached by his mind-shattering dialectic, or believed himself to have reached, was a world absolute in spirit, a world eternally perfect, and yet a world which, in its time aspect, was realizing itself through progressive stages of evolution. Hegel

thus was an evolutionary optimist. God, the Absolute, was in his heaven; and all was eternally coming to be right with the world!

These were the philosophies that dominated our lives in the eighties and nineties. They were thoroughly conventional philosophies. They seemed, to be sure, to be something very rare and out of the ordinary. Their jargon was like to nothing that we could remember and their thoughts seemed desperately hard to master. But after all was said and done and the smoke of battle was cleared away, it came to little more than this, that those tough old German philosophers approved our long-standing conventional thoughts—our thoughts about religion, about morals, about politics, about sex relations, about business. In short, they approved our long-standing conventional Christian optimism. Above all, they confirmed us in our customary view that if people would only *think* things through, if they would only seek for the truth and get that truth stated, everything would be fine and noble.

It is significant now to remember that the eighties and ninties were, in our country, the days of agriculture and small business. Big business was indeed beginning to rear its head, but we were not yet quite aware of it. We were a nation of farmers and small tradesmen, with the typical outlook of farmers and small tradesmen.

Now it is just that outlook which is interesting here. Farmers and small tradesmen lead a relatively quiet life. There is no great fume and fret about them, no helter-skelter rush, no wild expectancy or thrilling adventure. Among such folk, life goes on from day to day very much as it always has. The season comes round and the plow must be hauled out of its corner. The time comes for marbles and for summer hats; and in the small store, a letter is carefully indited ordering the new stock. Farmers and small tradesmen make no big demands on life. They have no heaven-scaling ambitions, no fiery discontents. Periodically, a faithful and uncomplaining wife presents a new offspring to an equally faithful but not always uncomplaining husband, who forthwith mends the baby buggy for another season's run. On Sunday, the family repairs to its particular church and offers up thanksgiving in its particular way to a God that giveth all. And on Monday the farmer swaps horses and the grocer sands the sugar. A quiet, complacent, unadventurous life, with no great evils to be fought save the two monstrous evils of the flesh, whiskey and sex immorality.

For such life the great outlines of reality were fixed and secure. Things, in the main, were right. Individuals indeed went wrong sometimes and had to be set in order—the church and the jail were

there for that purpose. But on the whole, things were as they should be—things political, things economic, things social, and things religious.

It was somewhere in the nineties that little clouds began to show themselves in the blue of our complacent heavens. One heard of dishonest uses of public moneys—"graft," it came to be called. Some very ugly minded persons began to print ugly tales in ugly magazines. We were told things about aldermen and bosses. And then the stories began to creep in about congressmen, even about those noblest Romans of them all, United States senators. And then the stories dared even to besmirch our judges, the most sacredly inviolate of all beings in our commonwealth.

We refused to listen, and yet the stories somehow got beneath the skin of us. At the same time, another annoyance was coming into our quiet life. As we plowed our fields, as we sold our calicos, there sounded in our ears a low growl from over the country. "Unions," we muttered, "the unions are making trouble." Then, in a big city, someone threw a bomb and killed some policemen, and we swore that the blackguard and all his crew should be hanged. We hanged them and returned to our plowing and our selling of calicos. But the growl grew louder. Then there were shots and cries of the wounded; windows

smashed, factories burned. And we sent the militia to shoot down the dogs. And when the militia couldn't do it, we sent federal troops.

It was all very annoying. When we came to church on Sunday, a dodger would be thrust into our hands, bidding us to stand by the strikers, to stand for decent living wages, and decent conditions of work. We got very angry and tore the dodger to bits. And then we composed ourselves and went in and told God how we hadn't been drunk or done that other unmentionable thing, and that we hoped he'd let us go to heaven when our time came.

I need not pursue the matter in detail. I want simply to emphasize how radically our life has changed from the life of those complacent eighties and early nineties. Today we cry for peace and there is no peace—no peace in business, no peace in politics, no peace in religion, no peace between the nations. We are torn and shattered. Great doubts assail us. Great perplexities stagger and dumfound us. While we were living our quiet lives, great forces, forces of good and forces of evil, were growing up among us—big business, big cities, big politics, big science, big adventures. We suddenly found ourselves in a new world, a world for which we hadn't prepared ourselves and which we didn't know quite how to handle.

We stopped reading our Kant and our Hegel.



Somehow they didn't seem to apply. We began to tackle things right and left. We got interested in political reform, in trade unionism, in socialism, in sweatshop work and child labor, in criminality and prostitution, in bad housing and parkless streets, in imbecile children and unhealthy parents. We got interested in Rockefeller and Harriman and Gould and Morgan. We got interested in Wall Street. We got interested in the Supreme Court.

And when we stopped to take breath, lo, the old philosophy was gone and a new one—new ones—had grown up in its stead.

As we look now at the new philosophies born in America since the nineties, we discover that the spirit of them was the spirit of the new America, the America that was outgrowing her youth of complacent self-conceit, the America that was learning sad and oftentimes tragic truths about herself, the America that was slowly finding herself face to face with new and vastly perplexing human problems. It was the spirit, in short, of self-criticism, the spirit impatient of easy optimisms, grim to confront real difficulties, frank to accept the human world not as all planned and perfect, but as one where the tragedy of defeat was real and where there was need for the strong arm and the strong heart of loyal help. The characteristic,



you will remember, of pragmatism—the first philosophic child of the new American spirit—was its biting scorn of absolutism's "block universe," that finished futility of German philosophy; that beatific world beyond good because beyond real evil. Pragmatism threw out the challenge of an awakened America: the world is not all good; the world is hugely bad. God's not in his heaven; the devil disputes his throne. Optimism is pap for babes. The strong man is he who looks his world in the face and sees it as a world of vast and perilous adventure, a world where all manner of forces contend, a world that may go to smash for all that we can tell, a world, therefore, that calls for one's help to win against the forces of darkness. Not optimism, but an adventurous meliorism—a world to be made better by fighting for it, not a world to be accepted as already the best of all possible worlds.

With this defiance of the complacent absolutisms went another defiance. Truth—how was truth to be found? For the absolutist, truth *was there*. Truth was eternal. Truth was something to be *discovered*, a content already in place in the high heavens, that somehow was to be appropriated. If people would but *think* hard enough they would reach it. Thus the absolutisms laid greatest stress upon thinking, and so upon the purely logical disciplines and activities.

Pragmatism, disavowing the whole absolutistic block conception of a universe finished and perfect, believing instead that the universe is an adventurous universe, unfinished, whirling along, muddling along, fighting along, striking out into this line, now into that, had no use for Truth with a capital T, Truth that is *already there*, eternally real, all boxed up and ready for delivery. Truth was something in process of creation. Tomorrow there would be more truth than today; and no one could tell what radically different truth there might not be in a thousand aeons. Truth was not a something to discover and appropriate; truth was something to create. The truth-getting process was a trying-it-on process. The act that fitted, the project that succeeded, the line of direction that could carry itself out—that was truth. Truth in short was a dynamic thing, a thing of action. And so, just as in the absolutisms the stress was laid upon thought, in pragmatism the stress was laid upon action. The one type of philosophy was intellectualistic; the other voluntaristic.

There was another outcome still. For the absolutisms, reality, in its proper nature, was not this changing world of appearance. Reality was the changeless, the eternal. Time, therefore, was a category of lower import. Time, somehow, and all that was in time, were relatively unreal,

of lesser import and value. For pragmatism, on the contrary, with its denial of absolutes, it was precisely the eternal that was the untrue category. Time, and all that was in time—these were the real; these were the only sources of authentic values. While absolutism in short was eternalistic, pragmatism, by its very nature and interest, was aggressively temporalistic.

It will be interesting at this point to note the parallel between this pragmatic way of thinking in philosophy and a way of thinking that was already manifesting itself with increasing vigor in the social and political world. The Fathers of the Nation had written out for themselves in their national constitution what to them was practically an absolute formulation of Political Truth. For decades Americans had regarded that formulation with supreme reverence, reciting its doctrine of rights and its theory of the functions of government as something beyond the mutations of time. Indeed so perfect did they conceive this formulation of Political Truth to be that they firmly believed that if other nations would but take their constitution over bodily the social and political millenium would be at hand. But in the late nineties, Americans were beginning to be very doubtful about their revered Constitution. One experience after another led them to see in how great measure the supposedly Absolute Truth em-

bodied in the Constitution was but the truth of a specific and very much limited period in the nation's life. They began to see that one must be very suspicious of any fixed and final setting forth of political truth, that political truth in short is created in the very process of a nation's growth. Moreover they began to see that political truth is not to be discovered by thinking it out *a priori*, deducing it from some high and holy principles of human "rights," but that it is to be found by constant, patient experimentation, experimentation in which the institution or the law which "succeeds," which "fits" the specific situation, is the institution or the law which is, for that situation, true. Americans, in short, under stress of their national difficulties, were quite unconsciously and yet with growing conviction, changing from the political absolutism of the first century of their national life to political pragmatism. And I think it will not be denied, when I say that such pragmatism in political thinking is the characteristic note of present-day American life.

I pass now to another equally significant though somewhat more difficult aspect of philosophic pragmatism. William James startled American philosophers some years ago by asking the apparently silly question, "Does consciousness exist?" I remember that, at the time, I was still in the growing-up stage in philosophy; and that

when I saw the question, I snorted and cast the article which made pretense to answer the question aside. But, curiously enough, despite my exceedingly disapproving snort, the question stayed. And indeed, not only has American philosophy not been able to cast the question aside, but I think I am correct in saying that in the most trusted quarters of American philosophy, the answer is now given as James gave it: "Consciousness does not exist."

I am well aware that such a statement will make the layman gasp; or perhaps better, it will cause him to renew his conviction that, as all philosophers are fools anyhow, it doesn't much matter what they say. But this time let the layman not be so sure. James was asking a big question and was answering it in a big way. His answer, in all its deeper significance, marked practically a revolution, not only in our philosophical, but in our social, our economic, our moral, and our religious thinking. Simply to illustrate, let me take the last. Religion, for most of the past centuries, had been a thing *von oben herab*. There was supposed to be a higher order of being—the spiritual—which somehow ruled over our lowly bodily life, gave it its purport and direction, handed down its laws and their penalties. Religion was reverence for this higher, non-bodily order of being. Not only, however, was there

above human life such a non-bodily order of being, but human life was itself in part non-bodily. Human life was split in two; it was body and it was soul. And at death, the thinking part would bid a fond but grateful farewell to the bodily part and fly away to its heaven of disembodied bliss.

James's answer, in its full implications, swept the slate clear of all such dualistic doctrine. By brilliant analysis—an analysis pursued with convincing power by such men as Dewey, Woodbridge, Holt, Thorndike, Watson, Singer and others—James showed how impossible it was to believe in a non-bodily substance, a “consciousness” that somehow “ran” the body. Consciousness, he showed, is not a substance, a peculiar kind of being; consciousness is a relation, a way of acting, the relation, in short, between a living organism and the environment to which it specifically responds. Consciousness, he showed, is a type, a very complicated type, of organic (bodily) behavior, and as such can no more be separated from the body than the surface of a sphere can be separated from the sphere itself.

All this is increasingly of the spirit of our day. Some people decry the materialism of our day, meaning by materialism the fact that people are interested in *things*—in finding them, in making them, in making them over again into still more

satisfactory things. They who decry this are in the main still at the older dualistic point of view, at the point of view namely that it is man's business to have as little commerce as possible with the bodily world, that it is his business rather to spend his energies in cultivating his "inner" life. But the attitude of social and economic America, like the attitude of the regnant American philosophy is increasingly against such ancient dualistic thinking. The spirit of America calls for the valiant conquest of the bodily world, which to America means likewise the valiant conquest of our own wider and more fruitful life.

I cannot here enter into the profound changes which this anti-dualistic attitude of James and his followers must bring to pass. Let me simply say, as I leave the matter and pass on, that such an attitude, as it grows among us, will sanctify the world of common things; it will give us a religion and a morals not, as in the past, *von oben herab*, but *von unten hinauf*, a religion and a morals that will root in the everyday adjustment of everyday matters, a religion and a morals, in short, whose heroisms will be not the heroisms of the world-reviling ascetic or the heaven-aspiring saint, but the heroisms of the engineer and the business man, the producer and the manufacturer, the artist and the scientist, the heroisms of those who love this world of organic life and who work



courageously to bring such life more abundantly. And that, I think, will be no small gain.

I have indicated above that the absolutists were interested in thought. Truth, for the absolutists, was there, eternally waiting to be discovered, and it behooved man therefore to think and keep on thinking. By thinking hard enough it was believed, he might some day reach the very arcanum itself. Pragmatism, on the contrary, had no great confidence in thought. And it lacked confidence, not because it had any particular distrust of thought, but because it visualized the world differently from the absolutists. It saw the world as a world in the making, a world in which fact-truths and value-truths were actually in process of being created. Hence it distrusted thought, not because thought was intrinsically a poor sort of thing but because no thought, however competent, could find The Truth, for the simple reason that in a world-in-the-making The Truth was not there to be found. Truth was a daily, hourly outcome of action.

Hence for pragmatism, thought took a secondary place in the scheme of life. In the classical philosophical tradition, rooting in Aristotle, thought was something good-in-itself. The highest life indeed was the life of pure contemplation. Pragmatism reversed this tradition, joining with



the voluntaristic Duns Scotus in the conviction that the highest in life is action. Thought is simply contributory to action, a pathbreaker, a problem solver, a smoother out of difficulties. Thought in short is never in any sense an end in itself, but always purely an instrument of action.

It was at the University of Chicago, among a group of vigorous thinkers, working together under the leadership of John Dewey, that "instrumentalism"—the underlying logic of pragmatic thinking—was brought to its most elaborate and penetrating formulation. We all still remember the electric shock of William James's announcement of the discovery of the "Chicago school" of philosophy. We are far enough away now from that announced discovery to evaluate it; and I think that most philosophers would today agree that what James so delightedly announced as a new and vital development in philosophy was indeed precisely as he characterized it.

The interesting thing about this Chicago movement is that it has already had most far-reaching effects in one region at least of our practical life, in education. The new theory of education that is sweeping over the country today, carrying the name of John Dewey from end to end of the land, is nothing more nor less than the philosophy of instrumentalism applied in the schoolroom. Take for example, the slogan of the new theory,

“Learn by doing.” *Doing’s* the thing. One may think and think till one bursts one’s skull, but never by thinking shall one really arrive. Life is a process to be lived, not simply to be thought about. The schoolroom, therefore, must be a place where students actually *live through* their problems. Hence the quiet scorn of these idol-breaking philosophers of the futile intellectualism of the schools, the wearisome efforts to discipline the child’s mind, to develop his “thinking” power by heaps of meaningless mathematics or parsing of the classics or memorizing of kings and queens. One need not be a bold prophet to declare that here, in this new action-philosophy of education, something deeply authentic has been brought into our life, something through which life will be more vigorously and intelligently effective.

I pass now to a very different development of American philosophy, a development which holds itself to be in some respects opposed to the one just considered, but which in reality is in largest degree supplemental. I shall not be concerned to trace out the subtle disagreements of this movement with the one preceding, but rather to indicate just what the movement is and how it finds a place in our present-day American thought.

Neo-realism, the movement referred to, is a protest against the *unrealness* of past philosophy.

Philosophy had, by a curiously involuted logic, got itself so tangled up in its subjectivisms that it had come actually to declare that thought was more real than the physical things about us. Although the real world was really most obviously real, philosophy had so twisted and turned itself that it had become timid about everything that wasn't born within its own skull. Neo-realism, through Woodbridge, Montague, Perry, Holt, Spaulding, and others, restored philosophy to the courage of the unsophisticated man. It restored philosophy to a commerce with *things*, good, hard, physical things. And it set for philosophy the task of coming out of its subjectivistic haze and tackling the problems of the world about us.

Such is the healthy spirit of neo-realism, a spirit, be it noted, wholly in keeping with the realism of our modern American life. For American life demands today that the realities be frankly and fearlessly faced—the crude, hard, work-a-day realities. It has no patience with the old timidities, the old sentimentalities, the old romantic self-deceptions. In every region of life it demands that we know the truth and that we let the truth set us free. And it believes above all that truth is to be discovered, not by some revelation out of a philosophic heaven, but by a straight-from-the-shoulder tackling of the commonplace matters of this world.

And this brings us properly to Santayana, a philosopher without a school, yet a philosopher whose influence is deep and will be lasting. Santayana writes with fascinating satire of the "genteel" tradition in American philosophy, the Christian, puritanic, supernatural tradition. Santayana is frankly pagan, frankly naturalistic. Like the pragmatists and the neo-realists, he is at outs with the old romantic subjectivizings of philosophy, the old romantic self-delusions. Like them, he asks for a straight-away taking of the natural world at its word, for an unashamed meeting of its conditions, and an unafraid appraisal of its values.

But now I find myself at the most difficult point in this hasty review of American philosophy. I have spoken of the restless, heaven-defying pragmatists, of the dour, earth-gripping neo-realists and of the pagan Santayana; and my time is almost exhausted. And yet there is Royce!—Royce, the master of so many of the masters of American philosophy. Ought not the major portion of this paper to have been devoted to him? Doubtless. But the curious fact is that, wonderful as Royce's work has been, the major portion of it does not belong to present-day philosophy. For good or for ill—I speak of course subject to correction—the philosophy that made Royce internationally famous is a philosophy that today is no longer

in the saddle. I should not venture to say this were I not able to record another fact, namely that a new Roycean philosophy is mounting to the saddle. This is a philosophy that is as yet but in the making; but I verily believe that if the good fortune is granted our world of having Royce live for a number of years to come, this new Roycean philosophy will shape itself into a form most fruitful for American life.<sup>1</sup>

Those who know Royce know that he is one of the most remarkable men that has appeared in American philosophy, and nothing more remarkable has occurred in the history of this great mind than his slow but unmistakable growth out of a philosophy pertinent to a past generation into a philosophy deeply and splendidly in keeping with our more recent democratic life.

In 1901 Royce published his monumental treatise, *The World and the Individual*. In that volume of profound metaphysical analysis, the Absolute was so commandingly in evidence that human personality was all expunged. Universal Thought, Universal Experience, Universal Selfhood, the All-inclusive Self were the concepts that were to the fore in the writer's interest. Seven years later, Royce published his *Philosophy of Loyalty* and marked thereby the rise in him of

<sup>1</sup> This was delivered some months before Professor Royce's death.

new dominating interests, the ethical and social. Three other volumes appeared in rapid succession—*William James and Other Essays* in 1911; *The Sources of Religious Insight*, in 1912; and *The Problem of Christianity*, in 1913. In this succession, the ethical and social interests developed with increasing power, until in the last mentioned, the concept of human personality and of the social community so dominated the whole discussion that the old Cosmic Absolute was all but forgotten. A new type of idealism was there developed—the idealism of social humanity. Life in the Beloved Community, loyalty to the Beloved Community, the striving for the realization of the Beloved Community, these were the rich and permanent human values; these were art and science and morals and religion; these were the be-all and the end-all.

It is unnecessary to dwell at length upon the significance of all this. That one of the three or four master minds in American philosophy definitely turned to the social group and to the principle of cooperative relationships within that group as the expression of the truly indefeasible values is to say that philosophy at its highest has turned its face firmly and convincingly away from the atomistic individualism of the earlier generations and is looking with eager hope to the mutualism of an integrated, cooperative society.

Having spoken of Royce, nothing would seem more fitting now than to mention Howison; for the two in their oppositions as well as in their agreements stand nearest together of all American philosophers.<sup>1</sup> Both are idealists; both are personalists. Both have struck the note of a profound reverence for human values. But to Howison it was given to strike early and with brilliant power a note which, until recently, was lacking in Royce—the note of pluralism. Howison, like James, had no use for the Absolute. His mind, vigorously alive to the reality of personality, would brook no merging of that individuality in any Universal Self, however exalted the latter might be. The City of God was to Howison indeed a *city*, a city with citizens who were just as real, just as indefeasible in their ultimate nature as God himself. To Howison, in short, democracy was not simply of this changing order of things; democracy was laid in the changeless foundations of the world. Here again, on its highest plane, American philosophy has voiced the reverence for the unlimited possibilities of human personality.

The pity of it is that this gifted mind has left only the meagerest report of himself in his writings. Nevertheless the vigor of his fight for

<sup>1</sup> Professor Howison has likewise died since this was delivered.



idealistic pluralism has left its deep impress upon American philosophy.

Let us pause now for a moment before we make our final summing up of contemporary American philosophy. We have reviewed thus far the points of view and the spirit of five characteristic developments of American philosophy—pragmatism, neo-realism, the naturalism of Santayana, the new social idealism of Royce, and the pluralistic idealism of Howison. Let me speak briefly of one further characteristic development. This development belongs to no single school or movement of philosophy but in increasing measure to all of them—I mean the development of the social point of view. Philosophy has had its day of epistemological absorption, when it laid out its universe of logical and methodological concepts with a devotion as untiring as, to the ordinary man, it seemed utterly useless. Philosophy, however, has never been frightened from great pursuits by the cry that the results were “useless.” It has sought truth in the high places, oftentimes beyond the vulgar ken. Today a subtle but very real change is coming over philosophy. Philosophers everywhere are turning with increasing interest to the problems that root in social life. In the philosophy of conduct, the change from the old introspective, individual-



istic point of view was marked decisively by the publication, in 1908, of Dewey and Tufts' *Ethics*. From that time on, the study of the moral life has been, with growing depth and comprehensiveness, a study of the social order in which the moral life operates. The philosopher has thereby become interested on the one hand in a new type of psychology, social psychology, and on the other, in a new type of metaphysics, the metaphysics of social values. And this double interest has led him to reenter, from a new and freshened point of view, his old domains of politics and law. The movement is too recent to report large results—a book like Dewey's *German Philosophy and Politics* (1915) or Royce's *The Problem of Christianity* being but forerunners of great things to be accomplished.

But two cooperative enterprises among philosophers will show the direction in which much philosophic thought is being turned. The first of these enterprises is the *International Journal of Ethics*, which, although retaining the same name, has under the editorship of Tufts, with the cooperation of such men as Roscoe Pound and Bertrand Russell and John Dewey been transformed, from an organ of the old introspective, individual ethics, to a vigorous organ of social, political, and legal philosophy. This movement is of profound importance, for up to the present

there has actually been in America no organ set apart for the discussion of the living problems of social, political, and legal philosophy—a discussion which the restless, searching life of social and political America would seem to make wholly necessary. The second cooperative enterprise is the increasingly successful endeavor to unite the deeper ranging minds in the legal and the philosophical professions in the penetrating effort to work out for American law, what now it so lacks, a consistent and unifying philosophy.

I hesitate to speak of another influence that is turning philosophy from her ancient paths of quietude. We philosophers have been apprised lately, with humiliating force, that one touch of war makes fools of all philosophers. Nevertheless, I believe that the war has turned the philosophic mind of America to a far deeper searching out of the fundamental grounds of human relationships and of the principles of organized human activity. Plato, you will remember, wrote his *Republic* after the heartbreaking tragedies of the Peloponnesian War. Is it too much to expect that out of the horrors of this world conflict another and a greater *Republic* will shape itself for the finer, more enduring guidance of men?

And so to sum it all up. American philosophy is far different from what it used to be. To my

own mind it is far greater. Chary of absolutes, suspicious of transcendental flights, tentative, experimental, it has set itself, with a kind of grim, rebellious determination, to coming to better grips with reality. It holds off old categories; it refuses old consolations. It takes its problem as immensely bigger, more complicated. It has no longer the old ready "yea" and "nay." It stumbles and falters with "perchance" and "if" and "it may be so." All of which means that philosophy no longer stalks proudly on the heights. It takes its way in low places; it goes stumbling through ditches; it gets down on its hands and knees through bramble and brush. It is a very sorry sight, is philosophy today! It is much more like a ragged, earth-wandering tramp than, as of old, a king in royal purple. And yet somehow, on the whole—well some of us who are philosophers like it much more in these days when it is stained with the mudstains of the common road.

And perhaps, after all, in its mudstained days, it may be worth far more to America. Fellow, again, with the common man, it faces his immediate problems; it wrestles with his perplexities; with him, it fashions its world out of the stuff of the everyday things. And this is to say that today it is far more deeply and vitally democratic than it ever has been before.

What the American philosophy of the future is to be is still in the lap of the gods. I believe that we shall witness the growth of a new type of philosophic idealism, a type of idealism that, sloughing off both the absoluteness and the subjectivity of the older theories, will nevertheless attempt what they attempted, namely, to base life broadly and fundamentally upon the splendid human values. To that great work of the future, to that great task for our American Commonwealth, the philosophy of today is called.

## XII

### Ideals in Literature



## XII

### IDEALS IN LITERATURE

By Robert Morss Lovett, *Professor of English, University of Chicago; Editor of The Dial*

THE subject stated, the ideals of literature in the present day, may seem to some a contradiction in terms, for at the outset of the consideration we are confronted by the fact that literature as an art of expression has, in large measure, lost its ideals. No longer do writers form a caste apart, an institution devoted to competition in the production of masterpieces, seeking like Milton "to leave something so written to aftertimes as they should not willingly let it die." On the contrary, in these days of popular education, everyone writes, or threatens to do so, and measures his success not in length of time, but in width of space, not by a fit audience though few, extending in a thin line down the centuries, but by the unfit and vast assembly of readers scattered over the whole world who for a week or a year may be held by the potent charm of a "best seller." No longer does the literary audience consist of a group of connoisseurs like the apprecia-

tors of music or painting, instructed by criticism to make formal comparisons and praise the best. On the contrary, everybody reads, and supplying reading matter to an immense and voracious public has become a business like supplying it with clothes and food. And finally, since the public has become the dominant force in literary production, literature itself has changed in deference to its tastes and interests. This public is uneducated in appreciation of the art of expression; it is primarily interested in the thought expressed. Thus no longer do we find writers devoted primarily to form, seeking subject matter that will serve as material for epic, tragedy, or sonnet sequence. On the contrary, the writer expends his ingenuity and imagination in finding what material will take the public by its novelty or significance, and adopting a form which will serve most directly and powerfully to convey this material to its destination.

These differences between its position in the past and in the present are not peculiar to literature. The same phenomena are to be observed in the history of painting and music, but undoubtedly in the case of literature they are more striking and fundamental. They are the result of democracy, felt more strongly in literature because literature is the most democratic of all the fine arts. Unlike music, painting, and sculpture,



it is not defended from popular practise by a complicated special technique or the necessity of expensive materials and tools. It is therefore not necessarily a profession but may be a matter of casual pursuit. That stanch social democrat, William Morris, upheld this view of literature as an occasional or by-product: "Unless a man can write an epic while he is weaving a tapestry he is no good at all." And not only does this absence of exacting technique render literature the most easily practised of the fine arts; it gives it also the most immediate and general appeal to the world of mankind.

Thus literature is exposed to two dangers, the practise of its art by the unlearned and the determination of its quality by the masses. These dangers are not, it is true, entirely modern. In the past there were those who made writing a means of direct popular appeal; but they were in a measure held in check by criticism, whose function it was to defend literature, especially poetry, from practise by the unfit and subjection to popular taste. But at the present time the aristocratic standards of criticism are of little avail. Whatever our differences as to what literature is, we are agreed that books that are not published and read are not literature. Those who believe that the only standards of literature are aristocratic, in the old sense of dependence on

the past for sanction, will declare therefore that our title is a contradiction in terms, and the ideals of literature, along with literature itself, have ceased to exist. But even if the pretentious terms "ideals" and "literature" must be renounced in the face of such challenge, it may still be worth while to inquire into the tendencies and value of public writing in a democracy.

As I have said, the so-called degradation of literature, and the loss of its ideals, are due to the democratic demand that it shall serve the uses, not of the few, but of the many. Now the chief uses which the many have found for literature are two, corresponding to the two passions of democracy, education and entertainment. And in both departments it must be admitted that the demands of democracy are still in the elementary stage. What is wanted in education is a rough general knowledge of the world in which we live, with answers to questions in the field in which, for the moment or century, we are particularly interested, and some data by which to direct our own course toward what we euphemistically call success in life. That field of interest at present is represented by science, including sociology; and our principle of success is, as it has been since the Renaissance, efficiency. Accordingly we find literature both in subject matter and form, reflecting these influences. For entertainment, the

mass of men are dependent on appeal to the senses and the emotions, but there is one form of intellectual enjoyment which is widespread—the satisfaction of curiosity, that emotion of the mind which is stirred by novelty. We find therefore that the questions which the multitude of readers ask in regard to the subject matter of any writing are, Is it true? Is it important? Is it new? at least in point of view or suggestion. Now our standards of truth, as determined by science, and of importance, as marked by efficiency for the purposes of life, find exemplification in the great mass of material drawn from the lives of human beings everywhere, selected and presented with a view to emphasizing reality and importance, which we call realistic. And the demand of interest is best served by that instinct for the novel, and particularly the timely, which is of the nature of journalism. A term then which covers both the substance and the technique of a large part of present-day writing is journalistic realism.

I am aware that the word journalism will seem to many a term of reproach, that in fact it is used freely to designate the very antithesis of literature. It is clear, however, that the attempt to possess the whole public for the moment, rather than a minute fraction of it for centuries, is the controlling impulse of the writer of today. It is so in response to the demand of the public that

what is produced shall be immediately useful, a demand which it enforces by magnificent rewards. Nor is it certain that such a stimulus is less productive of vital work than what Mr. Leo Stein has happily called "the obsession of eternity." How much of the art, literary and plastic, which has come down to us from the past was produced in response to the immediate demand of the age which it adorned! In adoring our classics, we are in large part paying homage to the journalism of the Ages of Pericles, of Augustus, of Elizabeth, or of Louis XIV. It will be said, and truly, that the journalism of these ages was more refined than ours because the reading public was always the select few, not the whole mass; but this is but to bring us back to the cardinal distinction between literature in an aristocracy and that in a democracy. We need not hope that our art will bind future ages in chains of tradition and precedent, in order to believe in that art as valid and vital for ourselves. Those ages may be the better for their freedom. "Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof" may have a wider application than the merely ethical. At all events, journalism, the thing, involving an immediate appeal to the interests and a satisfaction of the needs of the moment, is the very vital essence of present-day writing.

The principles of public criticism noted above,

reality, importance, and interest, are obviously to be applied primarily to subject matter rather than to form, and indeed it is to material that the realistic common mind of democracy first addresses itself. "What does it mean?" not, "How is it expressed?" is the question of which the answer decides, in the first instance, the acceptance or rejection of the work. Indeed, the annals of recent criticism are full of instances of astounding success won in despite of every canon of form and style. Yet such examples tend to prove, not that form and style are dead, past, and useless, but only that the canons which defined them are so—that in fact the structural forms of literature in the large, and the devices of style in detail, are only infinitely more vital, capable of vastly more adaptation and variation than we thought. To say that modern writing subordinates form to subject matter is merely to say that it has restored the original relation between the two. The primitive forms of literature, the ballad, the epic, the lyric, the drama, the sermon, the tale were not there until the need of expressing certain thoughts called them into being. True, during the centuries when the control of literature, as of society, was aristocratic, they achieved an authority comparable to that of the social distinctions of feudalism. Criticism defined them minutely, and fixed the type of material appro-

priate to each. So late as the middle of the last century we find the youthful Matthew Arnold gravely considering the limitations which the concept of great poetry put upon subject matter, deciding that such matter could be found only in the past—and, it may be added, turning to journalism as the medium of social criticism of his own world.

At present, the concepts poetry, drama, novel, exercise no such authority. The sincere writer finds the form which affords the greatest opportunity of expression and reenforcement of his theme and treats it with that end in view. If he chooses the drama, he will care nothing about the unities or the concept of the well-made play. He will, however, be alert to take advantage of the unique opportunities of the stage as a means of giving power and emotional appeal to his theme. As an elementary fact, for example, he will recognize that he is working in a medium of three dimensions, not, as the narrative writer, in one. It is true, his public may know nothing of these considerations in the abstract, and further may be accustomed to seeing the stage

Defamed by every charlatan,  
And soil'd with all ignoble use.

Yet if the use of the stage by the author really gives to an important theme an emphasis which

it could have in no other form, the public must be conquered. The so-called renaissance of the drama is due to the discovery by Ibsen and his successors that the stage is not limited by its technique to a certain kind of subject matter, but may deal effectively with the important and immediate realities of modern existence.

What we may almost call the renaissance of poetry is due to the same discovery, not merely through the repudiation of so much of the conventional technique of poetry by the professors of "free verse," but also through the amplification and ease of control of that technique attained by such poets as John Davidson and John Masefield, and through its enlargement by such as Francis Thompson and William Vaughn Moody. These men are genuinely modern in their recognition of the proper relation of substance and form.

The novel, owing to its hybrid origin and bourgeois history, has never suffered from the obsession of sacrosanctity. Fortunately no one has ever known exactly what a novel is. Yet certain technical principles of plot-establishment, background-development and character-drawing have been held to constitute a technique of the novel. Characteristic of the modern attitude is Mr. Wells, in his transition from *Ann Veronica* to *Mr. Britling Sees It Through*, proclaiming

Laurence Sterne the greatest of English novelists because he most insolently flouted the technique of the novel. *Mr. Britling* is an example of the prose narrative, which most readers do not distinguish from the novel, but which by its disregard of novelistic conventions approaches infinitely closer to life, and lays emphasis with infinitely more exactness upon its overwhelming and tragic facts. Naturally the Great War has given birth to many such works, narratives of a reality so stark and terrible that the reenforcement of fiction, as in the great war novels of the past—*War and Peace*, and *La Débâcle*—would be an impertinence. *Le Feu* and *The Backwash of War* may be taken as examples. But even before the war such books were recognized as among the most powerful examples of modern realism, e. g., *No. 5 John Street*, *The Ragged-Trousered Philanthropists*, *Children of the Dead End*. It may in general be declared that the vitality of a form of literature in the present day consists in its flexibility and freedom of adaptation to the infinitely various needs and uses of life.

So far I have spoken of contemporary literature in two aspects, subject matter and structural form. There is another aspect which will seem to the apologists for what they call in proud humility "mere literature," of at least equal importance—that is, those devices of expression in detail, pecu-



liar to the individual, which are known as style. Now the same principles which I have mentioned before, reality, importance, and interest, apply to style as to material and form. That style which serves best to reveal the subject as it really is, and with true emphasis upon its value to life, is unquestionably that which is most efficient for modern purposes. But the third principle of interest is clearly of great application in this field, as a reenforcement to the other two. By the personal reaction of the writer, which is the essence of style, the subject matter, even though remote and difficult, may be made immediate and insistent to others as it is to himself, the old may be freshened and given the appeal of the new. By the arousing and vivifying power of style, literature is enabled to do its work of education. And it is also clear that in imparting interest to a theme, the principle of timeliness in style is of great moment. To speak the language of living men has been the aim of modern writers from the time of Wordsworth's *Lyrical Ballads*—an aim haltingly and confusedly pursued with many disgusted reactions, but becoming clearer in the present day, as the true sources and the great need of power through intellectual leadership in democracy are more clearly discerned. By this journalism in style, it is needless to say that I do not mean writing like newspaper reporters. I may

point out, however, that the secrets of power of the written word, the power of vivid portrayal through detail, of passionate utterance, of the convincing logic of events, of clarifying explanation, and of winning persuasion, are to be learned not in the old schools of pulpit, bar, and assembly, nor in the academic classroom, with its traditions of aristocratic formalism, but in the modern school afforded by the daily newspaper and the weekly and monthly magazine. The public is the best teacher; it is a pity that those who attend its school as pensioners often learn so badly.

I have hitherto spoken of literature in a democracy as one of the useful arts, with functions primarily of education and entertainment, and it would be useless to deny that such it has, by force of events, become. Our culture is literary. In the attempt to diffuse culture widely among men, literature must inevitably sacrifice its high places to the plain. Suppose our culture were musical instead of literary, would not music suffer the same vulgarization? But there are some who insist that true literature is a fine art, that it has nothing to do with useful education and trivial entertainment, that its function is to afford a medium for the creation of true beauty, that so far as it does not this it is not literature at all but what Hamlet was reading—words, words, words. I have made it clear, I think, that I do

not share this view if by it is implied that in literature the artist may profitably put before himself an ideal of pure beauty, and aspire toward it consciously by the means which it offers. Those means are now too much the common possession of man, too much a social product, to give him that exclusive sense of control which is necessary to the pure artist who lives in his own dream of the world. But I should be far from denying that literature is still a fine art, and that in its production of beautiful things it realizes its highest function toward men, to train them in appreciation of beauty and to afford them pleasure by its contemplation. As in all education so in the artistic, as in all entertainment preeminently so in aesthetic, is literature best fitted to serve modern men. Only I deny that the artist can render this service by devotion to an aristocratic formula of his ancestors, or of his social equals, or of his own. Indeed it may be questioned whether literature as a fine art was not always, except in cases of sheer imitation, the unsought result of an unfathomable combination of the Maker's soul with that of his fellow-men—only whereas in the past it was only the souls of the few who counted, today it is the soul of democracy. It may be questioned whether the other so-called fine arts have not had the same history, and will not submit to the same future. But at all events at the

present moment literature is most like architecture, a fine art imposed upon a useful one. The common possessions and the practical needs of men determine the material and the structural plan—to the artist belong the problems of selecting the material in detail and of working out the structure with a design of beauty, and it may be of giving it fitting decoration. Because he works under the limitations of his human service, is he less an artist? His aesthetic is new and constantly changing, as the life about him changes.

Naturalism, impressionism, symbolism, imagism, mysticism, come and go—"a dust of systems and of creeds." It is hard to predict which devices among so many will survive the day which called them forth. Only this is certain, the true aesthetic cannot be imposed from without by individual caprice or vision, nor can it be recovered from the past by study. The laws of beauty were not given along with the Ten Commandments. The true aesthetic is the result of human need, human aspiration, human agony. It cannot be complete unless it takes account of the human experience of the entire race, in which today for the first time in the world's story the soul of man is tragically one.

# XIII

## Human Progress



### XIII

## HUMAN PROGRESS

By Allen B. Pond, *President City Club of Chicago, 1914-16*

**D**URING the first century of our national life, in spite of sundry political and financial crises and in spite of the severe strain of the Civil War, the predominant mood of the average American was one of unquestioning optimism. Mankind was making progress; civil liberty and political liberty were being established; economic liberty was taken for granted. The direct guidance of a divine Providence was writ large on the pages of history; by the grace of this Providence, America was leading the way, and in the fullness of time all nations would follow her example. It was seldom that this American submitted his faith in human progress to the ordeal of a rigorous cross-examination; he seldom attempted to define with exactitude just what he meant by human progress; he contented himself with vague phrases. Of course there would be problems, but they would arise only in connection with matters of detail. Man's capacity for progress and the

certainty of his progress were not to be questioned.

The past generation has witnessed a marked change in the American mood; it is no longer predominantly unquestioning, no longer uncritical, no longer content to lull itself with vague phrases. America, after the first rapturous ravishment of its virgin soil, has discovered that the measurable filling up of its domain, and the consequent curtailing of unlimited opportunity for the untrained, have restaged in the New World many of the perplexities and evils that have so bitterly harassed the Old World. We are no longer sure that we are the pets of Providence, destined to travel by a flower-strewn path to the *ultima Thule* of human desires. We have begun to admit to ourselves that we are part and parcel of mankind; that we are not and never can be a nation aloof; that, thanks to the invention and widespread utilization of space-conquering means of intercommunication, our ultimate fate and our daily life are inextricably involved with that of other nations.

Then, too, we are beginning to realize that the warp and woof of human institutions and social organization are so intricate that any considerable change in one phase may involve quite incalculable results, and that what bade fair to bring an unqualified gain may bring in its wake a loss that is



fairly staggering in its apparent implication. To illustrate by a single example: (Requisite brevity compels me to sweeping generalizations that were otherwise unpardonable.) Let us call the period from the beginning of the eleventh century to the end of the fifteenth century the Gothic period, and let us roughly contrast it in some of its aspects with the modern period dating from the flowering out of the modern industrial system. The panorama of the Gothic period discloses to us a welter of life—brawling princes, warring cities, chronic lawlessness, venturesome commerce, dense popular ignorance, crude superstition, keen though footless scholasticism, a searching though bottomless dialectic, tumultuous emotion, ribald coarseness, a vigorous industrial life wherever and whenever lawlessness was but slightly abated; a craftsmanship wherein the workman was himself a creator and wherein therefore his mind was wedded to his labor and as a result of which living was joy in spite of discomfort and even in the face of disease or violent death; poetry growing out of the popular life and vivid with the vividness of experience that smacked of the market place and not of the study; a worthwhileness in the artizan's life that squarely contradicted the ruling theology which proclaimed life in this world to be despicable and a painful stepping stone to heaven—a period, in short, in which,

in the teeth of lawlessness and theological pessimism, the craftsman's work was joy, and life was a dish well seasoned by zest.

And the modern period! What of it? Comparative orderliness; lawlessness banished or cloaked under the mask of law; wide ranging commerce; superstition being gradually replaced by the comforting assurance that, if there be any malign powers, they all live "at the back of the beyond" and that means of intercommunication are lacking; theology relegated to a less dominating position and become optimistic in tone; the emphasis on life and its implicit purpose shifted from a future world to this world; a more inclusive altruism in constant evidence; the ravages of disease being successfully opposed; steam and electrical energy harnessed and the factory system in full swing; manufacture with its individual creative zest supplanted by mechanifecture and the individual workman become a cog in the machine; trade, commerce, transportation all being recast in a similar cramping mold; the ratio of employees to employers vastly multiplied; the workman busied with a fraction of a part of a process and largely stripped of initiative and of the zest that inheres in creative work; in spite of the deep spiritual experience that his problems are now bringing to the worker, labor divorced from joy, because humdrum and routine have re-

placed thought and interest; life no longer finding widespread, spontaneous, and joyous daily self-expression in terms of beauty; poetry largely banished from the market place and from the scenes of men's work and play and become a cult for the cloistered and the erudite; the modern industrial system put on its trial on charge of having stripped the workmen's work of its joy and compelled him to seek solely in his leisure for the satisfactions and the zest of life.

Here is a case of a staggering loss springing from a seeming advance. The mechanization of industry is a magnificent achievement of the human mind; but we are concerned with ultimate consequences, and every passing decade makes more clear the need for devising some counterbalancing adjustment or reorganization to fit this great achievement to social ends. Has man, the inventor, like Frankenstein, created a machine to dominate him? Or will man, the social being, contrive some means of dominating the machine? If he does not, many will argue that human life has sustained a loss so severe that the mechanization of industry—brilliant and spectacular though the achievement be—marks a retrogression and not an advance. Until a way out shall have been found, the problem thus roughly stated must be ranked as a vital problem, not one of mere detail.

America also dreamed that, having done away with political inequality, she had likewise shut the door on class. But the mechanization of industry, aided, perhaps, by other forces, has created the so-called capitalistic system and has let class antagonism in at the back door, while we have been placarding the front door with "No Admission" signs.

And so America, confronted by these and other social problems that cannot be blinked, has come to look at life and its unfoldings with a sober mind. And now comes the *débâcle* of the European war. Mexico we had, after a fashion, explained to the satisfaction of our political philosophy, a people sunk in deep ignorance, autocratically misgoverned for years, unaccustomed to the use of liberty, the very word liberty carrying not an appeal to self-control but an exhortation to unbridled license. What more probable than that, the grip of the strong hand once loosened, chaos would reign?

But Europe! What of Europe? From the outset it was certain that the war would provide a stage, as all wars everywhere have done, for the display of devotion, unto death, to obligations that are the accepted result of status and not conceived in thoughtful self-determination, for the display of consecrated loyalty to ideals whether sound or unsound; that it would provide

a stage, as all wars between civilized peoples have done, for the display of individual heroism and magnanimity, of individual tenderness to the weak. But the war has thrown up in sharp relief quite other considerations than these. We note the reannunciation of the monstrous doctrine of hegemony, the right of the large state to absorb or to dictate to the small state whose sole offense is its helplessness. We note the affirmation, in America as well as in Europe, that the virility of states and of peoples is dependent on the cultivation of the warlike spirit and that wholesale slaughter of human beings, when practised under the name of war, is a stimulus to the energy and a tonic to the soul essential to the highest human progress. We note the painstaking forethought and the cold calculation with which, in a nation that boasts its superiority to all other nations, deeds of ruthless brutality are planned and executed. Solemn pledges, not given under duress, have the binding force of vagrant breezes. We stand aghast. The civilization that we have so boastfully acclaimed seems tumbling about our heads like a house of cards.

Let us turn aside for the moment from the spectacular and the tragic aspects of this absorbing drama of human life. Let us in all soberness ask ourselves: What, then, underneath and behind it all, are the standards by which we of

today are to measure the human achievement? Is the race really advancing? We talk casually of civilization, of culture. Of what do they consist? And are they one and the same thing? We talk of human destiny. Have we a part in determining that destiny or are we the helpless creatures of a shifting environment over which we have no control? What do we mean by human progress? In these days that so distress and disconcert us, it is preeminently fitting that we pull ourselves together and anew submit to the crucible of thought our estimate of the human achievement, the validity of our ideals for humanity and of our notions as to what constitutes human progress.

The scientists are practically agreed that, in the slow processes of time, organic life has responded to a changing environment, has taken on more and more complex forms, and that in the course of this evolutionary process man has been evolved. Many scientists and not a few social philosophers find in this evolution no evidence whatever of intelligent purpose. Even so, it does not inevitably follow that it is impossible for some creature of this evolutionary process to acquire free agency within certain limits and in accordance with the rules of the game. I am not going to undertake to settle here and now the problem of "free will." But I am going to assert that we

all act every day as though we believed ourselves possessed of a degree of free agency.

Very well then, suppose we grant the claim for human origins in the interplay of blind, unthinking forces. The fact remains that, in the stress of social contact, the human race has evolved fairly well-differentiated modes of thought and action which we name "noble," "ethical," "altruistic," and the like; that it has evolved a sense of social obligation. Is there no way by which, through human forethought and initiative, we can more certainly ensure in the relations of men the supremacy of what we recognize as social obligation, as ethical conduct? If not, our chance of furthering human progress is slight, even though we may think we see the path it ought to follow.

Students of psychology believe nowadays that the character of a child is markedly influenced by its surroundings and experiences, its contacts and reactions, and that we can, accordingly, bring a modifying influence to bear on a child's character by controlling its environment. We have, in the Liverpool rehousing experiments, indisputable examples of modifying to a remarkable degree the conduct of large groups of people by a sweeping change in environment. What is to prevent us from materially modifying, on a larger scale, the racial environment by reshaping our human institutions and social organization to ensure move-



ment toward a definite preconceived result, i. e., human progress in consonance with the highest ideals the race has yet reached?

And this line of human progress which is to be to us a sunpath leading to a happier dawn! Where is it to be found?

Is it to be sought in otherworldliness — the anchorite's despair of conquering this world and his attempt to conquer himself *in vacuo*? Or is it to be sought in vivid participation in life? Is it to be sought in a further uncovering of nature's secrets and in a still further bending of natural law to serve the needs of man? And if in a further conquest of nature, in what way shall we ensure that that conquest shall meet man's highest need? Shall the test be ample creature comfort and material prosperity for each and all? Or shall the test be opportunity for mental and spiritual attainment by each up to the limit of his capacity? Shall the end sought be the *state*, conceived as an entity, for the sake of which the individual shall exist and in whose greatness he finds his complete satisfaction — no matter how subordinate his lot, how circumscribed his scope of action, or how cramped and limited his field of thought? Or shall it be sought in the upbuilding of a social order which uses its every function and bends its every energy toward giving each citizen a chance to be well-born and then to develop to the highest degree of



which he is capable? Or is there some more fundamental synthesis which includes more than one of these alternatives?

The anchorite's solution needs but to be stated to be cast aside. That door at least opens on no pathway to progress, for over it is written "Abandon Hope." Whatever disaster may await him who chooses a vivid participation in life, any disaster is better than the self-imposed futility of meditation divorced from reality. For the end of life is not contemplation, but rather an indissoluble union of thought and act.

Any solution to be accounted worthy of a race of manly men must involve coming to grips with circumstances and wrestling with environing conditions to the end that man may bend environment to his uses and may thereby live more abundantly. This measurable subjection of environment to man involves an ever-widening comprehension of the forces of nature and the progressive mastery of those forces for the service of man. To be sure, only the few will "follow knowledge like a sinking star, beyond the utmost bounds of human thought;" but these few will be pioneers not supermen, will blaze a trail for millions and will not rest content in an achievement for themselves—their "care no more to reckon of might or right." The world is having a bitter lesson, which points only too clearly the

moral that something more is needed than the conquest of nature by the few and a consequent utilization of the acquired knowledge and power for the benefit of a caste at the expense of a nation of efficient and subservient workers. Once again, we find that the privileged few cannot, in the long run, be trusted to be regardful of the highest interests of the many and that science and its application to the processes of life offer no guarantee that, when they become the possession and the instruments of the few, those who possess and employ them, if only they may be allowed to sit "on the hills like gods together," will not be content to

. . . . smile in secret, looking over wasted lands,  
Blight and famine, plague and earthquake, roaring deeps  
and fiery sands,  
Clanging fights, and flaming towns, and sinking ships, and  
praying hands.

And, *per contra*, this means that human progress, in any fundamental view, must involve an increasing conquest and utilization of the forces of nature and, at the same time, a continuous reshaping of the human environment, both material and social, such that there will ensue a nearer and yet nearer approach to reasonable assurance of material well-being, of sanity of body and mind, of opportunity for intellectual and spiritual expansion, to every child born into the world—bar-

ring accidents against which no human prevision can avail. In this view the state considered as an entity, existing of and for itself and commanding the strict obedience of the citizen—while the state itself knows no obligation and owes no allegiance to its citizens or to other states or even to Truth itself—becomes an impossible conception, because the very essence of such a conception inevitably carries with it the idea of “privilege” peculiar to those who manipulate the mechanism of the state. And all history shows that the path of “privilege” lies athwart the path of human progress, unless the word “human” be wrested from its true sense and be made to connote an oligarchy or a caste. Are we not driven then to the conclusion that human progress is to be sought in the upbuilding of a social order which shall exist, not in and for itself, but because only through a social order can we hope to secure an opportunity for each individual to be well-born and to develop in body, mind, and spirit to the highest degree of which he is capable—a social order to which every citizen recognizes his obligation not for the sake of the order as such, in any passing phase of form, but because only through a social order, one which has not finally crystallized, can humanity hope to approach its ideal perfection? In the functioning of men in such a social order, the conquest of knowledge, the

measurable subjection of natural laws to human will, the molding of environment, the achievement of sound health as something to be taken for granted and of creature comfort and economic independence for every citizen, will be seen to require *pari passu* an expanding consciousness of social obligation, a deepening, not a relaxing, sense of ethical values, a more and more widely spread ability on the part of individuals to "see life steadily and see it whole," and, so seeing, to hold as a vivid working creed the deep conviction that

All are needed by each one;  
Nothing is fair or good alone.

I do not minimize the bewildering complex of human life and the puzzling intricacy of its unfoldings in history; I do not shut my eyes to the tragedy of it; but I submit that, in the long, slow, painful years that have witnessed its unfolding, the splendor of the achievement far outweighs the tragedy. And I further submit that a sane, clear, wide-ranging view does indeed show that progress toward the ideal that I have set forth is written on man's history. If we keep this ideal and this faith clearly before our minds, shall we not bear with some measure of equanimity the buffeting of trying times, distant as the goal may be?















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